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Abstract
In the first paper of my dissertation I document that industries with low offshoring
potential have 7.31% higher stock returns per year compared to industries with high off-
shoring potential, suggesting that the possibility to offshore affects industry risk. This
risk premium is concentrated in manufacturing industries that are exposed to foreign
import competition. Put differently, the option to offshore effectively serves as insurance
against import competition. A two-country general equilibrium dynamic trade model in
which firms have the option to offshore rationalizes the return patterns uncovered in the
data: industries with low offshoring potential carry a risk premium that is increasing in
foreign import penetration. Within the model, the offshoring channel is economically
important and lowers industry risk up to one-third. I find that an increase in trade bar-
riers is associated with a drop in asset prices of model firms. The model thus suggests
that the loss in benefits from offshoring outweighs the benefits from lower import com-
petition. Importantly, the model prediction that offshorability is negatively correlated
with profit volatility is strongly supported by the data.
In the second paper (co-authored with Andrea Tamoni and Alex Hsu) we study the
impact of fiscal policy shocks on bond risk premia. Government spending level shocks
generate positive covariance between marginal utility and inflation (term structure level
effect) making nominal bonds a poor hedge against consumption risk leading to positive
inflation risk premia. Volatility shocks to spending have strong slope effect (steepening)
on the yield curve, producing positive nominal term premia. For level and volatility
shocks to capital income tax, term structure level effects dominate, delivering negative
risk premia. Fluctuations in term premia are entirely driven by volatility shocks. Lastly,
fiscal shocks are amplified at the zero lower bound.
The third paper (co-authored with Andrea Tamoni and Alex Hsu) discusses how risk
aversion (RA) affects the macroeconomic response to uncertainty shocks. In the data,
heightened level of RA during the 2008 crisis amplified the decline of output and invest-
ment by roughly 21% and 16%, respectively, at the trough of the recession. The degree of
RA determines the impact of second moment shocks in DSGE models featuring stochas-
tic volatility. Ceteris paribus, higher RA leads to stronger responses of macroeconomic
variables to uncertainty shocks, making un certainty shocks as economically significant
as level shocks. Conversely, elevated RA can amplify or dampen responses to level shocks
depending on whether RA exaggerates or attenuates consumption growth expectations.
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Chapter 1
From Local to Global: Offshoring
and Asset Prices
Lorenzo Bretscher1
1.1 Introduction
“The typical ‘Made in’ labels in manufactured goods have become archaic
symbols of an old era. These days, most goods are ‘Made in the World’.”
Antras (2015)
Over the recent decades, the world economy has seen a gradual dispersion of the pro-
duction process across borders. Firms increasingly organize their production on a global
scale and choose to offshore parts, components, or services to producers in foreign coun-
tries. The revolution in information and communication technology (ICT) and the dis-
mantling of trade barriers allow firms to engage in global production networks, or global
sourcing strategies, in order to cut costs.2 For this reason, the choice of production
1I would like to thank Veronica Rappoport, Andrea Vedolin, Ulf Axelson, Oliver Boguth (discussant),
Harris Dellas, Boyan Jovanovic, Ian Martin, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Christopher Polk, Andreas Rapp
(discussant), Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi, Andrea Tamoni, Branko Urosevic, Philip Valta, Alexandre Ziegler
(discussant) and, especially, Christian Julliard and Lukas Schmid as well as the seminar participants at
LSE, the University of Bern, the University of Warwick, Oxford University, Nova School of Business &
Economics, CEMFI, INSEAD, HEC Paris, Boston College, Carnegie Mellon University, the University
of Chicago, Imperial College, London Business School, the Swiss Economists Abroad Conference, the
Belgrade Young Economist Conference, the Doctoral Tutorial of the European Finance Association and
the HEC Paris Finance PhD Workshop for valuable comments. I also thank J. Bradford Jensen for
sharing his data on industry tradability. All remaining errors are my own.
2In addition to the ICT revolution and lower trade barriers, political developments have led to an
increase in the fraction of world population that actively participates in the process of globalization
(Antras (2015)).
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location is a potentially valuable decision tool at the firm level. However, firms/indus-
tries differ in their ability to engage in offshoring due to the nature of their products
and tasks involved in the production process. In short, in the era of globalization, the
possibility to take a business from local to global has heterogenous implications for the
cross-section of industries.
In this paper, I exploit cross-sectional heterogeneity in the ability to offshore to study
how the possibility to relocate the production process affects industries’ cost of capital.
In particular, I focus on industries’ ability to offshore the employed labor force and
examine whether this is reflected in the cross-section of returns.3 To this end, I construct
a measure of labor offshorability at the industry level. The measure is calculated in two
steps. In the first step, using data from the O*NET program of the U.S. Department
of Labor, I calculate an offshorability score at the occupation level, as in Acemoglu
and Autor (2011).4 In the second step, I aggregate occupation offshorability scores by
industry, weighting them by the product of employment and the wage bill associated
with each occupation. The resulting data set covers an average of 331 industries per
year during the period 1990 to 2016.5
I sort industries in five offshorability quintiles and find that the strategy that is long
the low and short the high offshorability quintile portfolios, L-H, yields average annual
excess returns of 7.31 percent and a Sharpe ratio of 0.48. This premium is not spanned
by well-known risk factors such as Fama and French (2015) and Carhart (1997). Even
after controlling for the five factors of Fama and French (2015), L-H generates positive
average annual excess returns of 4.18 percent.
Furthermore, I split the sample into manufacturing and service industries. In univari-
ate sorts, the L-H excess return spread in manufacturing is two to three times larger
in magnitude compared to services. Moreover, for service industries, the premium is
explained by the CAPM and a positive loading on the market. For manufacturing in-
dustries, on the other hand, common linear factor models fail to explain the returns
generated by L-H. Consistent with this, in annual panel regressions at the firm level, I
find that lagged industry offshorability significantly predicts annual excess returns for
manufacturing but not for service industries. The results for manufacturing firms are
3In a related paper, Donangelo (2014) shows that industries that employ many workers with trans-
ferable skills are more exposed to aggregate shocks.
4A strand of literature in labor economics studies offshoring of tasks at the occupation level. See, for
example, Jensen and Kletzer (2010), Goos and Manning (2007), Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2010),
Acemoglu and Autor (2011), and Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2013).
5Industries are defined at the three-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) from 1990 to 2001
and at the four-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) level thereafter.
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economically meaningful: a one standard deviation increase in offshorability is asso-
ciated with 4% to 5% lower annual excess stock returns. These results are robust to
controlling for firm characteristics known to predict excess returns.
A first-order question is what drives the heterogeneity between manufacturing and ser-
vices. A potential explanation is based on the degree of foreign import competition.
While manufacturing industries have seen a sharp increase in foreign competition, mainly
from low-wage countries, this is not the case for service industries.6 I relate my results
to foreign import competition in manufacturing industries using conditional double sorts
of excess returns on proxies of import competition and offshorability. I find that the L-H
premium is monotonically increasing in import competition.7 The results are robust to
different proxies of import competition: First, I use a direct measure of import pene-
tration from low-wage countries defined as the imports from low-wage countries divided
by the sum of domestic production and net exports in a given industry (see Bernard,
Jensen, and Schott (2006a)). Second, I use industry-specific shipping costs as a proxy
for barriers to trade.8 These results are consistent with the U.S. having a comparative
advantage in providing services but not in manufacturing (see also Jensen (2011)).9
In a related paper, Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017) focus on manufacturing
industries and document that industries more exposed to foreign competition have higher
excess returns. While their work establishes that import competition poses risks for an
industry, my findings document that offshoring allows industries to hedge these risks.
Intuitively, being able to offshore allows firms to fight import competition from low-
wage countries by reducing costs through relocating production. Consistent with this
argument, a recent paper by Magyari (2017) shows that offshoring enables U.S. firms to
reduce costs and outperform peers that cannot offshore.
To further improve understanding of the mechanism, I embed the option to offshore in
a two-country general equilibrium dynamic trade model similar to Ghironi and Melitz
(2005) and Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017) with multiple industries and ag-
gregate risk. I will refer to the two countries as East and West. My model departs
from previous work by allowing firms to offshore part of the production, as in Antras
6This can be seen from U.S. trade balances. While the trade balance in goods is negative and has
decreased sharply over the last 25 years, the trade balance for services is positive and has been stable
over time.
7In line with this, many recent empirical studies, such as Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013, 2016) and
Pierce and Schott (2016), stress the importance of imports from low-wage countries for understanding
the dynamics in U.S. manufacturing industries.
8Shipping costs are calculated as the markup of the Cost-Insurance-Freight value over the Free-on-
Board value, as in Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006b).
9The principle of comparative advantage was first elaborated by Ricardo (1821) and formalized by
Heckscher (1919) and Ohlin (1933). They argue that countries have a comparative advantage in activities
that are intensive in the use of factors that are relatively abundant in the country.
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and Helpman (2004). Moreover, I assume that the East has a comparative cost advan-
tage over the West in performing offshorable labor tasks. As a result, offshoring to the
East allows Western firms to reduce production costs and diversify aggregate risks. In
addition, firms in both countries can export and sell their products abroad.
The model successfully matches industry- and trade-related moments and generates
return patterns qualitatively, in line with the data. First, it generates a return spread
between low and high offshorability industries. Second, the spread is increasing in the
degree of import penetration. Third, excess returns of multinational companies are
higher than for domestic firms. Fourth, industry excess returns are increasing in import
penetration.
Asset price movements in the model are governed by shocks to aggregate productivity
in each of the two countries. The responses of equilibrium quantities to the two ag-
gregate productivity shocks are related because quantities react to changes in the ratio
of aggregate productivity of the two countries: upon arrival of a positive (negative)
productivity shock in the East (West), more Eastern firms find it profitable to export,
which results in an increase in import penetration and competition in the West. As a
result, Western firms experience losses in market share and lower profits. At the same
time, offshoring allows Western firms to reduce production costs, which renders them
more competitive towards new market entrants. Consequently, industries with a higher
offshoring potential have smoother profits and dividends. Put differently, high (low)
offshorability industries are less (more) exposed to aggregate productivity shocks in the
model. This difference in exposure to aggregate risk results in an L-H return spread in
industry excess returns, as observed in the data.
To further validate the model, I test three of its main predictions in the data. First,
the model predicts that profit volatility is decreasing in industry offshorability, which
is strongly supported by the data: a one standard deviation increase in industry off-
shorability is associated with an up to 19.7% lower profit volatility for the median firm.
Second, the model predicts that the offshorability premium is largest in industries with
more price-sensitive consumers. Conditional double sorts of monthly excess returns on
U.S. trade elasticities from Broda and Weinstein (2006) and offshorability confirm this
prediction in the data: the L-H spread is roughly double in magnitude for industries
with high compared to low U.S. trade elasticities. Finally, within the model, low (high)
offshorability industries have high (low) covariance with consumption. Consistent with
this, I find that the strategy that is long low and short high offshorability industries has
a positive and significant consumption beta in the data.
To quantify the importance of the offshorability channel in the model, I study industry
moments in absence of offshorable labor tasks. The counterfactual indicates that an
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industry with no offshorability exhibits substantially higher risk premia (up to 33% or
3.14 percentage points) and lower equity valuations (a reduction of up to 17%). Hence,
offshoring is an economically important channel in the model.
Finally, within the context of my model, I examine the consequences of a sudden in-
crease in trade costs on goods shipped from East to West. Alternatively, this could be
interpreted as a sudden increase in trade barriers for all goods imported by the West.
Intuitively, higher barriers to trade lead to a decrease in import penetration in the
model, which reduces industry risk. However, an increase in trade barriers also renders
offshoring less valuable, since shipment of intermediate goods becomes more costly. In-
terestingly, within the model, the loss in benefits from offshoring outweighs the positive
effects from lower import penetration. As a result, consumption and asset prices in the
West fall.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After the literature review, section 1.2
details the data and discusses the construction of the labor offshorability measure. In
section 1.3, I discuss the empirical findings. Section 1.4 presents a theoretical model
with a calibration. Finally, section 1.5 concludes.
Literature Review
This paper relates to four main strands of literature. First, the paper relates to the lit-
erature that studies the interaction between labor and asset prices. Danthine and Don-
aldson (2002) and Favilukis and Lin (2016) document that operating leverage induced
by rigid wages is a quantitatively important channel in matching financial moments in
general equilibrium models.10 More recently, a growing body of papers focus on differ-
ent forms of labor heterogeneity and the cross-section of stock returns.11 In particular,
Zhang (2016) finds a real option channel for firms that have the possibility to substitute
routine-task labor with machines. Moreover, Donangelo (2014) shows that industries
with mobile workers are more exposed to aggregate shocks, since mobile workers can
walk away for outside options in bad times, making it difficult for capital owners to shift
risk to workers. This paper contributes to the literature by studying a new dimension
of labor heterogeneity, i.e., whether or not a task can be offshored.
Second, this study relates to the literature on the effects of competition and international
trade for asset pricing. Among others Loualiche (2015), Corhay, Kung, and Schmid
10Gomes, Jermann, and Schmid (2017) investigate the rigidity of nominal debt, which creates long-
term leverage that works in a similar way to operating leverage induced by labor.
11See, among others, Gourio (2007), Ochoa (2013), Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), Belo, Lin, Li,
and Zhao (2015), Kuehn, Simutin, and Wang (2017), Donangelo, Gourio, Kehrig, and Palacios (2016)
and Tuzel and Zhang (2017)
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(2017) and Bustamante and Donangelo (2016) show that the risk of entry is priced in
the cross-section of expected returns. In a recent and closely related paper, Barrot,
Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017) focus on risks associated with import competition and
find that firms more exposed to import competition command a sizeable positive risk
premium. Furthermore, Fillat and Garetto (2015) document that multinational firms
exhibit higher excess returns than purely domestic firms. This is rationalized in a model
in which selling abroad is a source of risk exposure to firms: following a negative shock,
multinationals are reluctant to exit the foreign market because they would forgo the
sunk cost they paid to enter. While their model shows how firms’ revenues relate to risk
in multinationals, my paper focuses on the relation between firm risk and labor costs.
Third, a recent line of research studies the consequences of the surge in international
trade over the last decades at the establishment and firm level. Among others, Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson (2013) and Pierce and Schott (2016) show that U.S. manufacturing
establishments more exposed to growing imports from China in their output markets
exhibit a sharper decline in employment relative to the less exposed ones.12 Other stud-
ies use tariff cuts to instrument for import competition and find that it affects firms’
capital structure (Xu (2012) and Valta (2012)) and capital budgeting decisions (Bloom,
Draca, and Van Reenen (2015) and Fre´sard and Valta (2016)). My paper complements
this literature by studying asset pricing implications instead of firm quantities. I find
that offshoring allows firms to allocate resources more efficiently and lowers risks asso-
ciated with foreign import competition.13 Therefore, my paper also contributes to the
growing body of empirical trade literature that documents that manufacturing firms
have benefited from offshoring. Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang (2016), Chen
and Steinwender (2016) and Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2015) document that off-
shoring fosters firms’ productivity and innovation activity. Magyari (2017) shows that
offshoring enables U.S. firms to reduce their costs. She also finds that firms that are able
to offshore actually increase their total firm-level employment both in manufacturing and
headquarter service jobs.14
Fourth, this paper relates to the literature that examines the relationship between firm
and plant organization and performance. Empirically, Atalay, Hortac¸su, and Syverson
(2013) examine the domestic sourcing by U.S. plants, and Ramondo, Rappoport, and
Ruhl (2016) study foreign sourcing by U.S. multinational firms. These papers show that
firms and plants tend to source a large share of their material inputs from third-party
12See also Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2016), Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price (2016), Amiti,
Dai, Feenstra, and Romalis (2016).
13Related papers show that firms suffer less from import competition if they have larger cash holdings
(Fre´sard (2010)) or higher R&D expenses (Hombert and Matray (2017)).
14Compared to other related papers, Magyari (2017) focuses on employment at the firm level rather
than at the establishment level.
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suppliers. My paper documents how sourcing decisions affect asset prices. Theoret-
ically, Antras and Helpman (2004) formulate a model in which firms decide whether
to integrate the production of intermediate inputs or outsource them with incomplete
contracts. Both decision can either take place domestically or abroad. More recently,
Antras, Fort, and Tintelnot (2016) develop a quantifiable multi-country sourcing model
in which global sourcing decisions interact through the firm’s cost function, and Bernard,
Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2016) present a theoretical framework that allows firms to
decide simultaneously on the set of production locations, export markets, input sources,
products to export, and inputs to import. In contrast, my model focuses on the inter-
action of offshoring and industry risk. To do so, I incorporate the possibility to offshore
into a dynamic trade model with multiple industries, as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005),
Chaney (2008) and Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017).15
1.2 Data
In this section, I first outline the data and the method to construct a measure of labor
offshorability at the occupation level and the industry level. Second, I discuss the
financial and accounting as well as international trade data used in the empirical analysis.
1.2.1 Measuring Labor Offshorability
As a first step, I calculate a measure of offshorability at the occupation level. To do so, I
follow the recent literature in labor economics and use data from the U.S. Department of
Labor’s O*NET program on the task content of occupations.16, 17 This program classifies
occupations according to the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system and
has information on 772 different occupations.18 O*NET contains information about the
tools and technology, knowledge, skills, work values, education, experience and training
needed for a given occupation.19 I follow Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Blinder (2009)
and calculate an offshorability score at the occupation level.
15Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Jensen, Eaton, and Kortum (2003) also allow for firm heterogeneity and
heterogenous gains from trade.
16For papers that rely on the O*NET data base, see, among others, Jensen and Kletzer (2010), Goos
and Manning (2007), Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2010), Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2013), and
Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
17I use O*NET 20.3, available from https://www.onetonline.org/
18Some of the 772 occupations are further detailed into narrower occupation definitions. The total
number of more-detailed occupations in O*NET is 954.
19The O*NET content model organizes these data into six broad categories: worker characteristics,
worker requirements, experience requirements, occupational requirements, labor market characteristics,
and occupation-specific information.
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Acemoglu and Autor (2011) argue that an occupation that requires substantial face-to-
face interaction and needs to be carried out on site is unlikely to be offshored. To capture
this notion of offshorability, they focus on seven individual occupational characteristics,
which are tabulated in Panel A of table 1.18. Compared with alternative occupation
offshorability scores (see Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2013), for example), Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) base their calculations on fewer occupation characteristics to mitigate
a high correlation with the routine-task content of an occupation.20
[Insert Table 1.18 here.]
The O*NET database organizes characteristics in work activities or work context (see
column 3 of Panel A in table 1.18). For work activities, O*NET provides information
on “importance” and “level”. I follow Blinder (2009) and assign a Cobb-Douglas weight
of two-thirds to “importance” and one-third to “level” to calculate a weighted sum for
work activities.21 Since there is no “importance” score for work context characteristics,
I simply multiply the relative frequency by the level.22 Thus, the offshorability score for
occupation j, offj, is defined as
offj =
1∑A
l=1 I
2
3
jl × L
1
3
jl +
∑C
m=1 Fjm × Ljm
(1.1)
where A is the number of work activities, Ijl is the importance and Ljl is the level of a
given work activity in occupation j, C is the number of work context elements, Fjm is
the frequency and Ljm is the level of a given work context in occupation j.
23 Finally, I
take the inverse to obtain a score that is increasing in an occupation’s offshorability.24
In a second step, I aggregate the occupation offshorability scores at the industry level us-
ing industry-level occupation data from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES)
program of the BLS. This data set contains information on the number of employees
in a given occupation, industry and year. The data set is based on surveys that track
employment across occupations and industries in approximately 200,000 establishments
20As a robustness check, I also calculate occupation offshorability according to Firpo, Fortin, and
Lemieux (2013). They base their calculations on 16 different occupation characteristics, which are
organized into three categories: face-to-face contact, on-site and decision-making. The characteristics
are tabulated in an online appendix. The results of the paper remain qualitatively the same when the
measure of Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2013) is employed and are available upon request.
21The results are robust to different Cobb-Douglas weights. For example, taking simple averages
between importance and level scores does not change any of the results in the paper.
22For example, the level of the work context element “frequency of decision-making” is a number
between one and five: 1 = never; 2 = once a year or more but not every month; 3 = once a month or
more but not every week; 4 = once a week or more but not every day; or 5 = every day.
23Note that importance and level scores are all rescaled to be between zero and one. Relative frequen-
cies Fjm lie, by definition, between zero and one.
24The occupation offshorability for Acemoglu and Autor (2011) ranges between one-sixth and one.
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every six months over three-year cycles, representing roughly 62% of non-farm employ-
ment in the U.S. Each industry in the sample was surveyed every three years until 1995
and every year from 1997 onwards. For the period before 1997, I follow Donangelo
(2014) and use the same industry data for three consecutive years to ensure continuous
coverage of the full set of industries. For example, the data used in 1992 combine sur-
vey information from 1990, 1991, and 1992. Unfortunately, the OES did not conduct a
survey in 1996. To avoid a gap, I follow Ochoa (2013) and Donangelo (2014) and rely
on survey information from the years 1993, 1994, and 1995.
The data set employs the OES taxonomy with 258 broad occupation definitions before
1999, the 2000 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system with 444 broad occu-
pations between 1999 and 2009, and the 2010 SOC afterwards. To merge the occupation
level offshorability with the OES data set, I bridge different occupational codes using the
crosswalk provided by the National Crosswalk Service Center. Industries are classified
using three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes until 2001 and four-digit
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes thereafter.25
The OES/BLS data set also includes estimates of wages since 1997. For the 1990 to
1996 period, I use estimates of wages from the BLS/U.S. Census Current Population
Survey (CPS) obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series of the Min-
nesota Population Center.26 I aggregate the occupation level offshorability measure,
offj, by industry, weighting by the wage expense associated with each occupation:
OFFi,t =
∑
j
offj × empi,j,t × wagei,j,t∑
j empi,j,t ×wagei,j,t
(1.2)
where empi,j,t is the employment in industry i, occupation j and year t, and wagei,j,t
measures the annual wage paid to workers. Using wages at this stage is consistent with
placing more weight on occupations with greater impact on cash flows.27 Lastly, OFFi,t
is standardized in each year, i.e., the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation of
the offshorability measure are set to zero and one, respectively. The resulting data set
covers the years 1990 to 2016, with an average of 331 industries.
25While the OES data set is designed to create detailed cross-sectional employment and wage estimates
for the U.S. by industry, because of changes in the occupational classification, it might be challenging
to exploit its time series variation. For this reason, I focus predominantly on cross-sectional analyses of
the data.
26These data are available from https://www.ipums.org/. For more information, see King, Ruggles,
Alexander, Flood, Genadek, Schroeder, Trampe, and Vick (2010)
27I also test for robustness of the empirical analysis by using an industry measure of offshorability
that does not rely on wages, i.e.,
OFF ⋆i,t =
∑
j
offj ×
empi,j,t∑
j empi,j,t
.
The results remain qualitatively unchanged and are available upon request.
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1.2.2 Financial and Accounting Data
For the empirical analysis, I use monthly stock returns from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) and annual accounting information from the CRSP/COM-
PUSAT Merged Annual Industrial Files. The sample of firms includes all NYSE-,
AMEX-, and NASDAQ-listed securities that are identified by CRSP as ordinary com-
mon shares (with share codes 10 and 11) for the period between January 1990 and
December 2016. I follow the literature and exclude regulated (SIC codes between 4900
and 4999) and financial (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) firms from the sample. I also
exclude observations with negative or missing sales, book assets and observations with
missing industry classification codes. Firm-level accounting variables are winsorized at
the 1% level in every sample year to reduce the influence of possible outliers. All nomi-
nal variables are expressed in year-2009 USD.28 I also use historical segment data from
COMPUSTAT to classify firms in multinationals and domestic firms as in Fillat and
Garetto (2015). Finally, I use COMPUSTAT quarterly to calculate the volatility of
sales and profits, as in Minton and Schrand (1999). A detailed overview of the variable
definitions can be found in the online appendix.
1.2.3 International Trade Data
I use product-level U.S. import and export data for the period 1989 to 2015 from Peter
Schott’s website. For every year, I obtain the value of imports as well as a proxy for
shipping costs at the product level that can be aggregated to the industry level. I follow
Hummels (2007) and approximate shipping costs with freight costs, i.e., the markup of
the Cost-Insurance Freight value over Free-on-Board value. Moreover, I use data on US
trade elasticities at the product level from Broda and Weinstein (2006). Finally, data
on U.S. trade balances are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
1.3 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I present the empirical results of the paper. First, I examine the validity
of the offshorability measures. Second, I report that average portfolio excess returns
are decreasing in offshorability. Third, I show that the premium that can be earned by
going long low and short high offhsorability industries is concentrated in manufacturing
industries and is not explained by a wide range of linear asset pricing models. Finally, I
28I use the GDP deflator (NIPA table 1.1.9, line 1) and the price index for non-residential private
fixed investment (NIPA Table 5.3.4, line 2) to convert nominal into real variables.
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offer further empirical evidence that links the offshorability premium to the recent surge
in foreign import competition from low-wage countries.
1.3.1 Validity and Summary Statistics of Labor Offshorability
I start by examining whether the measures discussed in section 1.2 deliver reasonable
rankings of occupations and industries in terms of offshorability. Panels B and C of
table 1.18 report the top and bottom ten occupations by offshorability. Occupations
with high offshorability are not restricted with respect to location or immediacy to the
final consumer. Conversely, occupations at the bottom are either closely related to the
location, such as “tree trimming”, or to customers, such as “dentists”. Unfortunately,
offj is, by construction, constant throughout time. Therefore, occupation offshorability
is unable to capture how technological progress has affected the offshorability of individ-
ual occupations.29To the extent that technological progress has affected offshorability
symmetrically across occupations, this is not a concern for my cross-sectional analysis.
In contrast, industry offshorability inherits some time variation from the changes in
the occupation-industry composition of the U.S. labor force. To gain a better sense of
the time-variation in OFFi,t, I examine the industry rankings for manufacturing and
services industries separately.30 Table 1.2 reports the top and bottom ten industries by
offshoring potential in the years 1992 and 2015 (Panels A and B) and the transition
probabilities (Panel C) between offshorability quintiles for manufacturing industries.31
In 1992, the top industries are predominantly apparel industries, whereas the bottom
industries are related to mining and construction. The 2015 rankings reveal that there is
not much variation over time during the sample period. In fact, even though industries
are now classified according to the NAICS system, the top and bottom ten are similar
to 1992.32
Another way to examine the persistence of OFFi,t over time is to look at transition
probabilities. I do so by sorting industries into quintiles of offshorability each year and
calculating the transition probabilities across quintiles. Panel C of table 1.2 reports
the one- and five-year transition probabilities.33 For industries in the top or bottom
29Several authors note that recent technological advances have substantially increased the offshorabil-
ity of occupations. See, among others, Antras (2015) for manufacturing occupations and Jensen (2011)
for service industry occupations.
30Manufacturing industries contain all industries with SIC codes between 2011 and 3999 and NAICS
codes between 311111 and 339999, respectively. Conversely, service industries encompass all industries
that are not classified as manufacturing industries.
31An analogous table with industry rankings for the full sample can be found in an online appendix.
32Note that the industries with NAICS code 3341xx correspond to SIC industry 3570, which ranks
18th in 1992.
33I calculate transition probabilities for the period 1991 to 2001 (SIC codes) and 2002 to 2016 (NAICS
codes) separately and report the average of the two. The transition probabilities are very similar for the
two subsamples.
From Local to Global: Offshoring and Asset Prices 24
quintiles of labor offshorability, the probability of being in the same quintile the next
year (in five years) is close to 90% (80%). For the middle quintiles, the persistence is
slightly lower, approximately 75%, over one year and 60% over five years. To sum up,
industry offshorability is very persistent over time, consistent with offshoring being a
slow-moving response to changes in the economic environment.
[Insert Tables 1.2 and 1.3 here.]
Table 1.3 reports analogous industry rankings and transition probabilities for service
industries. I find that legal and financial services and computer software programming
are high in offshorability, whereas mining, labor unions and other personal services
are not.34 Overall, the findings are very much in line with those for manufacturing.
Again, the top and bottom ten industries in 1992 and 2015 suggest that OFFi,t does
not exhibit much variation over time. The transition probabilities in Panel C confirm
this impression. The probability of remaining in the same quintile over the next year
(next five years) ranges between 83% and 91% (61% and 82%). Moreover, there are only
very few changes, other than to the neighboring quintile, even over five years.
Next, I examine how offshorability correlates with other labor- and trade-related vari-
ables. Panel A of table 1.4 reports correlations at the occupation level. Interestingly,
offj is positively and significantly related to skill (correlation coefficient of .31), which
is driven by the large number of service occupations that are both offshorable and skill-
intense.35 This is in line with Jensen (2011), Blinder (2009) and Amiti and Wei (2009),
who discuss that recent advances in communication technologies increasingly allow for
the offshoring of service jobs. Importantly, the correlation between offshorability and
routine-task occupations is statistically indistinguishable from zero (correlation coeffi-
cient of .04). Hence, occupation level offshorability does not solely capture occupations
that can be substituted with machines. This is consistent with Zhang (2016), who
finds an insignificant empirical correlation coefficient of -.02 between offshorability and
routine-task labor at the firm level. In panel B, I report the overlap in occupations that
rank in the top tercile for the different measures. I find that the percentage overlap is
close to 33%, which is what one would expect in case of no correlation. This suggests
that there is little correlation in the highest-ranked occupations across measures.
[Insert Table 1.4 here.]
34Related to this finding, Alan Blinder writes in Foreign Affairs in 2006 that “...changing trade
patterns will keep most personal-service jobs at home while many jobs producing goods and impersonal
services migrate to the developing world...”.
35Examples of such occupations include legal support workers or paralegals, computer programmers,
and radiologists.
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Panel C reports time-series averages of annual Spearman rank sum correlations of differ-
ent variables at the industry level both for manufacturing and services. The correlation
with skill is positive and significant for both manufacturing and service industries. While
the point estimate for manufacturing is very similar to that at the occupation level (.29),
it is slightly higher for services (.44). The correlation with routine is statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero for both sectors (the point estimates are .10 for manufacturing
and .14 for services). Interestingly, the correlation with the labor mobility measure of
Donangelo (2014) is negative (-.22) and weakly statistically significant for manufactur-
ing and is positive (.11) but insignificant for services. The weak relationship with labor
mobility is not surprising. Labor mobility is intended to capture the transferability
of occupation-specific skills across industries, which is conceptually very different from
offshorability.
Furthermore, I find that the correlation coefficient with product tradability from Jensen
(2011) is positive (.13) but insignificant for manufacturing and positive and highly sta-
tistically significant for services (.23).36 The insignificant correlation coefficient in man-
ufacturing is not surprising. While offshorability captures the “tradability” of the labor
force, the measure by Jensen (2011) captures the tradability of the product.
Finally, I also analyze the relation between OFFi,t and industry shipping costs, a variable
often employed in studies of international trade. I document a negative and weakly
significant correlation coefficient (-0.16) between offshorability and shipping costs paid
by importers for manufacturing industries. For services, the lack of import data makes
it impossible to calculate shipping costs at the industry level.
1.3.2 Portfolio Analysis
1.3.2.1 Offshorability Portfolios and Excess Returns
To study the characteristics of sample industries and realized excess returns, I construct
five offshorability portfolios. For each sample year, I assign industry offshorability in
the previous year to individual stocks. I then obtain monthly industry returns by value-
weighting monthly stock returns. Again, industries are defined at the 3-digit SIC level
between 1990 and 2001 and at the 4-digit NAICS level between 2002 and 2016. In every
year, at the end of June, I sort industry returns into five portfolios based on industry
offshorability quintiles. Finally, industry returns within each offshorability portfolio are
either equal- or value-weighted. To obtain value-weighted portfolio returns, I use an
industry’s market capitalization as a weight. In what follows, in the interest of brevity,
36I thank J. Bradford Jensen for sharing his data on industry tradability. Jensen (2011) measures of
industry tradability are based on geographic concentration/dispersion of production.
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I refer to industry excess returns simply as excess returns. Panel A of table 1.5 reports
the equal- and value-weighted excess returns of the five portfolios. L (H) stands for the
portfolio consisting of industries with low (high) offshorability, and L-H refers to the
strategy that is long L and short H.
[Insert Table 1.5 here.]
Industries with low offshorability have average equal-weighted (value-weighted) monthly
excess returns that are .61% (.80%) higher compared to high offshorability industries.
The magnitude of the spread is economically meaningful: 7.31% (9.64%) per year for
equal-weighted (value-weighted) returns with an annualized Sharpe ratio of .48 (.47).
I also consider unlevered equity returns to ensure that the results are not driven by
leverage. I follow Donangelo (2014) and Zhang (2016) and calculate unlevered stock
returns as
runleveredi,y,m = r
f
y,m + (ri,y,m − rfy,m)× (1− levi,y−1)
where ri,y,m denotes the monthly stock return of firm i over month m of year y, r
f
y,m
denotes the one-month risk-free rate in month m of year y, and levi,y−1 denotes the
leverage ratio, defined as the book value of debt over the sum of book value of debt
plus the market value of equity at the end of year y− 1 for firm i. The unlevered excess
returns (.51% equal-weighted and .73% value-weighted) and corresponding Sharpe ratios
(.46 equal-weighted and .43 value-weighted) are slightly lower in magnitude.
Despite the relatively short sample period, t-tests using Newey-West standard errors
confirm that the L-H spread is statistically significant both in equal- and value-weighted
portfolios. Notably, the results are slightly stronger for value-weighted returns. While
traditional t-tests only compare returns of the L and H portfolios, the “monotonic re-
lationship (MR)” test by Patton and Timmermann (2010) tests for monotonicity in
returns relying on information from all five portfolios. Next to the L-H spread in table
1.5, I report in parentheses the p-value from the MR test, which considers all possible
adjacent pairs of portfolio returns. The bootstrapped p-value is studentized, as ad-
vocated by Hansen (2005) and Romano and Wolf (2005). The p-values indicate that
the null hypothesis of non-monotonic portfolio returns is rejected both for equal- and
value-weighted returns.
To test whether the L-H spread reflects industries’ exposure to risk factors irrespec-
tive of the ability to relocate production, I estimate linear factor regression models.
Panels B and C of table 1.5 report time-series regressions across the five offshorability
portfolios for the four- and five-factor models of Carhart (1997) and Fama and French
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(2015).37 Even after controlling for the various factors, the estimated alphas show a
nearly (one exception) strictly monotonic pattern for both equal- and value-weighted
returns.38 Moreover, the alpha of the L-H portfolio remains statistically significant in
three out of four specifications. L-H loads positively on SMB in all specifications. More-
over, for equal-weighted portfolios, L-H is positively related to HML. Even though the
magnitude of the L-H alpha is smaller than the spread in univariate portfolio sorts, it is
economically meaningful: the annualized alphas range between 3.82% and 6.49%, with
Sharpe ratios from .35 to .41.
1.3.2.2 Offshorability premium: Manufacturing vs Service Industries
Due to limited data availability, most empirical papers that study the effects of offshoring
focus on U.S. manufacturing firms or European data.39 Hence, having a measure of
offshorability both for manufacturing and services industries, it is interesting to see how
the results differ among these two broad sectors. To this end, I first split the sample into
manufacturing and services and then conditionally sort industries into five offshorability
portfolios, as discussed above.40
Table 1.6 reports univariate portfolio sorts and CAPM regression results for manufac-
turing (Panel A) and services (Panel B). The univariate sorts show that portfolio excess
returns are decreasing in offshorability in both sectors, which suggests that the reloca-
tion of production is a desirable option in manufacturing and service industries. This is
consistent with Jensen and Kletzer (2010), Blinder (2009) and Amiti and Wei (2009),
among others, who discuss the increasing importance of offshoring in service industries.
However, the annualized mean excess return of L-H in manufacturing is two to three
times the magnitude of that in services: 12.37% versus 6.66% for equal-weighted levered
returns and 12.43% versus 4.15% for equal-weighted unlevered returns. This is also true
for value-weighted excess returns. Hence, having the option to offshore seems to affect
the risk profile of manufacturing and services industries differently. This conclusion finds
further support in sector-specific CAPM regression results. For manufacturing, the L-H
strategy is not spanned by the market, and the resulting alphas are highly statistically
and economically significant. For services, on the other hand, the alphas are insignificant
37The risk-free rate and the market, size, value, momentum, profitability and investment factors are
obtained from Kenneth French’s website.
38The results are very similar for the unconditional CAPM, the conditional CAPM and the three-factor
model of Fama and French (1992). The corresponding regressions are tabulated in an online appendix.
39See Harrison and McMillan (2011) and Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips (2014) for
studies on U.S. data and Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang (2016) for a study with Danish data.
40Manufacturing includes all industries with SIC codes between 2011 and 3999 and NAICS codes
between 311111 and 339999. Conversely, services encompass all industries that are not classified as
manufacturing.
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and are only roughly one-third in magnitude compared to manufacturing. In short, while
differential exposures to the market across the five offshorability portfolios explain the
offshorability spread in services, this is not the case in manufacturing.41
[Insert Tables 1.6 and 1.7 here.]
Panel C of table 1.6 shows portfolio characteristics of the five portfolios in manufacturing
and services, respectively. For manufacturing, firms with low offshorability tend to be
large, have a low book to market ratio, low market leverage and low labor intensity
compared to high offshorability firms. For services, on the other hand, the five portfolios
show no clear patterns in terms of book to market ratio and market leverage.
As a more restrictive test of the offshorability premium in manufacturing, I employ the
four- and five-factor models by Carhart (1997) and Fama and French (2015), respectively.
The results are reported in table 1.7. The alpha of the L-H strategy remains highly
statistically and economically significant across all specifications: the annualized alphas
range between 8.05% and 9.94% with Sharpe ratios from .55 to .81. Moreover, L-H
positively loads on size and momentum.
To gain an idea of the performance of L-H in each sector over time, I plot the evolution
of a one USD investment on a log-scale in the left panel figure 1.1. The figure plots L-
H separately for manufacturing and service industries along the market, size and value.
Both L-H portfolios significantly outperform the size and value strategies over the period
from July 1991 until June 2016.
[Insert Table 1.8 and Figure 1.1 here.]
Interestingly, the L-H strategy in manufacturing does not generally correlate strongly
with the market except during the financial crisis, when both investments lose value.
The right panel of figure 1.1 plots the realized equal-weighted excess returns of the L-H
strategy in manufacturing along with average monthly excess returns for the first and
second half of the sample period. The two averages are similar in magnitude (1.19%
during 1991 and 2004 and 0.86% during 2004 and 2016), which suggests that the L-H
strategy delivers a stable return over time.
To further investigate the offshorability premium in manufacturing, I report portfolio
sorts for different time subsamples in table 1.8. The sample is split into four subsamples
- one for each decade plus one that excludes the financial crisis. The offshorability
41These results also hold for the three-factor model of Fama and French (1992): the L-H for manu-
facturing loads positively on size, and the L-H for services loads positively on the market and size. The
corresponding results are tabulated in an online appendix.
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premium is, with one exception, positive and significant in all subsamples. This is true
both for equal- and value-weighted portfolios. For most subsamples, the premium is
significant at the 10% level due to the relatively small sample size and the corresponding
loss of statistical power. Moreover, the MR-test rejects the null hypothesis of non-
monotonic portfolio returns for all but the most recent subsample that runs from 2010:01
to 2016:06.42
In a next step, I investigate the predictive power of offshorability in the cross-section of
returns. To do so, I run annual panel regressions at the firm level. The regressions are
of the following form:
ri,t = a+ bj,t + c ∗OFFi,t−1 + d ∗ controlsi,t−1 + ǫi,t, (1.3)
where ri,t is the firm’s i annual stock return, a is a constant term, bj,t is an industry×year
fixed effect, OFFi,t−1 is lagged labor offshorability and controlsi,t−1 are lagged firm-level
characteristics.43 I include firm size, book-to-market ratio, market leverage ratio, hiring
rate, investment rate, one-year lagged stock return, operating leverage, and profitability
to control for characteristics known to predict expected excess returns. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm and year level.
Table 1.9 reports the regression results for manufacturing in Panel A and services in
Panel B. All variables are standardized with mean zero and variance one, which makes
the coefficients directly comparable. For manufacturing, the coefficient of offshorability
is negative and statistically significant across all specifications. Moreover, the coefficients
are only marginally affected by adding control variables individually (compare regression
specifications (1) to (9)), which is reassuring.44 The estimated slopes range from -
4.64 to -5.06 and are economically meaningful: a one standard deviation increase in
offshorability is associated with a 4% - 5% lower annual excess stock return.
[Insert Table 1.9 here.]
Regression specification (10) includes all control variables at once, which results in a
reduction in sample size. Nevertheless, the coefficient on OFFt−1 stays negative and
42In a robustness test, I test whether the results are driven by the time variation in the OFFi,t measure.
I find that keeping industry offshorability fixed over time (i.e., fixing it to the first observation for each
industry classification period) results in very similar full and subsample results. The corresponding
results are tabulated in an online appendix.
43Note that offshorability is measured at the industry level only. Hence, firms in a given industry and
year share the same offshorability.
44I run similar monthly panel regressions following Belo, Lin, Li, and Zhao (2015) and find that the
results are nearly identical. The results are available upon request.
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highly statistically significant.45 For services, the coefficients on offshorability are neg-
ative throughout all specifications. However, the coefficients are statistically significant
only in two regression specifications, which suggests that for services, OFFt−1 does
not have much predictive power once controlled for other firm characteristics. This is
consistent with the findings of table 1.6.
1.3.3 Manufacturing Industries and the Surge in International Trade
Technological advances such as the revolution in information and communication tech-
nologies and the dismantling of trade barriers have contributed to an increase in inter-
national trade activity over the recent past. The left panel of figure 1.2 shows that the
ratio of imports to U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased by a factor of
1.5 over the sample period. Interestingly, this increase in imports/GDP is mostly due
to imports from low-wage countries, which have increased by a factor of 4.5 since 1990.
By contrast, high-wage country imports have increased by a factor of 1.2 only.46 These
growth patterns are illustrative of the change in the composition of U.S. imports, con-
sistent with the principle of comparative advantage first elaborated by Ricardo (1821)
and continued by Heckscher (1919) and Ohlin (1933).47 They argue that countries have
a comparative advantage in activities that are intensive in the use of factors that are
relatively abundant in the country. As a result, countries that have an abundance of
low-cost labor have an advantage in producing labor-intense products, and countries
with an abundance of skilled labor specialize in skill-intense products.
[Insert Figure 1.2 here.]
Another way of illustrating the change in the composition of U.S. imports is to look at the
trade balances for goods and services separately, as reported in the right panel of figure
1.2. While the trade balance in goods has decreased sharply over the last 25 years, the
trade balance in services has been positive and slightly increasing since 1960. Hence, the
United States is a net exporter in services.48 Consistent with this, Jensen (2011) argues
that providing services is consistent with the U.S.’s comparative advantage. On the other
hand, international specialization has led to fierce import competition in manufacturing
45These results are robust to various industry definitions. The corresponding results are tabulated in
an online appendix.
46I follow Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006a) and label a country as low-wage in year t if its GDP
per capita is less than 5% of the GDP per capita of the U.S. A list of countries that were classified as
low-wage in every year of the sample period can be found in an online appendix.
47The figure that plots value shares of imports instead of real value of imports looks nearly identical.
The corresponding figure can be found in the online appendix of the paper.
48In fact, the United States is the global leader in business service exports. The OECD reports that
the United States accounts for approximately 22 percent of the OECD total.
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industries.49 In fact, many recent empirical studies stress the importance of international
trade for understanding the dynamics in U.S. manufacturing industries. In particular,
the rise in import penetration from low-wage countries has been emphasized as the key
driving force of the decrease in manufacturing employment (see, among others, Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson (2013, 2016), Pierce and Schott (2016)).50
Motivated by this evidence, I examine how my results relate to import competition from
low-wage countries. I follow Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006a) and calculate import
penetration from low-wage countries at the industry level. Panel A of table 1.10 reports
conditional double sorts on import penetration and offshorability.51 Indeed, the L-H
spread is monotonically increasing with import penetration both for equal- and value-
weighted returns. This finding is consistent with the interpretation that the ability
to relocate production is most valuable in industries that are exposed to fierce import
competition from low-wage countries.52
[Insert Tables 1.10 and 1.11 here.]
I also run cross-sectional return predictability regressions conditional on import pene-
tration being lower (higher) than the median, which allows me to control for various
firm characteristics. The results are reported in Panel B. Consistent with the double
sorts, I find that coefficients on offshorability are negative and significant only for firms
in industries with high import penetration. Moreover, the absolute values of the esti-
mated coefficients on OFFt−1 are double the magnitude for high compared to low import
penetration industries.
A potential concern is that realized U.S. imports from low-wage countries may be cor-
related with industry import demand shocks. To mitigate this concern, I instrument
for import competition with industries’ average shipping costs paid on imports, which
serves as a proxy for barriers to trade. In the data, industries with low shipping costs
are associated with high imports and exports. Panel A of table 1.11 reports average re-
turns of conditional double sorts on shipping costs and offshorability. The L-H spread is
monotonically decreasing with shipping costs, consistent with the findings in table 1.10.
49The increase in imports is either due to new market entrants or imports of intermediate production
inputs. Antras (2015) reports that between 2000 and 2011, close to 50% of imports were intra-firm
transactions, i.e., either intermediate production inputs or final goods manufactured entirely abroad. The
other half of imports were either third-party intermediate goods or final products of foreign competitors.
Hence, the surge of imports from low-wage countries over the past 25 years brought cheaper intermediate
production inputs but also more fierce competition to the U.S.
50While US total imports as a share of GDP have increased from 4.19% to 15.48% since 1960, US
manufacturing employment as a percent share of nonagricultural employment has fallen from 28.43% to
8.69%. A corresponding figure can be found in the online appendix.
51I first sort on import penetration and then on offshorability.
52The results are very similar for double sorts on offshorability and import penetration from China,
as reported in an online appendix.
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Panel B tabulates the results of conditional panel regressions. Offshorability negatively
predicts firms’ annual excess returns only in industries with lower-than-median shipping
costs.
Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017) document that industries with low shipping
costs face higher import competition and have higher excess returns. This premium
originates from the risk of displacement of least efficient firms triggered by import com-
petition. Given that the offshorability premium is increasing in import penetration from
low-wage countries and decreasing in shipping costs, my findings suggest that offshoring
helps protect industries from foreign competition. In particular, being able to offshore
allows firms to reduce their labor costs upon increases in competition. This argument
is consistent with Magyari (2017), who finds that offshoring enables US firms to reduce
costs and outperform peers that cannot offshore.
Table 1.4 shows that offshorability is slightly negatively related to shipping cost. Hence,
one might be concerned whether sorting on offshorability is similar to sorting on ship-
ping costs. To mitigate this concern, I replicate the findings of Barrot, Loualiche, and
Sauvagnat (2017) for my sample period and control for the return of the portfolio that
is long firms in low shipping cost industries and short firms in high shipping cost indus-
tries (henceforth, SC). The explanatory power of SC is very limited. In fact, neither the
monotonic relationship in the offshorability portfolio alphas nor the highly statistically
significant alpha of the L-H portfolio is impaired.53
Approximately half of the manufacturing firms in my sample are multinational compa-
nies that have sales in at least one country other than the United States. Fillat and
Garetto (2015) have documented that multinational firms experience higher stock re-
turns compared to domestic firms. To understand how their results relate to mine, I
first split the sample into multinational and domestic manufacturing firms and then
conditionally sort them into five offshorability portfolios in each subsample. The results
are reported in panel A of table 1.12.
[Insert Table 1.12 here.]
In line with Fillat and Garetto (2015), I find that equal-weighted excess returns for
multinationals are higher than for domestic firms. Moreover, the L-H spread is positive,
significant and of very similar magnitude for both groups. This suggests that sorting on
offshorability is different from sorting on a firm’s location of sales. In addition, the non-
monotonicity of portfolio excess returns can only be rejected for firms with multinational
53In a first step, I replicate the findings of Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017). Despite different
sample periods, the resulting portfolio sorts look very similar to those in their paper. Portfolio sorts and
the regression results are reported in the online appendix of this paper.
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operations. Panel B confirms that even after controlling for other firm characteristics,
offhsorability negatively predicts future annual excess returns both for multinational and
domestic firms.
Finally, given the large number of multinationals in manufacturing industries, another
potential concern is that L-H is related to differential foreign exchange exposures across
industries. To address this, I estimate three two-factor models including the U.S. market
excess return and either the dollar factor, the carry factor (both from Verdelhan (2017))
or the excess return of high interest rate currencies minus low interest rate currencies
(from Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011)). I find that the three factors related
to foreign exchange are insignificant in most specifications. Moreover, the L-H alphas
are positive and statistically different from zero in all specifications. The corresponding
results are tabulated in an online appendix.
1.4 Model
In this section, I develop a two-country dynamic general equilibrium trade model with
multiple industries that are heterogenous in their ability to offshore.
The model builds on existing work on trade models with aggregate risk by Ghironi and
Melitz (2005) and Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017), who also focus on asset
prices. To discuss my empirical results through the lens of the model, I additionally em-
bed firm-level offshoring, as in Antras and Helpman (2004), in the model. Consequently,
firms not only decide whether or not to export but also where to produce their goods.
The model features two countries, West and East. To distinguish between the two
countries, quantities that refer to the East are labeled with a ⋆. Each country is inhabited
by a continuum of homogenous households and two industrial sectors that are spanned
by S + 1 industries. The first sector consists of one industry and a single homogenous
good, and the corresponding sector quantities are labeled with a 0. The second sector
encompasses S industries, which each consist of a continuum of differentiated goods that
are produced by a continuum of firms.
1.4.1 Demand Side: The Households Problem
Homogenous households have the following Epstein-Zin preferences over the consump-
tion stream {Ct}:
Ut =
{
(1− β)C
1−γ
ν
t + β
(
Et
[
U1−γt+1
]) 1
ν
} ν
1−γ
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where Ct is an aggregate consumption index, β is the subjective time discount factor,
γ is the coefficient of risk aversion, ψ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and
ν ≡ 1−γ1−1/ψ is a parameter defined for notational convenience. Each period, households
derive utility from consuming goods in S + 1 industries. Ct is given by the following
aggregator:
Ct = c
1−a0
0,t
∑
s
δ
1
θ
s
(∫
Ωs,t
cs,t(ϕ)
σs−1
σs dϕ
) σs
σs−1
θ−1
θ

θ
θ−1
a0
,
where c0,t and 1 − a0 denote, respectively, the consumption and the expenditure share
in the homogenous good sector; cs,t(ϕ) denotes the consumption of differentiated good
variety ϕ in industry s; δs is an industry taste parameter (where
∑
s δs = 1); θ is the
elasticity of substitution between industries; σs is the elasticity of substitution among
good varieties within industry s; and Ωs,t is the set of firms that sell their goods at time
t in industry s in the West.
The aggregation over industry-specific consumption and over varieties is based on con-
stant elasticity of substitution with elasticities θ and σs, respectively. This results in
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) demand schedules at both the industry and the product level.
Detailed derivations can be found in appendix 1.8.4 of the paper.
Finally, households obtain revenues Lt from inelastic labor supply and from ownership
of firms, resulting in the following budget constraint:54
∑
s
∫
Ωs,t
ps,t(ϕ)cs,t(ϕ)dϕ ≤ Lt +Πt,
with Πt being profits from firm ownership.
55 In what follows, I suppress the time index
t for ease of notation.
1.4.2 Supply Side: Firms’ Production and Organizational Decision
Homogenous good sector - The homogenous good 0 is produced under constant
returns to scale (CRS) and a production function that is linear in labor.56 Moreover,
54Wages in each country are equal to the numeraire and are set to 1 as discussed below.
55Households can have ownership both in Eastern and Western firms, as will become clear in the
section on asset prices below. Alternatively, one can think of households owning a share in a world
mutual fund that redistributes profits of firms from the two countries, as discussed in Barrot, Loualiche,
and Sauvagnat (2017).
56In other words, one unit of labor produces one unit of good 0. Because of the CRS technology, there
are no profits to be distributed from sector 0.
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the good is freely traded across countries. Its price is used as a numeraire in each country
and is set to one.57
Differentiated goods sector - This sector encompasses S industries that each consist
of a continuum of differentiated goods that are produced by a continuum of monopolis-
tically competitive firms. Each firm produces a different product variety, ϕ. Intuitively,
firms possess a product variety-specific blueprint that determines their idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity. In what follows, ϕ not only serves as an identifier of product variety but also
stands for idiosyncratic productivity. Following Antras and Helpman (2004), I model
firms’ production function as a Cobb-Douglas function that aggregates two tasks: non-
offshorable headquarter tasks, h(ϕ), and offshorable tasks, o(ϕ):58
ys(ϕ) = A
[
hs(ϕ)
αs
]αs [ os(ϕ)
1− αs
]1−αs
,
where ys(ϕ) is the amount of product variety ϕ produced in industry s, A is aggregate
productivity and αs is the headquarter-intensity in industry s. Importantly, 1 − αs
measures to what extent a firm can offshore its production. Since αs is identical for all
firms in industry s, firm offshorability is identical to industry offshorability in the model.
Furthermore, I assume that aggregate productivity follows an autoregressive process of
order one in each country:
at = ρaat−1 + ǫ
a
t a
⋆
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⋆
t−1 + ǫ
a⋆
t ,
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0.
Production is costly. Firms are subject to production costs as well as fixed organizational
costs. The total production costs consist of wages or salaries paid for time actually
worked, w, and other labor costs, c, such as payments to pension plans, unemployment
insurance fees, legal costs and accruals for possible severance payments. I assume that
other labor costs are proportional to the amount of labor hired such that the marginal
costs of labor equals w + c. I further assume that any unit of labor can be employed
either as headquarter or offshorable tasks. In other words, within a country, there is
no separation of the labor force. For clarity of exposition, in what follows, I will be
explicit about the total costs associated with one unit of headquarter and offshorable
labor employed in industry s. I call them wh,s and wo,s, respectively.
57Consequently, wages are equal to one in both countries.
58The task-specific technology is linear in labor: for every unit of labor, each task produces ϕ units
of task-specific output.
From Local to Global: Offshoring and Asset Prices 36
Throughout the paper, I further assume that the East has a comparative cost advantage
in offshorable labor over the West. In particular, I assume that c > c⋆. That is, within
the context of the model, the East can be associated with a low-wage country such as
China and the West with a highly developed economy such as the U.S. Intuitively, the
wedge c− c⋆ can be interpreted as differences in unemployment benefits and other social
insurances, strength of labor unions and severance payments across the two countries.
This cost wedge provides an incentive to Western firms to offshore and, as such, is a key
ingredient for the model to generate results consistent with the empirical evidence.
Given the comparative cost advantage of the East over the West, firms decide on their
organizational strategy along two dimensions. First, they decide whether to produce
domestically or offshore part of their production. Second, they choose whether to sell
their output only domestically or, alternatively, both on the domestic and export market.
In what follows, I detail the optimal sorting of firms into the different strategies.
Domestic Production vs Offshoring
Firms operate in monopolistically competitive industries and set their prices at a markup
over marginal costs. The monopolistic competition markup σsσs−1 is determined by the
elasticity of substitution among product varieties within an industry, σs.
59 Hence, the
price set by firms that produce domestically is given by
ps,D(ϕ) =
σs
σs − 1
(wh,s)
αs(wo,s)
1−αs
Aϕ
,
where wh,s (wo,s) are total wage costs for headquarter (offshorable) tasks. Firm profits
in industry s are defined as the difference between sales and total costs, Γs,D(ys,D(ϕ), ϕ):
πs,D(ϕ) = ps,D(ϕ)ys,D(ϕ)− Γs,D(ys,D(ϕ), ϕ)
=
1
σs
ps,D(ϕ)
[
ps,D(ϕ)
Ps
]−σs
Cs
= Bs
(
(wh,s)
αs(wo,s)
1−αs
)1−σs
(Aϕ)σs−1 ,
where Bs =
1
σs
[
σs
σs−1
]1−σs
P σss Cs. Without loss of generality, fixed organizational costs
for a purely domestic firm are set to 0.60 Consequently, all firms in an industry are
productive, since domestic production is profitable for all values of ϕ.
59The higher the σs, the lower the markup
σs
σs−1
.
60Alternatively, I could set the fixed costs for domestic production to a value different from zero.
Consequently, firms with sufficiently low idiosyncratic productivity would decide to shut down production
entirely. In the absence of fixed costs for domestic production, fixed costs of offshoring, fO, can be
interpreted as the excess cost of offshoring in comparison to domestic production.
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Firms decide whether or not to offshore tasks of type o. On the one hand, firms that
offshore can benefit from potentially lower total production costs and from risk diversi-
fication.61 On the other hand, offshoring is costly due to trade costs, τ⋆, and per-period
fixed organizational costs of offshoring, fO.
62
Trade costs are often associated with the costs of transporting intermediate inputs across
countries. Alternatively, τ⋆ can be interpreted more broadly to reflect other technological
barriers related to international fragmentation, such as language barriers, communica-
tion or search costs.
As in Antras and Helpman (2004), fixed organizational costs, fO, can be interpreted as
the joint management cost of final and intermediate goods production, such as super-
vision, quality control, accounting, and marketing, which depend on the organizational
form and location of production. These costs are expressed in units of effective labor.
I assume that firms hire workers from their respective domestic labor markets to cover
these fixed costs. Hence, profits with offshoring are equal to
πs,O(ϕ) = Bs
(
(wh,s)
αs(w⋆o,sτ
⋆)1−αs
)1−σs (
Aαs (A⋆)1−αs ϕ
)σs−1 − fO
A
.
Profit-maximizing firms in industry s decide to offshore whenever profits from doing so
are larger than profits from domestic production, πs,O(ϕ) ≥ πs,D(ϕ). ϕs,O is defined
as the idiosyncratic productivity level for which the profits from the two strategies are
equalized, such that πs,O(ϕs,O) = πs,D(ϕs,O):
ϕs,O =
 fO (A)−1
Bs
[[
(wh,s)
αs
(
w⋆o,sτ
⋆
)1−αs]1−σs [Aαs (A⋆)1−αs]σs−1 − [(wh,s)αs (wo,s)1−αs]1−σs Aσs−1]

1
σs−1
ϕs,O is decreasing in A
⋆ and wo,s, since σs ≥ 1. In other words, the stronger the compar-
ative advantage of the East over the West, the more Western firms decide to offshore.
Regardless of the organizational decision, firm profits are monotonically increasing in ϕ.
This can be seen from figure 1.3, which plots profits of different organizational strategies
against idiosyncratic productivity both for Western firms (left panel) and Eastern firms
(right panel). Western firm profits from offshoring are negative for low values of ϕ due
61More formally, the total costs of producing y units of a final good of variety ϕ associated with
Domestic sourcing and Offshoring can be written as
Γs,D(ys,D(ϕ), ϕ) =
ys,D(ϕ)
Aϕ
(wh,s)
αs(wo,s)
1−αs
Γs,O(ys,O(ϕ), ϕ) =
fO
A
+
ys,O(ϕ)
Aαs (A⋆)1−αs ϕ
(wh,s)
αs(w⋆o,sτ
⋆)1−αs
62Notation: τ⋆ labels trade costs for shipments from East to West and τ labels trade costs for shipments
from West to East.
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to the fixed organizational costs. However, profits from offshoring grow significantly
with higher ϕ, which eventually leads to higher profits compared to domestic produc-
tion. Consequently, all firms with idiosyncratic productivity larger than ϕs,O decide to
offshore. This implies that large and productive firms offshore. In contrast, Eastern
firms abstain from offshoring, since domestic production is more cost-efficient (lower
production costs and no trade costs on intermediate inputs). This aspect of the model
is discussed in more detail in appendix 1.8.4.3.
[Insert Figure 1.3 here.]
Decision to Export
In addition to choosing the location of production, firms decide whether or not to export.
Similar to offshoring, exporting is costly and involves variable trade costs, τ , and per-
period fixed costs, fX . Firms choose to export whenever profits from doing so are
positive, πs,X ≥ 0. However, the decision to export also depends on the location of
production. Consequently, the productivity cutoff for domestic producers is different
from the cutoff for firms that offshore.
The cutoff level for firms that produce domestically is defined as 63
ϕs,X,D =
 fX (A)−1
B⋆s
[
τ (wh,s)
αs (wo,s)
1−αs
]1−σs
Aσs−1

1
σs−1
.
Profit maximization implies that all domestically producing firms in the West with
idiosyncratic productivity higher than ϕs,X,D engage in exporting.
In contrast, firms that offshore decide to export whenever their productivity level is
higher than 64
ϕs,X,O =
 fX (A)−1
B⋆s
[
τ (wh,s)
αs
(
w⋆o,sτ
⋆
)1−αs]1−σs [Aαs (A⋆)1−αs]σs−1

1
σs−1
.
63Note that the corresponding profit expression is equal to
πs,X,D(ϕ) = B
⋆
s
(
τ (wh,s)
αs(wo,s)
1−αs
)1−σs
(Aϕ)σs−1 −
fX
A
.
64Corresponding profits are equal to
πs,X,O(ϕ) = B
⋆
s
(
τ (wh,s)
αs(w⋆o,sτ
⋆)1−αs
)1−σs (
Aαs (A⋆)
1−αs ϕ
)σs−1
−
fX
A
.
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As above, all Western firms that engage in offshoring with idiosyncratic productivity
higher than ϕs,X,O decide to export. Importantly, this productivity cutoff is valid only
for firms that offshore. Hence, the fixed costs of offshoring fO need not be considered
again.
Allowing firms to choose the production location and decide whether or not to export is
realistic but increases complexity substantially. In fact, the decision to offshore might
affect the decision to export and vice versa. Hence, to ensure tractability, I rule out
equilibria in which in a given country, firms that produce only domestically and export
and firms that offshore and export co-exist.65 One way to prevent co-existence is to
ensure that only firms that offfshore engage in exporting. This can be induced by large-
enough fixed costs of exporting, fX . In particular, it is sufficient that ϕs,X,O > ϕs,O
holds period by period.66 This case is illustrated in the left panel of figure 1.3. ϕs,X,O
is indeed larger than ϕs,O in this specific equilibrium of the model. As a result, only
Western firms that engage in offshoring also export. For the East, the problem is much
simpler. Since all firms produce domestically, the relevant cut-off productivity that
separates exporters from non-exporters is ϕ⋆s,X,D.
1.4.3 Aggregation
In what follows, I follow Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and assume that firm productivity
is distributed according to a Pareto distribution with lower bound ϕmin and shape
parameter κs > σs − 1 : G(ϕ) = 1−
(
ϕmin
ϕ
)κs
. The assumption of a Pareto distribution
for productivity induces a size distribution of firms that is also Pareto, which fits well
the empirical distribution. The parameter κs relates industry output to the cross-section
of firms, where high values are associated with more homogenous industries in the sense
that more output is concentrated among the smallest and least-productive firms.
Quantities
As in Melitz (2003) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005), it is enough to track the mass and
the average productivity for firms that choose the same strategy. In essence, the model
is isomorphic to one in which firms within a strategy group all have a productivity
65Antras, Fort, and Tintelnot (2016) multi-country sourcing model, in which global sourcing decisions
interact through the firm’s cost function, and Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2016) present a
theoretical framework that allows firms to decide simultaneously on the set of production locations,
export markets, input sources, products to export, and inputs to import.
66To be precise, a large fX lowers the probability of co-existence to a very small number but does not
strictly rule it out. Therefore, when simulating the model, I check ex post that ϕs,X,O > ϕs,O holds
period by period for all industries s. More details on the computation approach when solving the model
can be found in an online appendix.
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equal to the average productivity of the group. Put differently, the average productivity
levels per group summarize all information on the productivity distribution relevant for
macroeconomic variables.
First, I calculate the fraction of firms in industry s that engage in domestic production,
ζs,D, and offshoring, ζs,O. Moreover, ζs,X,O and ζ
⋆
s,X,D stand for the fractions of firms
that export in the West and East, respectively. These quantities are determined by
the cutoff productivity levels and the shape of the Pareto distribution, as detailed in
appendices 1.8.4.2 and 1.8.4.3.
Second, I derive average productivity levels for the different groups: 1) ϕ¯s,D, for purely
domestic Western firms; 2) ϕ¯s,O, for Western firms that offshore; 3) ϕ¯s,X,O, for West-
ern firms that offshore and export; 4) ϕ¯⋆s,D, for purely domestic Estern firms; and 5)
ϕ¯⋆s,X,D, for Eastern firms that produce domestically and export. These quantities can
be calculated as simple conditional averages for the Pareto distribution. Again, detailed
derivations can be found in appendices 1.8.4.2 and 1.8.4.3.
Industry Profits and Prices
Industry-wide profits and price indices can now be calculated using probability masses
and average productivity levels. Industry profits are simply given by the sum of the
profits made on the domestic and exporting markets. Therefore, industry profits in the
West are given by
Πs = Ns [ζs,Dπs,D(ϕ¯s,D) + ζs,Oπs,O(ϕ¯s,O) + ζs,X,Oπs,X,O(ϕ¯s,X,O)]
and industry profits in the East are given by
Π⋆s = N
⋆
s
[
π⋆s,D(ϕ¯
⋆
s,D) + ζ
⋆
s,X,Dπ
⋆
s,X,D(ϕ¯
⋆
s,X,D)
]
,
where Ns (N
⋆
s ) is the total mass of firms in the West (East) exogenously set to match
the size of the economy.
Finally, the industry price indices in the two countries are equal to
Ps =
[
Ns
[
ζs,Dps,D(ϕ¯s,D)
1−σs + ζs,Ops,O(ϕ¯s,O)
1−σs
]
+N⋆s ζ
⋆
s,X,D
(
p⋆s,X,D(ϕ¯
⋆
s,X,D)
)1−σs] 11−σs ,
in the West, and
P ⋆s =
[
N⋆s p
⋆
s,D(ϕ¯
⋆
s,D)
1−σs +Nsζs,X,Ops,X,O(ϕ¯s,X,O)
1−σs
] 1
1−σs ,
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in the East.
1.4.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the aggregate budget constraint of the representative household is given
in terms of the aggregate price index P , composite consumption C, labor income L and
revenues from Western and Eastern industries, Πs and Π
⋆
s:
PC ≤ L+
∑
s
Πs + χ
[
Ns
Ns +N⋆s
Π⋆s −
N⋆s
Ns +N⋆s
Πs
]
.
The exogenous parameter χ ∈ [0, 1] controls the level of risk sharing across countries in
the economy. This formulation embeds both the case of no risk-sharing and perfect or
full risk-sharing. Without risk-sharing, χ = 0, households only receive dividends from
domestic firms: Πno =
∑
sΠs. In comparison, with full risk-sharing, χ = 1, households
receive a share of total world profits that is proportional to their capital endowments:
Πfull =
∑
s
Ns
Ns+N⋆s
(Πs +Π
⋆
s). Consequently, dividends paid to households are a convex
combination of Πno and Πfull.
The model is solved with time-invariant mass of firms in each industry. Moreover,
the model abstracts from capital or investment. As a result, firms can adjust their
production solely by deciding either to offshore or export. The equilibrium is defined as
a collection of prices (ps,D, ps,O, ps,X,O, ps,X,D, Ps, PT , P ), output (ys (ϕ)), consumption
(cs (ϕ)) and labor demand (ls (ϕ)) such that each firm maximizes profit, consumers
maximize their utility, and goods and labor markets clear.
1.4.5 Asset Pricing
Since the representative household in the West holds Western firms, the firms are priced
using her stochastic discount factor (SDF). Therefore, I derive the Euler equation from
the portfolio problem faced by the representative household. She maximizes her con-
tinuation utility over the consumption stream {Ct} subject to her budget constraint.
Because there is no capital and investment in the model, firms pay out dividends that
are equal to their profits, πs,t(ϕ).
max
{
(1− β)C
1−γ
ν
t + β
(
Et
[
U1−γt+1
]) 1
ν
} ν
1−γ
s.t. PtCt +
∑
s
∫
Ωs
xs,t+1(ϕ)υs,t(ϕ)dϕ ≤ L+
∑
s
∫
Ωs
xs,t(ϕ) [υs,t(ϕ) + πs,t(ϕ)] dϕ
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where xs,t(ϕ) is the investment in the firm in industry s of variety ϕ and υs,t(ϕ) is the
corresponding firm valuation.
The resulting Euler equation reads as follows:
υs,t = Et [Mt,t+1 (υs,t+1(ϕ) + πs,t+1(ϕ))] ,
where Mt,t+1 = β
ν∆C
− ν
ψ
t R
ν−1
c,t is the stochastic discount factor (SDF) and Rc,t is the
return on the consumption claim.
1.4.6 Calibration
To calibrate my model, I associate the West with the United States and the East with
China. Moreover, where possible, I calibrate the model using parameters from the
literature, as reported in table 1.13. In particular, I use elasticities across industries
from Loualiche (2015) and across goods from Broda and Weinstein (2006). The firm
distribution is governed by the parameter κs, which is set to 3.4, as in Ghironi and
Melitz (2005). The industry taste parameter δs is equal to 0.5. Hence, households do
not have a preference for a certain industry.
[Insert Table 1.13 here.]
Wage costs other than pay for time in the West, c, are chosen to match the empirical
counterpart in the United States. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
24.35% of the total wage costs in manufacturing accounted for social insurance payments
and 8.92% for directly paid benefits.67 Hence, 33.27% of the total wage bill consisted of
payments other than wages and salaries for time actually worked. To reflect this in the
model, I calibrate c to 0.32 and c⋆ to 0, assuming absence of social insurance costs in
the East.
L and L⋆ are determined by the ratio of the working age population in the U.S. and
China. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis reports a working age population of 205
millions by the end of 2015 in the U.S. and 1’004 million in China. The mass of firms
in each country, Ns and N
⋆
s , is chosen to match the ratio of the market capitalization
in the U.S. and China. The World Bank states the total market capitalization of listed
domestic companies in 2015 as 25.068 trillion USD in the U.S. and 8.19 trillion USD in
China. To match the ratio between the two, I calculate the model-implied ratio of the
sum of market values of all firms in the West and East, respectively.
67Directly paid benefits are primarily pay for leave time, bonuses, and pay in kind.
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The headquarter intensities of the two industries, αs, are set to 0.55 and 0.95, respec-
tively. This implies that a high (low) offshorability industry has an offshoring potential
of 45% (5%) and that the average offshoring potential in the model economy is 25%.
For comparison, the OECD estimates that close to 20% of jobs in OECD countries are
offshorable, while Blinder’s (2009) estimates for the U.S. lie between 22% and 29%.68
Variable trade cost and fixed cost parameters are set to the values in Ghironi and
Melitz (2005) and Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017), respectively. The subjective
discount factor is 0.99, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 1.5, as in Bansal
and Yaron (2004a). I calibrate the risk aversion parameter to match the U.S. equity
premium. Finally, parameters related to aggregate productivity in the West (East) are
chosen to reflect GDP in the U.S. (Chinese imports to the U.S.), as in Barrot, Loualiche,
and Sauvagnat (2017).
1.4.7 Model Mechanism
Consumption Response - To examine what drives asset prices in the model, it is
necessary to understand how aggregate consumption and the SDF respond to aggregate
productivity shocks in the model.
The elasticity of consumption in the West to a productivity shock in the East, η⋆ (C)69,
is
η⋆ (C) = −η⋆ (P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
price effect
+
Π
L+Π
η⋆ (Π)︸ ︷︷ ︸
wealth effect
(1.4)
The elasticity consists of a price and a wealth effect. As will be discussed later, the
elasticity of the price index with respect to A⋆ is negative. As a result, the sign of the
first term is unambiguously positive. On the other hand, the sign of the wealth effect
depends on the degree of international risk sharing. With full risk-sharing, the wealth
effect is positive, as is the elasticity of consumption with respect to a foreign productivity
shock: Western households benefit from (1) lower domestic prices due to increases in
imports and (2) higher capital income due to higher world profits.
However, with a sufficiently high degree of home bias in capital income (low χ), the
wealth effect is negative and dominates the positive price effect. As an illustration, the
first row of figure 1.4 plots impulse response functions of consumption for different val-
ues of χ. In the baseline parametrization, χ < 0.75 is sufficient to generate a negative
68The OECD also reports the offshoring potential for NACE 2-digit industries. For the year 2003, the
numbers lie between 79.5% and 1.8%.
69Notation: η (X) = ∂ logX
∂ logA
and η⋆ (X) = ∂ logX
∂ logA⋆
.
From Local to Global: Offshoring and Asset Prices 44
consumption response. χ = 0.75 implies that Western households overweigh their in-
vestments in domestic firms by 18.62% compared to domestic firms’ share of the world
market. Hence, a fairly moderate home bias is sufficient to generate a negative elasticity
of consumption with respect to a positive productivity shock in the East. In compar-
ison, Coeurdacier and Rey (2012) empirically find a home bias for equity investments
of 44.6% in the U.S. in 2008.70 To simplify the exposition, I impose no international
risk sharing (i.e., χ = 0) in my benchmark specification; I then discuss the implications
thereof.
[Insert Figures 1.4 and 1.5 here.]
The elasticity of consumption to productivity shocks in the West looks identical to
equation 1.4. For shocks to A, however, the elasticity of consumption is unambiguously
positive. In particular, both price and wealth effect carry a positive sign.
In what follows, I separately discuss how shocks to A⋆ and A affect the equilibrium. The
discussion mostly focuses on the West as the main country of interest and starts with
the analysis of aggregate productivity shocks in the East.
Shocks to A⋆ - To facilitate the discussion, figure 1.4 plots impulse response functions
of model quantities to a positive one standard deviation shock to A⋆ in the absence of
risk sharing. As discussed, consumption in the West (East) decreases (increases) upon
arrival of a shock. Moreover, due to higher productivity, more Eastern firms find it
profitable to export, which results in an increase in import penetration. Higher import
penetration in turn leads to an increase in product variety, a decrease in industry prices
and a loss in market share and profits of Western firms.
Higher productivity in the East, however, also renders offshoring more attractive. Doing
so allows firms to lower costs, which goes hand in hand with a larger market share and
higher profits. Hence, offshoring effectively acts as partial insurance against adverse
consequences associated with foreign productivity shocks.
The response of the fraction of firms that offshore is more pronounced in high offshora-
bility industries. The reason is simple: in the model, industries with higher offshoring
potential are able to replace more workers/tasks, which results in a larger cost reduction
and makes it more likely for firms to overcome the fixed costs of offshoring. As a result,
profits drop less in industries with high offshorability.
70For further empirical evidence of home bias in the U.S., see, among others, French and Poterba
(1991) and Coval and Moskowitz (1999); and for rational explanations of the home bias puzzle, see,
for example, Glassman and Riddick (2001), Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004), Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp (2009) and Bretscher, Julliard, and Rosa (2016).
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What does this mean for asset prices? The heterogenous response of industry profits
maps into differential asset price and excess return dynamics across industries. The last
row plots the response of the SDF, asset prices and excess returns for the case of no and
full risk sharing, respectively. Consistent with the consumption response in the first row,
the SDF increases under no risk sharing but decreases with full risk sharing. However,
the qualitative response of asset prices and returns is not altered by the degree of risk
sharing. In both cases, the responses are negative and more pronounced for the low
offshorability industry.
Shocks to A - Figure 1.5 plots the impulse responses to a negative one standard de-
viation shock to A. I plot the responses to a negative productivity shock to facilitate
comparison with the impulse response functions after a shock to A⋆. Upon arrival of the
shock, Western consumption drops, which affects firms through a decrease in product
demand. Moreover, because the production function of Eastern firms that export to the
West is not directly affected by shocks to A, their productivity and, hence, their prices
remain unchanged. This gives Eastern exporters a competitive advantage over Western
firms whenever a negative shock to A happens. As a result, Western firms lose market
share to these exporters.
As above, offshoring presents itself as a valuable alternative in order to mitigate the
adverse consequences of the shock. Again, offshoring results in a larger cost reduction
for high compared to low offshorability industries. Consequently, the response of the
fraction of firms that offshore is more pronounced in high offshorability industries, which
ultimately leads to smoother industry profits. Asset prices and excess returns follow from
industry profits and look very similar to figure 1.4 (not shown).
To sum up, the ability to offshore protects industries against losses associated with
import competition. Differences in offshorability across industries contribute to a spread
in excess returns similar to the L-H spread observed in the data.
1.4.8 Model Simulation Results
To quantify the model and investigate the contribution of the two productivity shocks,
I calculate moments from simulated data. As discussed in section 1.4.6, I target the
ratios of market capitalization and working age populations in the U.S. and China as
well as the average import competition from China to discipline my calibration exercise.
In particular, matching these moments constrains the choice of parameters Ns, N
⋆
s , L,
L⋆ and f⋆X . The model matches the targeted moments well, as can be seen in panel A
of table 1.14.
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[Insert Table 1.14 here.]
Panel B of the same table reports model-implied macro moments. Similar to Barrot,
Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017), aggregate consumption is too volatile in the model.
While the mean of the risk-free rate is close to the data, the model implied standard
deviation is too low. Interestingly, the model-implied U.S. labor share aligns quite well
with the data. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports a labor share of 58.4% as of the
third quarter in 2016. In comparison, the model-implied labor share is 60.54%.
The moments of industry quantities are reported separately for high and low offshorabil-
ity industries in panel C. The level of import penetration is slightly higher in the industry
with low offshoring potential. Intuitively, because Eastern firms face less resistance upon
entering in this industry, it is optimal to do so to a higher extent in equilibrium. More-
over, import penetration is more volatile because the response to productivity shocks
is more pronounced, as can be seen from figures 1.4 and 1.5. For industry profits, the
standard deviation and covariance with aggregate productivity shocks and consumption
are decreasing in offshorability. In other words, the possibility to offshore allows firms
to smooth their profits, which renders them less exposed to shocks.
Panel D of table 1.14 reports moments of model asset prices and excess returns. The
model-implied annualized market risk premium is 4.52%.71 Since the model does not fea-
ture financial leverage, this is the unlevered risk premium. To make the model premium
comparable to the data, I calculate the model-implied levered market risk premium as-
suming a leverage ratio equal to the sample median of 23.8%. The model market risk
premium of 5.93% is quantitatively in line with the annualized excess return of the S&P
500 of 5.72% during the sample period. As in the data, model excess returns are lower
for high compared to low offshorability industries. The levered (unlevered) annualized
L-H spread between the two model industries is equal to 3.82% (2.91%), which is clearly
lower than the risk-adjusted annualized spread of 8.05% for manufacturing industries in
the data. I will discuss different reasons for the relatively low L-H spread in the model
in section 1.4.10. This section will also discuss how the magnitude of the spread depends
on model parameters and endogenous model quantities.
η⋆
(
ΠX
)
= −σs
[
1 +
κs − (σs − 1)
σs − 1
]
[−η⋆ (P ⋆s )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
price effect
+
[
1 +
κs − (σs − 1)
σs − 1
]
η⋆ (C⋆s )︸ ︷︷ ︸
demand effect
+ (1− αs) κs︸ ︷︷ ︸
productivity effect
(1.5)
Within the model, it is possible to separate the domestic profits from profits from ex-
porting. Equation 1.5 shows the elasticity of profits from exporting with respect to a
71I calculate the model market risk premium as the value-weighted excess return across industries.
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productivity shock in the East, A⋆. The elasticity consists of three parts: (1) price effect
(negative): the industry price index, P ⋆s , decreases and causes a loss in market share
and profits; (2) demand effect (positive): demand increases and leads to an increase in
profits; (3) productivity effect (positive): since all exporters also offshore, productivity
shocks in the offshoring country directly affect profits through gains in productivity.
Hence, the elasticity of export profits is negative whenever the price effect dominates.
Panel D of table 1.14 shows that profits from exporting are riskier than total industry
profits, which results in higher excess returns for exporters compared to the industry as
a whole. Intuitively, all exporters have exercised their offshoring option, which leaves
them unable to smooth profits going forward. Consequently, the model implies that
multinational firms whose profits stem from domestic and exporting markets exhibit
higher excess returns than purely domestic firms. This is consistent with the empirical
evidence in Fillat and Garetto (2015).
To quantify the contribution of the two productivity shocks, I simulate the model with
just one stochastic productivity process at a time. Panel A of table 1.15 reports simulated
moments in the model economy for industry profits and excess returns. In the model,
89% of the L-H spread is due to shocks to A⋆, while only 11% is due to shocks to A.
[Insert Table 1.15 here.]
In an extension discussed in section 1.8.4.4 of the appendix, I introduce international
bond trading to the model, as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005). Not surprisingly, the stan-
dard deviation of consumption decreases compared to the baseline model, as bonds allow
households to smooth their consumption intertemporally. As a result, the overall risk
premium is lower. Importantly, however, the L-H spread is unaffected by the introduc-
tion of international bond trading. Since risk-free bonds are a state independent savings
technology, trading them does not help mitigate state-specific risks.72
1.4.9 Testable Model Implications
The model delivers several predictions that can be tested in the data. Within the
model, the possibility to offshore allows firms and industries to lower their exposure to
aggregate productivity shocks. As a result, profits are less volatile for high compared
to low offshorability industries. To test this model implication, I calculate profit and
sales volatility as in Minton and Schrand (1999) and regress these volatilities on lagged
offshorability, other firm controls (Tobin’s Q, leverage and investment) and year fixed
72Relevant moments of simulated data of the model with international bond trading are reported in
table 1.28 of the appendix.
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effects.73 Standard errors are clustered at the year and firm level. The regression results
are tabulated in Panel B of table 1.15.
Consistent with the theory, the coefficients on OFFi,t−x for profit volatility are negative
and highly statistically and economically significant both for one- and five-year lags.
Interestingly, the coefficient on OFFi,t−5 is double the magnitude of the coefficient on
the first lag. A one standard deviation increase in industry offshorability is associated
with an 8.9% (one-year lag) to 19.7% (five-year lag) decrease in the profit volatility for
the median firm. Regression coefficients for several lags with 90% and 95% confidence
bands are plotted in figure 1.6. I find that the coefficient on OFFi,t−x is monotonically
increasing in magnitude with the horizon. This is consistent with offshoring being a
process that takes time to be fully incorporated.
[Insert Figure 1.6 here.]
The results for sales volatility are very similar as for profit volatility. While the coeffi-
cients on OFFi,t−x are negative in all specifications, they are statistically different from
zero at a 90% (95%) confidence level only for horizons larger or equal to three (four)
years. Intuitively, offshoring allows for a cost reduction that affects profits with higher
immediacy than sales.
Furthermore, the model allows one to form predictions about the cross-sectional disper-
sion of the L-H premium. Households become more price-sensitive when the elasticity
of substitution among product varieties, σs, increases. Put differently, in industries
with high elasticities, all else being equal, the drop in Western firms’ market share is
more pronounced upon arrival of an adverse productivity shock - both in low and high
offshorability industries. This can be seen from the elasticity of domestic profits with
respect to a productivity shock in the East:
η⋆
(
ΠD
)
= − (σs − θ) (−η⋆ (Ps))︸ ︷︷ ︸
competition effect
+ η⋆ (Cs) +
1− a0 − θ
a0
(−η⋆ (P ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
expenditure effect
+
 κs ζs,O (πs,O − πs,D)ΠD︸ ︷︷ ︸
relative benefits from offshoring
− (σs − 1) ζs,Dπs,DΦ+ ζs,Oπs,O
ΠD︸ ︷︷ ︸
industry composition effect
 (−η⋆ (ϕs,O)) +
ζs,Oπs,O
ΠD
(σs − 1) (1− αs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
productivity gain from offshoring
, (1.6)
73I adapt the methodology proposed by Minton and Schrand (1999) to calculate cash flow volatility
both for profit and sales volatility.
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where Φ > 0 and ∂Φ∂ϕs,O > 0.
74 Irrespective of an industry’s offshorability, the elasticity is
more negative with higher σs because the competition effect is amplified. Competition
leads to a decrease in industry prices, which results in a decrease in market share.
Moreover, the effect of an increase in σs depends on the industry equilibrium in the
West (industry composition effect). A higher elasticity of substitution harms firms that
have already offshored. These firms cannot decrease costs further, and their profits are
adversely affected by increases in competition.75
Lastly, productivity gains from offshoring increase the elasticity of domestic profits with
respect to a productivity shock in the East. Intuitively, firms that offshore benefit from
positive productivity shocks in the offshoring country. As a result, this productivity
effect shows up in the elasticity of profits. Interestingly, the productivity gain is multi-
plied by the term (σs − 1), which implies that being able to offshore is more valuable
when the elasticity of substitution is high. Hence, a testable implication of the model is
that excess return spreads between high and low offshorability industries are larger in
industries with high elasticity of substitution with respect to imported goods.
[Insert Table 1.16 here.]
To test this implication in the data, I use U.S. trade elasticities estimated by Broda and
Weinstein (2006) from 1990 to 2001. Table 1.16 reports average returns for double sorts
on offshorability and U.S. trade elasticities. The results are consistent with the model.
The L-H spread is increasing in trade elasticities. In fact, for low elasticity industries,
the spread is no longer statistically significant.
Finally, the model implies that the covariance of industry excess returns with consump-
tion is decreasing in offshorability. In other words, low (high) offshorability industry
excess returns have a high (low) covariance with domestic consumption. To test this
model implication, I calculate consumption betas for offshorability portfolios both in the
model and in the data. It is well known that differences in the covariance of returns and
contemporaneous consumption growth do not explain the expected returns observed in
the U.S. stock market.76 However, Parker and Julliard (2005) show that considering the
ultimate risk to consumption, defined as the covariance of quarterly portfolio returns
and consumption growth over the quarter of the return and many following quarters, can
74ϕ is defined as follows:
Φ =
ϕκss,min
σs − 1

 ϕσs−κss,O [κs − (σs − 1)]
ϕσs−1s,min − ϕ
κs
s,min
1
ϕ
κs−(σs−1)
s,O
−
κs
ϕκss,O − ϕ
κs
s,min


75Note that σs is multiplied by the share of profits that come from companies that offshore.
76See, among others, Mankiw and Shapiro (1986), Breeden, Gibbons, and Litzenberger (1989), Camp-
bell (1996), Cochrane (1996), and Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)
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largely explain the cross-sectional pattern of expected portfolio returns. Ultimate con-
sumption risk is likely to be a better measure of the true risk of an asset if consumption
is slow to adjust to returns. Alternatively, Brainard, Nelson, and Shapiro (1991) and
Bandi and Tamoni (2017) show that measuring both portfolio returns and consumption
growth at a lower than quarterly frequency improves the performance of the consump-
tion CAPM (CCAPM). Given that my model does not feature a slow adjustment of
consumption to returns, I follow the latter approach and calculate portfolio returns and
consumption growth over four and eight quarters both in the model and in the data.77
[Insert Table 1.17 here.]
Panel A of table 1.17 reports the regression results for the simulated data. As discussed
above, the consumption beta is higher for low compared to high offshorability industries.
As a result, L-H has a positive and significant consumption exposure in the model.
The R2 is close to one, since the CCAPM holds within the model. Panel B reports
corresponding regressions for my sample of manufacturing industries. Consistent with
the model, the consumption beta is positive and significant for the L-H portfolio for
four-, six- and eight-quarter returns. This is true both for equal- and value-weighted
returns.
1.4.10 Comparative Statics and Model Counterfactuals
This section explores the role of model parameters using comparative statics analyses
and discusses model counterfactuals. First, I explore comparative statics with respect to
differences in headquarter intensity across industries. Figure 1.7 shows that the model
L-H premium is increasing in the difference in headquarter intensity of low and high
offshorability industries, αL−αH . An increase in the difference in headquarter intensity
across industries maps into an increase in the difference in offshoring potential across
industries (i.e., αL−αH = (1−αH)− (1−αL)). Hence, a larger difference in offshoring
potential implies a larger difference in industry risk premia.
[Insert Figures 1.7 and 1.8 here.]
Second, the left panel of figure 1.8 plots annualized industry returns for different values of
risk aversion, γ. The L-H spread is increasing in risk aversion. To generate returns in line
with market returns over the sample period, a relatively high risk aversion coefficient of
77See Lynch (1996), Marshall and Parekh (1999) and Gabaix and Laibson (2002) for models that
implement slow or delayed adjustment of consumption.
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roughly 80 is needed.78 The right panel of figure 1.8 plots the returns of the two industries
for different levels of import penetration.79 In line with the findings of Barrot, Loualiche,
and Sauvagnat (2017), returns in both industries are increasing in import penetration.
Importantly, the model-implied L-H spread is increasing in import penetration. This
is consistent with the excess return double sorts from tables 1.10 and 1.11. Moreover,
the figure shows that import penetration is a quantitatively important driver of the
L-H spread: an increase in import penetration from 6.26% (benchmark calibration) to
11.12% leads to an increase in the levered L-H spread from 3.82% to 5.73%. This is
intuitive, given that offshoring protects industries against foreign import competition.
Consequently, a reason for the relatively low model L-H spread compared to the data
is that the calibration only accounts for import penetration from China. In fact, over
the sample period, the average import penetration from all countries is equal to 24.95%.
Therefore, allowing for a higher level of import penetration could help in matching the
L-H spread.
Having established that import competition drives returns, one might wonder whether
the L-H spread is predominantly driven by the difference in the level of import penetra-
tion across the two industries (see panel C of table 1.14). To explore this possibility, I
simulate the model such that both industries have the same mean of import penetration.
To do so, I slightly increase the mass of Eastern firms in the high offshorability indus-
try. Panel C of table 1.15 reports the results. Industry excess returns slightly increase
because overall import penetration has increased. Moreover, the levered L-H spread
decreases slightly from 3.82% to 3.45%. Hence, the difference in equilibrium means of
import penetration across industries matters, but it only accounts for 9.7% of the L-H
spread in the benchmark calibration. Therefore, the model-implied L-H spread cannot
be explained by differences in import penetration across industries.
Next, I explore the quantitative importance of the offshorability channel within the
model. To do so, I simulate the baseline model and set the offshorability in both indus-
tries to zero, i.e., (1 − αs) = 0. Consequently, firms can no longer offshore. Moreover,
by setting (1 − αs) = 0, the two industries become identical to each other, since dif-
ferences in headquarter intensity are the only source of industry heterogeneity. Panel
C of table 1.15 reports the moments for valuations and excess returns. In comparison
with the baseline low (high) offshorability industry, the excess returns are 2.65 (5.27)
percentage points higher. This remarkable increase in risk premium is due to a higher
exposure of firm profits to aggregate shocks. To further assess the importance of the
channel in absence of industry heterogeneity, I compare the no offshorability case with
78For comparison, the annualized return (excess return) of the S&P 500 over the sample period is
equal to 8.25% (5.72%).
79Average import penetration is defined as IP =
[∑
s ηsIP
1−θ
s
] 1
1−θ , where IPs is the import pene-
tration of a single industry.
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a counterfactual in which both industries have an offshorability of 20%, (1 − αs) = 0.2
(not shown): offshoring allows the industry risk premium to be lowered by 33% or 3.14
percentage points. Moreover, higher implied discount rates result in 17% lower equity
valuations in the model without offshoring. To sum up, the offshoring channel is eco-
nomically important in the model. Being able to offshore significantly lowers the risk of
an industry, which manifests in lower excess returns and higher equity valuations.
Furthermore, I use the model to explore the response to a sudden increase in trade costs
when shipping goods from East to West. This could be interpreted as the introduction
of a new tax in the West on all imported goods. To do so, I simply replace the trade
cost parameter, τ⋆, with an autoregressive process of order one with the mean equal
to 1.1 and a persistence of .95. This allows me to generate impulse response functions
for model variables upon a shock in trade costs, as shown in figure 1.9. The figure
shows responses after a one percent increase in τ⋆. In the model, an increase in trade
costs leads to lower import penetration from Eastern firms, which reduces the risk for
Western industries. However, higher trade costs also render offshoring less attractive,
since shipment of intermediate goods is more costly. Consistent with this, figure 1.9
shows that both import penetration and the fraction of firms that offshore fall upon
an increase in τ⋆. Interestingly, the asset prices of Western firms also decrease in the
model. Hence, the reduction in the benefits from offshoring outweigh the positive effects
from lower import penetration. Consistent with this, asset prices drop more for the high
compared to low offshorability industry.
[Insert Figures 1.9 and 1.10 here.]
Finally, I explore through the lens of the model what would happen if the comparative
cost advantage of the East over the West were to fade away. This is an important coun-
terfactual, given that hourly manufacturing wages in China have risen by an average of
12% per year since 2001.80 In particular, I assume that the comparative cost advantage
of the East decreases to half of its initial magnitude. Figure 1.10 reports impulse re-
sponses to a positive productivity shock in the East, A⋆, for the benchmark and the low
comparative cost advantage economies. As the comparative advantage becomes smaller,
the East loses its relative cost competitiveness over the West. This leads to lower import
penetration and exposure of Western firms to aggregate productivity shocks in the East.
As a result, industry profits and asset prices drop less compared to the benchmark econ-
omy, and the unconditional risk premium is lower. Importantly, the L-H spread is also
80See the article “A tightening grip” in the Economist from March 12, 2015.
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smaller, with a low comparative advantage.81 Intuitively, offshoring provides insurance
against a risk that is less severe compared to the benchmark economy.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper studies how the possibility to relocate production affects industries’ cost
of capital. Using a new measure of offshorability at the industry level, I find that
industries with low offshoring potential carry an annualized 7.31 percent risk premium
over industries with high offshoring potential. This suggests that the option to offshore
is an important driver of industry risk. The offshorability premium for services is only
half that of manufacturing. For manufacturing industries, traditional factor models fail
to explain the offshorability premium. For service industries, on the other hand, the
premium is explained by the CAPM and a positive loading on the U.S. market.
An explanation based on the recent surge in international trade and specialization is
consistent with various return patterns in the data. Intuitively, being able to reduce
production costs through offshoring allows firms to compete against foreign competitors
from low-wage countries. Consistent with this, double sorts of monthly excess returns
on industry import penetration from low-wage countries and offshorability show that
the offshorability premium is increasing in import penetration from low-wage countries.
A two-country general equilibrium trade model that embeds the option to offshore is
able to rationalize a number of stylized facts: (1) there is a positive excess return spread
between low and high offshorability industries; (2) the offshorability spread is increasing
in import penetration; (3) excess returns for multinational companies are higher than
for domestic firms; and (4) industry excess returns are increasing in import penetration.
Moreover, within the model, counterfactuals indicate that the offshorability channel is
economically important, as it allows industries to lower risk premia by 33% and increase
equity valuations by 17%.
Importantly, three main model predictions are strongly supported by the data. First,
the model predicts a negative relationship between offshorability and profit volatility. In
the data, a one standard deviation increase in industry offshorability is associated with
an up to 19.7% lower profit volatility for the median firm. Second, the model predicts
that the offshorability premium is the largest in industries that have high elasticities of
substitution with respect to imported goods. Double sorts of monthly industry excess
returns on U.S. trade elasticities and offshorability confirm this prediction. Finally,
within the model, low (high) offshorability industries have high (low) covariance with
81The annualized market risk premium and the L-H spread in the low comparative advantage economy
are equal to 4.54% and 2.52%, respectively.
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consumption. Consistent with this, I find that the strategy which is long low and short
high offshorability industries has a positive and significant consumption beta in the data.
Finally, the model implies that a sudden tax increase on all imported goods results in
a decrease in consumption and asset prices. Put differently, losing access to interna-
tional specialization and offshoring benefits outweighs the benefits from lower import
competition.
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1.6 Tables
Table 1.1: Occupation Tasks that define Offshorability
Panel A tabulates the tasks used to calculate occupation offshorability by Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
The acronyms WA and WC in the third column stand for work activity and work context. Panels B
and C report the top and bottom ten occupations by offshorability, offj .
Panel A: Acemoglu and Autor (2011)
4.C.1.a.2.l Face-to-Face Discussions WC
4.A.4.a.5 Assisting and Caring for Others WA
4.A.4.a.8 Performing for or Working Directly with the Public WA
4.A.1.b.2 Inspecting Equipment, Structures, or Material WA
4.A.3.a.2 Handling and Moving Objects WA
4.A.3.b.4 Repairing and Maintaining Mechanical Equipment (*0.5) WA
4.A.3.b.5 Repairing and Maintaining Electronic Equipment (*0.5) WA
Panel B: Top Ten Occupations by Offshorability
SOC Occupation Title offj
31-9094 Medical Transcriptionists 0.50
41-9041 Telemarketers 0.48
43-4011 Brokerage Clerks 0.47
51-6021 Pressers, Textile, Garment, and Related Materials 0.46
15-2041 Statisticians 0.45
43-3031 Bookkeeping, Accounting, and Auditing Clerks 0.45
43-9022 Word Processors and Typists 0.45
51-6031 Sewing Machine Operators 0.44
15-2099 Legal Support Workers 0.44
15-1131 Computer Programmers 0.44
Panel C: Bottom Ten Occupations by Offshorability
SOC Occupation Title offj
37-3013 Tree Trimmers and Pruners 0.26
47-4021 Elevator Installers and Repairers 0.26
29-1151 Nurse Anesthetists 0.26
29-1021 Dentists 0.26
47-5013 Service Unit Operators, Oil, Gas, and Mining 0.26
29-1024 Prosthodontists 0.25
29-2041 Emergency Medical Technicians and Paramedics 0.25
33-1021 Firefighters 0.25
49-9051 Electrical Power-Line Installers and Repairers 0.25
49-9095 Manufactured Building and Mobile Home Installers 0.24
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Table 1.2: Most Offshorable and Non-Offshorable Manufacturing Industries
Panels A and B tabulate the top and bottom ten manufacturing industries in terms of their offshoring
potential, OFFi,t. Industries are defined at the three-digit SIC level until 2001 and at the four-digit
NAICS level thereafter. Manufacturing encompasses industries with SIC codes between 2011 and 3999
and NAICS codes between 311111 and 339999. Panel C reports industry transition probabilities (in
percent), e.g., the probabilities that an industry in the highest offshorability quintile in year t will be in
the second highest offshorability quintile in years t+ 1 and t+ 5.
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Panel A: 1992 - Top and Bottom Ten Manufacturing Industries by Offshorability
SIC Industry Title OFFi,t SIC Industry Title OFFi,t
2310 Men’s and Boys’ Suits, Coats, and Overcoats 2.85 3730 Ship and Boat Building and Repairing -1.43
2320 Men’s and Boys’ Furnishings, Work Clothing 2.58 2450 Wood Buildings and Mobile Homes -1.51
2360 Girls’, Children’s, and Infants’ Outerwear 2.56 2110 Cigarettes -1.52
2330 Women’s, Misses’, and Juniors’ Outerwear 2.35 2430 Millwork, Veneer, Plywood, and Structural Wood -1.63
2340 Women’s, Misses’, and Children’s Undergarments 2.17 3530 Construction, Mining, and Materials Handling -1.88
2350 Hats, Caps, and Millinery 2.05 3860 Photographic Equipment and Supplies -2.09
3150 Leather Gloves and Mittens 1.94 2530 Public Buildings and Related Furniture -2.13
2370 Fur Goods 1.77 3820 Analytical, Optical, Measuring, and Controlling -2.32
2380 Miscellaneous Apparel and Accessories 1.75 3760 Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles and Parts -2.50
3010 Tires and Inner Tubes 1.39 3810 Navigation, Aeronautical, and Nautical Systems -2.95
Panel B: 2015 - Top and Bottom Ten Manufacturing Industries by Offshorability
NAICS Industry Title OFFi,t NAICS Industry Title OFFi,t
334100 Computer and Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing 2.59 311400 Fruits and Vegetables and Specialty Food -0.84
334200 Communications Equipment Manufacturing 2.46 331300 Alumina and Aluminum Production -0.85
334600 Manufacturing Magnetic and Optical Media 2.28 336600 Ship and Boat Building -0.88
334400 Semiconductors and Other Electronic Components 2.16 321200 Veneer, Plywood, and Engineered Wood Products -1.12
333300 Commercial and Service Industry Machinery 1.50 321100 Sawmills and Wood Preservation -1.23
315200 Cut and Sew Apparel Manufacturing 1.47 336100 Motor Vehicle Manufacturing -1.28
315900 Apparel Accessories and Other Apparel 1.32 327300 Cement and Concrete Product Manufacturing -1.33
316900 Other Leather and Allied Products 1.24 331100 Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy Manufacturing -1.38
314900 Other Textile Product Mills 1.10 322100 Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Mills -1.38
316200 Footwear Manufacturing 1.01 327400 Lime and Gypsum Product Manufacturing -1.43
Panel C: Manufacturing Transition Probabilities
year t+1 year t+5
year t Q1(t+1) Q2(t+1) Q3(t+1) Q4(t+1) Q5(t+1) year
t+5
Q1(t+5) Q2(t+5) Q3(t+5) Q4(t+5) Q5(t+5)
Q1(t) 86% 11% 2% 1% 0% Q1(t) 76% 17% 3% 3% 1%
Q2(t) 13% 73% 12% 3% 1% Q2(t) 17% 61% 17% 5% 1%
Q3(t) 2% 12% 72% 12% 1% Q3(t) 2% 19% 59% 18% 2%
Q4(t) 1% 3% 13% 78% 6% Q4(t) 2% 5% 20% 65% 7%
Q5(t) 1% 1% 1% 7% 90% Q5(t) 3% 1% 2% 9% 85%
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Table 1.3: Most Offshorable and Non-Offshorable Services Industries
Panels A and B tabulate the top and bottom ten service industries in terms of their offshoring potential,
OFFi,t. Industries are defined at the three-digit SIC level until 2001 and at the four-digit NAICS level
thereafter. Services encompasses industries with SIC codes below 2011 and above 3999 and NAICS
codes below 311111 and above 339999, respectively. Panel C reports industry transition probabilities
(in percent), e.g., the probability that an industry in the highest offshorability quintile in year t will be
in the second highest offshorability quintile in year t+ 1 and t+ 5.
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Panel A: 1992 - Top and Bottom Ten Services Industries by Offshorability
SIC Industry Title OFFi,t SIC Industry Title OFFi,t
8110 Legal Services 3.47 4740 Rental of Railroad Cars -2.29
6220 Commodity Contracts Brokers and Dealers 2.65 8650 Political Organizations -2.43
8720 Accounting, Auditing, and Bookkeeping Services 2.38 1010 Iron Ores -2.49
6210 Security Brokers, Dealers, and Flotation Companies 2.23 1230 Anthracite Mining -2.52
5120 Drugs, Drug Proprietaries, and Druggists’ Sundries 2.09 8730 Research, Development, and Testing Services -2.53
6060 Credit Unions 1.60 4970 Irrigation Systems -2.56
6140 Personal Credit Institutions 1.46 8230 Libraries -2.78
6030 Savings Institutions 1.41 8620 Professional Membership Organizations -2.78
7290 Miscellaneous Personal Services 1.40 8610 Business Associations -3.30
7370 Computer Programming and Data Processing 1.37 8630 Labor Unions and Similar Labor Organizations -3.32
Panel B: 2015 - Top and Bottom Ten Services Industries by Offshorability
NAICS Industry Title OFFi,t NAICS Industry Title OFFi,t
511200 Software Publishers 3.18 622100 General Medical and Surgical Hospitals -1.23
541200 Accounting, Bookkeeping, and Payroll Services 2.85 623100 Nursing Care Facilities (Skilled Nursing Facilities) -1.25
519100 Other Information Services 2.85 483200 Inland Water Transportation -1.25
541500 Computer Systems Design and Related Services 2.49 212100 Coal Mining -1.29
523100 Commodity Contracts Intermediation and Brokerage 2.41 481200 Nonscheduled Air Transportation -1.31
525900 Other Investment Pools and Funds 2.39 485100 Urban Transit Systems -1.38
541100 Legal Services 2.12 485200 Interurban and Rural Bus Transportation -1.43
523900 Other Financial Investment Activities 2.05 621900 Other Ambulatory Health Care Services -1.43
518200 Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services 2.04 487900 Scenic and Sightseeing Transportation, Other -1.54
525100 Insurance and Employee Benefit Funds 1.93 621200 Offices of Dentists -1.93
Panel C: Transition Probabilities Services
year t+1 year t+5
year t Q1(t+1) Q2(t+1) Q3(t+1) Q4(t+1) Q5(t+1) year
t+5
Q1(t+5) Q2(t+5) Q3(t+5) Q4(t+5) Q5(t+5)
Q1(t) 90% 6% 1% 1% 1% Q1(t) 79% 11% 3% 3% 3%
Q2(t) 7% 83% 7% 1% 1% Q2(t) 14% 63% 15% 6% 2%
Q3(t) 2% 8% 83% 6% 1% Q3(t) 3% 18% 61% 16% 2%
Q4(t) 1% 1% 6% 86% 5% Q4(t) 4% 4% 18% 64% 10%
Q5(t) 0% 1% 2% 6% 91% Q5(t) 1% 2% 4% 11% 82%
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Table 1.4: Correlations
This table reports correlation coefficients of offshorability with various labor-related variables. Panel
A reports the coefficients for correlations at the occupation level. off is occupation-level offshorability;
1{offj>offp66} is a variable that is equal to off if an occupation ranks in the top tercile in terms of
offshorability and zero otherwise; skill is the job zone measure from O*NET; and routine equals the
routine-task content score of an occupation calculated with O*NET task-level data, as in Acemoglu
and Autor (2011). Panel B reports the percentage overlap in occupations within the top tercile for
the different measures. For example, an overlap of 50% means that half of the top tercile tasks are
identical for two variables. Finally, Panel C reports the time-series averages of annual Spearman rank
sum correlations of different variables at the industry level, both for manufacturing and services. The
sample period is 1990-2016. The aggregation to the industry level for Skill and Routine is discussed in
detail in the appendix. Mobility is the industry-level labor mobility measure from Donangelo (2014),
which is available between 1990 and 2011. SC is shipping costs paid by importers. Shipping costs are
obtained at the product-level for all U.S. manufacturing imports and then aggregated at the 3-digit SIC
and 4-digit NAICS industry levels, as in Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017). U.S. trade data are
only available for manufacturing industries. Tradability is final product tradability per industry from
Jensen (2011), which is available at the 4-digit NAICS level. This restricts the sample period to 2002
to 2016. Significance levels are denoted by * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%.
Panel A: Correlation at the Occupation Level
offj 1{offj>offp66} Skill Routine
offj 1
1{offj>offp66} 0.79*** 1
Skill 0.31*** 0.33*** 1
Routine 0.04 -0.02 -0.67*** 1
Panel B: Overlap in Top 33% Occupations per Measure
# Occ # Top 33% # Overlap %-Overlap
off vs skill 772 259 113 43.63%
off vs routine 772 257 86 33.46%
Panel C: Correlation at Industry Level
Skill Routine Mobility SC Tradability
Manufacturing:
Corr(OFFi,t, ) 0.29** 0.10 -0.22* -0.16* 0.13
Services:
Corr(OFFi,t, ) 0.44*** 0.14 0.11 NaN 0.23***
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Table 1.5: All Industries: Univariate Sorts and Four- and Five-Factor Mod-
els
Panel A reports mean excess monthly levered and unlevered returns and corresponding Sharpe Ratios.
L-H stands for an investment strategy that is long the portfolio of firms with low offshorability (L)
and short the portfolio of firms with high offshorability (H). Values in parentheses next to the L-H
mean excess returns correspond to the p-values of the “monotonic relationship (MR)” test by Patton
and Timmermann (2010). Panel B (C) reports Carhart (1997) four- (Fama and French (2015) five-)
factor model regression results both for equal-weighted (columns 2-8) and value-weighted (columns 10-
16) portfolio returns. Monthly α estimates are expressed in percent. Offshorability is lagged by 18
months. Returns are at a monthly frequency. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West). R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. Significance
levels are denoted by * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%. The sample covers returns from July 1991 to
June 2016.
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Equal-Weighted Returns Value-Weighted Returns
L 2 3 4 H L-H L 2 3 4 H L-H
Panel A: Portfolio Sorts
Levered Ret. 1.061*** 0.893*** 0.712*** 0.398 0.452 0.609** (0.07) 1.059*** 0.814*** 0.586*** 0.434 0.255 0.804* (0.00)
Sharpe Ratio 0.69 0.60 0.51 0.27 0.35 0.48 0.73 0.64 0.49 0.30 0.18 0.47
Unlevered Ret. 0.824*** 0.655*** 0.573*** 0.297 0.318 0.506* (0.04) 0.895*** 0.628*** 0.463** 0.341 0.165 0.730** (0.01)
Sharpe Ratio 0.69 0.57 0.52 0.24 0.29 0.46 0.71 0.60 0.47 0.26 0.13 0.43
Panel B: Carhart (1997) Four-Factor
Alpha (%) 0.261** 0.093 0.068 -0.263** -0.057 0.318 0.372*** 0.212 0.102 0.054 -0.062 0.434*
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.21) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.26)
MKT Beta 1.010*** 1.015*** 0.951*** 0.989*** 0.846*** 0.163** 0.929*** 0.938*** 0.874*** 0.852*** 0.901*** 0.028
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13)
SMB Beta 0.624*** 0.470*** 0.272*** 0.406*** 0.227*** 0.397*** 0.283*** -0.072 -0.200*** 0.091* -0.071 0.354***
(0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12)
HML Beta 0.239*** 0.365*** 0.227*** 0.185*** -0.032 0.271*** -0.038 0.113* 0.081 -0.166* -0.328*** 0.291*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.16)
UMD Beta -0.048 -0.064 -0.123*** -0.173*** -0.133*** 0.085 0.117*** 0.000 -0.082* -0.226*** -0.265*** 0.382***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10)
R2 (%) 89.22 87.44 85.70 86.71 75.48 22.09 70.23 76.54 77.98 73.89 77.25 19.41
Panel C: Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor
Alpha (%) 0.081 -0.193** -0.206 -0.466*** -0.269* 0.350* 0.370** 0.046 -0.061 -0.031 -0.171 0.541*
(0.12) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.21) (0.17) (0.13) (0.12) (0.17) (0.18) (0.31)
MKT Beta 1.108*** 1.172*** 1.098*** 1.094*** 0.958*** 0.150** 0.937*** 1.031*** 0.960*** 0.885*** 0.947*** -0.010
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12)
SMB Beta 0.706*** 0.613*** 0.345*** 0.450*** 0.285*** 0.421*** 0.370*** 0.036 -0.204*** -0.062 -0.152* 0.522***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15)
HML Beta 0.163*** 0.237*** 0.142** 0.250*** -0.031 0.195* -0.150* -0.001 -0.004 -0.054 -0.107 -0.043
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) 0.100 (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) 0.148
RMW Beta 0.272*** 0.464*** 0.293*** 0.177* 0.221* 0.051 0.212 0.329*** 0.074 -0.326*** -0.167 0.379
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) 0.151 (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.14) 0.231
CMA Beta 0.035 0.042 0.104 -0.129 -0.041 0.076 0.026 0.047 0.216 0.139 -0.190 0.216
(0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.16) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.18) (0.30)
R2 (%) 90.13 90.54 85.83 84.95 74.56 20.64 69.69 78.84 77.70 71.56 71.80 8.07
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Table 1.6: Manufacturing vs Services Industries
Panel A (B) reports mean excess monthly levered and unlevered returns as well as CAPM regression
results for the sample of manufacturing (services) industries. L-H stands for an investment strategy
that is long the portfolio of firms with low offshorability (L) and short the portfolio of firms with high
offshorability (H). Values in parentheses next to the L-H mean that excess returns correspond to the
p-values of the “monotonic relationship (MR)” test by Patton and Timmermann (2010). Monthly α
estimates are expressed in percent. Offshorability is lagged by 18 months. Returns are at a monthly
frequency. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrela-
tion (Newey-West). R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. Significance levels are denoted by * = 10%,
** = 5%, and *** = 1%. Panel C reports portfolio characteristics for manufacturing and services indus-
tries separately. Size is the time-series average of annual portfolio means of the market capitalization
(logarithm); # Employees is the number of employees as reported in Compustat; Book to Market is
defined as the book value (item CEQ) of equity divided by the market value of equity (item CSHO ×
item PRCC F); Leverage is total debt (item DLC + item DLTT) divided by the sum of total debt and
market value of equity; Labor Intensity is a firm’s labor intensity defined as the logarithm of the ratio of
the number of employees divided by gross property, plant and investment (PPEGT). The sample covers
returns from July 1991 to June 2016.
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Equal-Weighted Returns Value-Weighted Returns
L 2 3 4 H L-H L 2 3 4 H L-H
Panel A: Manufacturing - Portfolio Sorts & CAPM Regressions
Levered Ret. 1.134*** 0.949*** 0.945*** 0.387 0.103 1.031*** (0.01) 1.257*** 0.614*** 0.737*** 0.466 0.045 1.212*** (0.16)
(0.34) (0.31) (0.29) (0.33) (0.27) (0.44) (0.32) (0.26) (0.22) (0.34) (0.29) (0.43)
Unlevered Ret. 0.905*** 0.719*** 0.776*** 0.276 -0.131 1.036*** (0.06) 1.117*** 0.441** 0.620*** 0.378 -0.003 1.120*** (0.22)
(0.27) (0.24) (0.24) (0.30) (0.24) (0.36) (0.28) (0.21) (0.19) (0.31) (0.27) (0.39)
Alpha (%) 0.420** 0.293* 0.355** -0.306* -0.424*** 0.844*** 0.649*** 0.112 0.341** -0.256 -0.503*** 1.152***
(0.19) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.23) (0.21) (0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19) (0.34)
MKT Beta 1.119*** 1.026*** 0.924*** 1.085*** 0.826*** 0.293*** 0.953*** 0.787*** 0.619*** 1.130*** 0.858*** 0.095
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
R2 (%) 71.02 70.61 68.83 71.52 62.20 10.03 55.50 61.84 48.72 65.16 59.45 0.22
Panel B: Services - Portfolio Sorts & CAPM Regressions
Levered Ret. 1.010*** 0.818*** 0.468 0.640* 0.455 0.555* (0.27) 0.991*** 0.577** 0.538* 0.444 0.513* 0.478* (0.06)
(0.35) (0.33) (0.34) (0.33) (0.28) (0.33) (0.33) (0.30) (0.32) (0.33) (0.28) (0.30)
Unlevered Ret. 0.751*** 0.568** 0.309 0.462* 0.405 0.346 (0.37) 0.746*** 0.437* 0.366 0.298 0.412 0.334 (0.15)
(0.28) (0.25) (0.25) (0.27) (0.26) (0.38) (0.28) (0.23) (0.24) (0.29) (0.26) (0.38)
Alpha (%) 0.305 0.146 -0.259* -0.010 -0.058 0.363 0.324* -0.028 -0.096 -0.256 0.014 0.310
(0.20) (0.19) (0.16) (0.20) (0.19) (0.25) (0.20) (0.16) (0.20) (0.18) (0.19) (0.27)
MKT Beta 1.105*** 1.053*** 1.139*** 1.018*** 0.803*** 0.301*** 1.046*** 0.947*** 0.993*** 1.095*** 0.781*** 0.264***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
R2 (%) 68.65 67.53 77.55 65.35 55.98 9.30 64.39 66.42 61.44 70.30 50.80 5.61
Panel C: Portfolio Characteristics
Manufacturing Services
Size 12.80 12.70 12.48 12.66 12.58 12.69 13.04 12.63 12.56 12.67
# Employees 9756 10091 6947 6866 6775 9741 12996 5745 6125 9365
Book to Market 0.66 0.76 0.86 0.92 0.93 0.80 0.85 0.85 0.82 0.81
Leverage 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.23 0.25
Labor Intensity 2.67 3.20 3.56 3.31 3.32 3.18 3.29 3.11 3.54 4.07
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Table 1.7: Manufacturing - Four- and Five-Factor Models
Panel A reports the Carhart (1997) four-factor model regression results both for equal-weighted (columns
2-8) and value-weighted (columns 10-16) portfolio returns. Panel B tabulates similar regression results
for the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015). Monthly α estimates are expressed in percent.
Offshorability is lagged by 18 months. Returns are at a monthly frequency. Standard errors reported
in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West). R2 is adjusted for
degrees of freedom. Significance levels are denoted by * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%. The sample
covers returns of manufacturing industries from July 1991 to June 2016.
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Equal-Weighted Returns Value-Weighted Returns
L 2 3 4 H L-H L 2 3 4 H L-H
Panel A: Manufacturing - Carhart (1997) Four-Factor
Alpha (%) 0.272* 0.163 0.355*** -0.258* -0.399*** 0.671*** 0.556*** 0.054 0.335** -0.002 -0.225 0.782***
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.22) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.29)
MKT Beta 1.071*** 1.001*** 0.878*** 1.011*** 0.766*** 0.306*** 0.940*** 0.821*** 0.654*** 1.019*** 0.761*** 0.180**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
SMB Beta 0.583*** 0.411*** 0.250*** 0.308*** 0.284*** 0.299*** 0.285*** -0.081* -0.193*** 0.097 -0.034 0.319***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13)
HML Beta 0.301*** 0.390*** 0.232*** 0.238*** 0.182*** 0.119 -0.134 0.222*** 0.089 -0.179** -0.214** 0.081
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.18)
UMD Beta -0.021 -0.059 -0.140*** -0.216*** -0.157*** 0.136* 0.145*** -0.013 -0.005 -0.274*** -0.272*** 0.417***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)
R2 (%) 82.26 80.74 75.39 79.64 69.85 17.98 61.02 64.63 51.48 69.70 66.83 16.70
Panel B: Manufacturing - Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor
Alpha (%) 0.092 -0.196 0.077 -0.617*** -0.594*** 0.687*** 0.571*** -0.145 0.167 -0.144 -0.257 0.828***
(0.14) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.24) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.19) (0.35)
MKT Beta 1.159*** 1.175*** 1.005*** 1.173*** 0.848*** 0.311*** 0.945*** 0.919*** 0.739*** 1.070*** 0.754*** 0.191**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09)
SMB Beta 0.679*** 0.599*** 0.343*** 0.331*** 0.342*** 0.337*** 0.372*** 0.012 -0.132** -0.105 -0.195** 0.567***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.16)
HML Beta 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.180*** 0.129 0.236*** -0.051 -0.270*** 0.063 -0.074 -0.122 0.034 -0.304*
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) 0.131 (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 0.170
RMW Beta 0.302*** 0.591*** 0.324*** 0.207** 0.196* 0.106 0.210 0.312*** 0.227*** -0.409*** -0.390*** 0.600**
(0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 0.168 (0.17) (0.10) (0.09) (0.13) (0.15) 0.278
CMA Beta 0.097 0.154** 0.039 0.313* -0.112 0.209 0.055 0.182 0.240*** 0.370** -0.091 0.146
(0.11) (0.07) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) (0.20) (0.19) (0.12) (0.10) (0.19) (0.17) (0.32)
R2 (%) 83.39 85.92 75.39 77.33 68.11 15.86 59.98 66.96 53.46 68.19 62.42 8.80
From Local to Global: Offshoring and Asset Prices 67
Table 1.8: Subsample Analysis
The table reports univariate portfolio sorts for manufacturing industries for different time subsamples.
Panel A tabulates results for equal-weighted returns and Panel B for value-weighted returns. L-H is an
investment strategy that is long the portfolio of firms with low offshorability (L) and short the portfolio
of firms with high offshorability (H). Column MR reports the p-values of the “monotonic relationship
(MR)” test by Patton and Timmermann (2010). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation (Newey-West). Significance levels are denoted by * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%.
The sample includes manufacturing firms and covers the period July 1991 to June 2016.
Panel A: Equal-weighted Returns
Offshorability
L 2 3 4 H L-H MR
1991:07 - 2016:06 1.134*** 0.949*** 0.945*** 0.387 0.103 1.031*** 0.005***
(0.34) (0.31) (0.29) (0.33) (0.27) (0.44)
1991:07 - 1999:12 1.484*** 1.123*** 0.888** 0.660 0.446 1.038* 0.000***
(0.50) (0.47) (0.44) (0.44) (0.41) (0.62)
2000:01 - 2009:12 0.813 0.630 0.712 -0.019 -0.086 0.899 0.017**
(0.65) (0.57) (0.51) (0.65) (0.50) (0.65)
2010:01 - 2016:06 1.171** 1.211** 1.376*** 0.653 -0.054 1.225* 0.332
(0.57) (0.54) (0.52) (0.56) (0.49) (0.72)
2000:01 - 2008:08 0.906* 0.705* 0.834* -0.134 -0.057 0.963 0.068*
(0.48) (0.40) (0.47) (0.56) (0.47) (0.62)
Panel B: Value-weighted Returns
Offshorability
L 2 3 4 H L-H MR
1991:07 - 2016:06 1.257*** 0.614*** 0.737*** 0.466 0.045 1.212*** 0.162
(0.32) (0.26) (0.22) (0.34) (0.29) (0.43)
1991:07 - 1999:12 1.956*** 0.970** 0.917*** 0.805** 0.619** 1.336*** 0.003***
(0.65) (0.46) (0.36) (0.39) (0.30) (0.71)
2000:01 - 2009:12 0.733 0.063 0.186 -0.038 -0.582 1.315* 0.016**
(0.49) (0.45) (0.35) (0.72) (0.63) (0.70)
2010:01 - 2016:06 1.150*** 0.996*** 1.348*** 0.797 0.258 0.892* 0.946
(0.44) (0.39) (0.41) (0.53) (0.30) (0.54)
2000:01 - 2008:08 0.887* 0.094 0.184 -0.061 -0.681 1.568* 0.067*
(0.48) (0.36) (0.34) (0.72) (0.68) (0.83)
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Table 1.9: Panel OLS Regressions - Annual Regressions
This table reports panel regression results. Panel A tabulates results for the sample of manufacturing
firms and Panel B for services firms. The regression design is as follows:
ri,t = a+ bj,t + c ∗OFFi,t−1 + d ∗ controlsi,t−1 + ǫi,t
where the subscripts i stand for firm i = 1, ..N, and t stands for time t = 1, .., T . The explained variable
is ri,t, the firm’s i future annual excess stock return. Realized annual stock returns are aggregated
from July of year t to June of year t + 1 and are expressed in percentages. Control variables are the
following: a is a constant term; bj,t is an industry×year fixed effect, where industries represent the
Fama-French 17 industries; OFF is the offshorability score lagged by 18 months; Size is the firm’s
lagged market capitalization; BM is the firm’s lagged log book-to-market ratio; R&D is the firm’s
lagged R&D investment scaled by assets; Leverage is the firm’s lagged leverage ratio; HN is the firm’s
lagged hiring rate; IK is the firm’s lagged physical investment rate; StockReturn is the lagged stock
return; CashF low is the firm’s lagged cash flow according to Zhang (2016); Op.Lev is the firm’s lagged
operational leverage, as in Donangelo (2014); LaborInt is the lagged labor intensity following Donangelo
(2014); Profitability is a firm’s gross profitability, as defined in Novy-Marx (2011). See appendix for
definitions of firm characteristics. All variables are standardized. Standard errors are clustered at the
firm and year level and reported in parentheses. R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. Significance
levels are denoted by * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%. The sample covers stock returns from July
1991 to June 2016.
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Panel A: Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OFFt−1 -4.64* -4.74* -5.06** -4.52* -5.00* -5.04* -4.84* -4.84* -4.72* -5.73**
(2.57) (2.56) (2.56) (2.64) (2.72) (2.79) (2.61) (2.56) (2.53) (2.88)
Sizet−1 -4.69*** -2.33
(1.79) (1.89)
BMt−1 6.16*** 4.36***
(1.30) (1.28)
Mkt.Leveraget−1 3.42** 1.39
(1.58) (1.22)
HNt−1 -3.63*** -2.63***
(0.58) (1.03)
IKt−1 -2.22* -1.37
(1.18) (1.15)
StockReturnt−1 -2.75*** -2.97**
(1.16) (1.28)
Op.Levt−1 3.48*** 0.28
(0.88) (0.83)
Profitabilityt−1 2.55* 5.75***
(1.54) (1.62)
Fixed Effects Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind
Clustered by Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID
N 39,387 39,336 37,552 32,481 34,743 34,899 38,369 36,103 39,387 25,194
R2 (%) 10.26 10.55 11.01 10.03 10.63 10.23 10.54 9.78 10.34 11.23
Panel B: Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OFFt−1 -1.98* -2.02 -1.50 -1.74 -1.71 -1.46 -1.90 -1.75 -2.11* -0.96
(1.21) (1.29) (1.34) (1.41) (1.24) (1.29) (1.33) (1.23) (1.22) (1.31)
Fixed Effects Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind
Clustered Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID
N 33,824 33,729 31,701 28,090 28,742 28,976 32,837 30,703 33,824 19,912
R2 (%) 8.69 9.21 9.39 9.41 9.28 8.95 8.92 9.02 8.86 11.51
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Table 1.10: Offshorability and Low Wage Countries’ Import Penetration
Panel A reports equal- and value-weighted excess returns conditionally double-sorted on import pen-
etration from low wage countries and offshorability. In any given month, stocks are first sorted into
three portfolios based on their industry import penetration from low wage countries and then into five
portfolios based on industry offshorability. Import penetration from low wage countries is calculated as
in Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006a). Due to data availability, import penetration can only be calcu-
lated until 2011. See appendix for more details on the calculation of import penetration. The split into
low (1), medium (2) and high (3) import penetration industries is based on import penetration terciles
calculated each year. Offshorability is lagged 18 months. Standard errors reported in parentheses are
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West). Panel B tabulates conditional panel
regression results, as in table 1.9. Low IP (High IP) refers to regressions based on firms that belong to
industries with import penetration below (above) the median. For each group, the results for regression
specifications 1 and 10 are reported. All variables are standardized. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm and year level and reported in parentheses. R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. Significance
levels are denoted by * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%. The sample includes manufacturing firms from
1991 to 2011.
Panel A: Return Double Sorts
Equal-weighted Returns
Offshorability
L 2 3 4 H L-H
Im
p
P
en
et
ra
ti
o
n 1 1.015*** 1.007*** 0.798*** 0.275 0.429 0.585
(0.34) (0.36) (0.30) (0.44) (0.28) (0.44)
2 1.067*** 0.709 0.764** 0.356 0.282 0.785
(0.42) (0.46) (0.38) (0.41) (0.41) (0.59)
3 1.515*** 1.172*** 1.009 0.085 -0.128 1.643***
(0.47) (0.44) (0.65) (0.40) (0.47) (0.66)
Value-weighted Returns
Offshorability
L 2 3 4 H L-H
Im
p
P
en
et
ra
ti
o
n 1 0.789*** 0.716*** 0.629*** 0.401 0.570** 0.219
(0.29) (0.30) (0.26) (0.38) (0.29) (0.41)
2 0.858*** 0.949** 0.730** 0.198 -0.063 0.921
(0.36) (0.48) (0.32) (0.38) (0.46) (0.58)
3 1.533*** 0.873 1.253* -0.180 -0.004 1.537***
(0.42) (0.56) (0.66) (0.39) (0.46) (0.62)
Panel B: Conditional Panel Regressions
Low IP Low IP High IP High IP
OFFt−1 -1.78 -2.85 -4.80* -5.90*
(2.60) (199) (2.53) (3.15)
Firm Control N Y N Y
Fixed Effects Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind
Clustered by Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID
N 18,676 11,477 16,866 11,100
R2 (%) 10.66 12.39 11.87 12.71
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Table 1.11: Offshorability and Shipping Costs
Panel A reports equal- and value-weighted excess returns sorted on offshorability and shipping costs.
In any given month, stocks are sorted into three portfolios based on their industry shipping costs and
five portfolios on industry offshorability. Shipping costs are calculated as in Barrot, Loualiche, and
Sauvagnat (2017). The split into low (1), medium (2) and high (3) shipping cost industries is based on
shipping cost terciles calculated each year. Offshorability is lagged 18 months. Standard errors reported
in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West). Panel B tabulates
conditional panel regression results, as in table 1.9. Low SC (High SC) refers to regressions based on
firms that belong to industries with shipping costs below (above) the median. For each group, the results
for regression specifications 1 and 10 are reported. All variables are standardized. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm and year level and reported in parentheses. R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Significance levels are denoted by * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%. The sample includes manufacturing
firms from July 1991 to June 2016.
Panel A: Return Double Sorts
Equal-weighted Returns
Offshorability
L 2 3 4 H L-H
S
h
ip
p
in
g
C
o
st
s 1 1.469*** 0.838* 0.554* 0.218 0.129 1.340**
(0.48) (0.46) (0.29) (0.38) (0.34) (0.59)
2 0.940*** 0.923*** 0.867*** 0.165 0.053 0.887
(0.36) (0.34) (0.32) (0.34) (0.45) (0.58)
3 0.962** 0.944*** 0.670 -0.002 0.406 0.556
(0.45) (0.36) (0.42) (0.48) (0.43) (0.63)
Value-weighted Returns
Offshorability
L 2 3 4 H L-H
S
h
ip
p
in
g
C
o
st
s 1 1.504*** 0.797* 0.657*** 0.169 0.079 1.425***
(0.51) (0.45) (0.26) (0.41) (0.33) (0.61)
2 0.675** 0.678*** 0.713** 0.543 -0.011 0.686
(0.31) (0.29) (0.31) (0.35) (0.44) (0.54)
3 0.625* 0.799*** 0.683* 0.359 0.490 0.135
(0.36) (0.27) (0.40) (0.36) (0.39) (0.53)
Panel B: Conditional Panel Regressions
Low SC Low SC High SC High SC
OFFt−1 -4.86* -5.92* -2.22 -1.66
(2.94) (3.43) (1.52) (1.13)
Firm Controls N Y N Y
Fixed Effects Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind
Clustered by Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID
N 17,145 10,489 16,129 10,691
R2 (%) 10.19 12.13 11.11 12.86
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Table 1.12: Offshorability and Multinational Companies
Panel A reports the post-ranking mean of equal- and value-weighted excess returns of stocks sorted on
offshorability for multinational manufacturing firms and domestic manufacturing firms. Excess Returns
are calculated as realized monthly returns minus the one-month risk-free rate. EW refers to equal-
weighted and VW to value-weighted portfolio returns. L-H stands for an investment strategy that is
long the portfolio of firms with low offshorability (L) and short the portfolio of firms with high offshora-
bility (H). The column MR reports the p-values of the “monotonic relationship (MR)” test by Patton
and Timmermann (2010). Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation (Newey-West). The sample includes manufacturing firms from July 1991 to June
2016. Panel B tabulates conditional panel regression results, as in table 1.9. MNC (Domestic) refer
to regressions based on multinational (domestic) manufacturing firms. For each group, the results for
regression specifications 1 and 10 are reported. All variables are standardized. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm and year level and reported in parentheses. R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Significance levels are denoted by * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%.
Panel A: Univariate Return Sorts
Offshorability
L 2 3 4 H L-H MR
Multinational Manufacturing Firms
EW 1.146*** 1.031*** 0.872*** 0.381 0.076 1.071*** 0.001***
(0.34) (0.32) (0.32) (0.29) (0.28) (0.45)
VW 1.209*** 0.837*** 0.687*** 0.480 0.021 1.188*** 0.004***
(0.30) (0.28) (0.23) (0.32) (0.31) (0.43)
Domestic Manufacturing Firms
EW 0.979*** 0.694* 0.805* 0.120 -0.016 0.995* 0.127
(0.41) (0.41) (0.46) (0.46) (0.32) (0.52)
VW 1.044*** 0.522 1.064*** -0.082 0.132 0.912*** 0.871
(0.34) (0.39) (0.45) (0.46) (0.17) (0.38)
Panel B: Conditional Panel Regressions
MNC Domestic
OFFt−1 -4.16* -4.56* -5.11* -6.06*
(2.34) (2.66) (2.95) (3.50)
Firm Controls N Y N Y
Fixed Effects Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind
Clustered by Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID
N 21,769 16,195 17,509 10,376
R2 (%) 12.51 14.15 9.62 11.19
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Table 1.13: Model Parameters
This table reports the parameters used in the benchmark calibration of the model (see section 1.4.6 for a more detailed description).
Parameter Value Source
Industry Parameters:
Expenditure share differentiated goods a0, a
⋆
0 0.1, 0.9 Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017)
Elasticity across industries θ 1.2 Loualiche (2015)
Elasticity of industry demand σs 3.8 Broda and Weinstein (2006)
Pareto tail parameter κs 3.4 Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
Industry taste parameter δs 0.5
Production:
Headquarter intensity αs 0.55, 0.95 OECD, Blinder (2009)
Wage costs c, c⋆ 0.32, 0 labor costs other than wages/salaries for time actually worked
Labor supply L,L⋆ 1.02, 5 match ratio of working age population in U.S. and China
Mass of firms Ns, N
⋆
s 30, 2.57 match ratio of market capitalization in U.S. and China
Trade:
Iceberg costs τs, τ
⋆
s 1.1 Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
Fixed exporting costs fX , f
⋆
X 3, 0.01 Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017) & match avg import penetration
Fixed offshoring costs fO 5e
−3 match avg import penetration
Aggregate Productivity
West ρa 0.98 U.S. GDP, Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017)
σa 1.6% U.S. GDP, Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017)
East ρ⋆a 0.96 Chinese imports to the U.S., Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017)
σ⋆a 6% Chinese imports to the U.S., Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017)
Stochastic Discount Factor:
Discount factor β 0.99 Bansal and Yaron (2004a)
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution ψ 1.50 Bansal and Yaron (2004a)
Risk aversion parameter γ 80 match U.S. equity premium
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Table 1.14: Model Simulations: Targeted and Model-Implied Moments
The table reports the main moments of the model-generated data. Panel A tabulates the targeted
moments in the model and the data. The share of the market capitalization (MC) in China is calculated
as MCChina/(MCUS + MCChina) and the share of the working age population (WP) in China as
WPChina/(WPUS+WPChina). Panel B (C and D) focuses on moments of macroeconomic (industry and
financial) quantities. Column titles “Low” and “High” refer to low and high offshorability industries.
The model is solved using perturbation methods and is approximated to the 3rd-order around the
deterministic steady state. Moments are calculated based on simulations over 10’000 periods (with a
burn-in period of 1’000 periods).
Panel A: Targeted Moments
model data
Share Market Capitalization China 0.28 0.25
Share Working Age Population China 0.17 0.17
Avg Import Penetration China - Mean 6.26% 6.36%
Avg Import Penetration China - Std 4.08% 2.75%
Panel B: Macro Moments
Agg. Consumption Risk-free Rate Labor Share
model data model data model data
mean 2.80% 2.63% 60.54% 58.40%
std 9.44% 2.00% 0.27% 2.12%
Panel C: Industry Quantities
Import Penetration Industry Profits
Low High Low High
mean 7.39% 5.36% 0.28 0.32
std 5.91% 2.83% 8.14% 3.67%
cov( ,A) -0.60 -0.30 0.24 0.12
cov( ,A⋆) 5.00 2.48 -1.75 -0.79
cov( ,C) -0.51 -0.26 0.76 0.34
Panel D: Asset Prices and Excess Returns
Valuations Excess Returns Export Excess Returns
Low High Low High Low High
mean 10.31 19.96 6.44% 3.53% 8.04% 3.62%
std 2.14% 1.65% 16.33% 8.42% 19.07% 9.14%
cov( ,A) 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.03
cov( ,A⋆) -0.43 -0.34 -0.90 -0.31 -1.28 -0.31
cov( ,C) 0.20 0.16 0.09 0.03 0.13 0.03
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Table 1.15: Variance Decomposition, Model Predictions and Counterfactu-
als
The left (right) part of Panel A shows industry profits and excess returns for the model economy with
shocks only to A (A⋆). Panel B reports panel regression results for profit and sales volatility. Firm-
specific profit and sales volatility are calculated as in Minton and Schrand (1999). All regressions include
year fixed effects. Firm control variables are size, Tobin’s Q, leverage and investment. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm and year level and reported in parentheses. The sample covers manufacturing firms
from 1991 to 2016. R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. Significance levels are denoted by * = 10%, ** =
5%, and *** = 1%. Panel C investigates the role of import penetration in the model by counterfactually
equating import penetration across the two model industries. In addition, Panel C reports moments of
industry valuations and excess returns, assuming that industries have zero offshorability, i.e., αs = 1 for
any s. In other words, the firm’s production function in both industries relies exclusively on headquarter
tasks. Consequently, the two industries are no longer distinguishable and, hence, have identical excess
returns and valuations. Throughout the table, column titles “Low” and “High” label low and high
offshorability industries. The model is solved using perturbation methods and is approximated to the
3rd-order around the deterministic steady state. Moments are calculated based on simulations over
10’000 periods (with a burn-in period of 1’000 periods).
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Panel A: Shock Decomposition
Only Shocks to A Only Shocks to A*
Profits Excess Returns Profits Excess Returns
Low High Low High Low High Low High
mean 0.29 0.32 1.10% 0.59% 0.28 0.32 5.33% 2.93%
std 3.03% 1.33% 4.34% 2.61% 7.59% 3.33% 14.67% 7.70%
cov( ,A) 0.24 0.10 0.07 0.04
cov( ,A⋆) -1.74 -0.77 -0.87 -0.32
cov( ,C) 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.63 0.28 0.31 0.11
Panel B: Panel Regressions
One-Year Lagged Offshorability (x = 1) Five-Year Lagged Offshorability (x = 5)
Profit Vol Sales Vol Profit Vol Sales Vol
OFFt−x -0.03** -0.03* -0.01 -0.01 -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm Control N Y N Y N Y N Y
Fixed Effects Yr Yr Yr Yr Yr Yr Yr Yr
Clustered by Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID
N 21,133 20,819 21,133 20,819 15,056 14,838 15,056 14,838
R2 (%) 1.52 6.41 1.87 10.12 2.58 9.05 3.05 12.57
Panel C: Counterfactuals
Role of Import Penetration No Offshorability (1 − αs = 0)
Import Penetration Excess Returns Valuations Excess Returns
Low High Low High Low High Low High
mean 7.31% 7.31% 6.99% 4.37% 10.86 10.86 9.64% 9.64%
std 4.97% 3.53% 13.60% 8.36% 2.62% 2.62% 19.45% 19.45%
cov( ,A) -0.50 -0.38 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.02
cov( ,A⋆) 4.15 3.10 -0.79 -0.49 -0.52 -0.52 -0.62 -0.62
cov( ,C) -0.47 -0.36 0.09 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.08
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Table 1.16: Double-Sorts: Offshorability and U.S. Trade Elasticities
Panel A reports equal- and value-weighted excess returns conditionally double-sorted on U.S. trade
elasticities and offshorability. In any given month, stocks are first sorted into three portfolios based on
their industry trade elasticities and then further into five portfolios based on industry offshorability. U.S.
trade elasticities are estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006) from 1990 to 2001 at the commodity level
and are aggregated at the industry level based on total imports over 1990-2001. The split into low (1),
medium (2) and high (3) trade elasticity industries is based on trade elasticity terciles. Offshorability
is lagged 18 months. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation (Newey-West). Panel B tabulates conditional panel regression results as in table 1.9. Low
TE (High TE) refers to regressions based on firms that belong to industries with U.S. trade elasticities
below (above) the median. For each group, results for regression specifications 1 and 10 are reported.
All variables are standardized. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and year level and reported in
parentheses. R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. Significance levels are denoted by * = 10%, ** =
5%, and *** = 1%. The sample includes manufacturing firms from July 1991 to June 2016.
Panel A: Return Double Sorts
Equal-weighted Returns
Offshorability
L 2 3 4 H L-H
T
ra
d
e
E
la
st
ic
it
ie
s L 0.918*** 0.761** 0.785*** 0.403 0.027 0.891
(0.36) (0.34) (0.31) (0.35) (0.45) (0.57)
2 1.406*** 0.650* 0.109 0.507 0.109 1.2971**
(0.35) (0.34) (0.46) (0.42) (0.43) (0.56)
H 1.879*** 0.996*** 0.866** 0.535 -0.335 2.213***
(0.48) (0.39) (0.39) (0.52) (0.67) (0.82)
Value-weighted Returns
Offshorability
L 2 3 4 H L-H
T
ra
d
e
E
la
st
ic
it
ie
s L 0.941*** 0.597** 0.750*** 0.434 -0.116 1.057*
(0.31) (0.26) (0.27) (0.31) (0.43) (0.53)
2 1.217*** 0.900*** 0.380 0.566 0.006 1.211**
(0.33) (0.31) (0.42) (0.38) (0.44) (0.55)
H 1.532*** 0.818*** 0.424 0.601 -0.193 1.725**
(0.42) (0.35) (0.42) (0.50) (0.66) (0.78)
Panel B: Conditional Panel Regressions
Low TE Low TE High TE High TE
OFFt−1 -2.74 -2.71 -10.36** -12.14***
(2.10) (2.46) (4.47) (5.17)
Firm Controls N Y N Y
Fixed Effects Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind
Clustered by Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID
N 19,427 13,672 19,667 11,307
R2 (%) 8.33 10.33 12.86 13.49
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Table 1.17: Model Prediction: Consumption CAPM
Panel A reports consumption CAPM (CCAPM) regressions on simulated model data both for return
horizons of 4 and 8 quarters. The reported coefficients, standard errors and R2 are averages over the
regression results of 200 regressions of identical sample size as observed in the data. α estimates are
expressed in percent. L and H stand for low and high offshorability industries in the model. Panel B
then reports analogous CCAPM regression results for my sample of manufacturing industries. Results
are tabulated both for equal-weighted (columns 2-6) and value-weighted (columns 8-12) portfolio returns.
4-quarter, 6-quarter and 8-quarter α estimates are expressed in percent. The portfolios L and H invest
in industries with offshorability in the lowest and highest quintiles. 2−4 is a portfolio that invests in the
remaining industries. Offshorability is lagged by 18 months. Returns on consumption are calculated
based on U.S. real per capita non-durable consumption, as in Parker and Julliard (2005). Standard
errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West).
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. Significance levels are denoted by * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** =
1%. The sample covers returns from July 1991 to June 2016.
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Panel A: Model Regressions
4 Quarter Returns 8 Quarter Returns
L H L-H L H L-H
Avg Alpha (%) 8.685*** 4.745*** 3.940*** 17.088*** 9.361*** 7.727***
(0.25) (0.07) (0.19) (0.48) (0.13) (0.37)
Avg C Beta 3.679*** 1.452*** 2.227*** 3.708*** 1.461*** 2.247***
(0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.02) (0.06)
Avg R2 (%) 97.79 98.73 96.62 96.02 98.00 93.80
Panel B: Empirical Evidence
Equally Weighted Returns Value-Weighted Returns
L 2 - 4 H L-H L 2 - 4 H L-H
4 Quarter Returns
Alpha (%) 3.708 1.309 -5.346*** 9.054*** 5.888*** 0.605 -5.714* 11.602***
(3.23) (2.62) (2.02) (2.23) (2.46) (2.22) (3.00) (3.08)
C Beta 6.318*** 4.334*** 3.513*** 2.805*** 6.346*** 3.833*** 3.755*** 2.591**
(1.61) (1.47) (1.07) (1.16) (1.45) (0.96) (1.10) (1.32)
R2 (%) 19.77 14.10 10.62 5.30 16.24 13.790 8.80 2.35
6 Quarter Returns
Alpha (%) 5.769 3.061 -7.606*** 13.375*** 8.227*** 1.798 -7.339* 15.566***
(3.65) (3.50) (2.45) (2.88) (2.60) (2.93) (3.75) (4.19)
C Beta 6.646*** 4.042*** 3.451*** 3.195*** 7.352*** 3.615*** 3.348*** 4.004**
(1.43) (1.41) (1.04) (1.20) (1.77) (0.90) (0.96) (1.86)
R2 (%) 27.18 15.03 12.87 6.90 19.68 13.81 8.12 4.62
8 Quarter Returns
Alpha (%) 7.508* 4.273 -10.375*** 17.882*** 9.602*** 2.957 -8.869** 18.471***
(3.96) (4.05) (2.72) (3.49) (3.04) (3.53) (4.15) (5.05)
C Beta 6.911*** 3.956*** 3.503*** 3.408*** 8.331*** 3.568*** 3.107*** 5.225***
(1.06) (1.24) (0.96) (1.17) (1.69) (0.81) (0.80) (2.07)
R2 (%) 33.95 15.94 15.11 7.91 27.21 13.66 7.73 6.86
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Figure 1.1: Investment Strategy and Excess Returns
The left figure plots the evolution over time of a one USD investment for the L-H strategy in man-
ufacturing and non-manufacturing industries, the excess return on the market (Mkt), small-minus-big
(SMB) and high-minus-low (HML). The results are presented on a logarithmic scale. The right panel
plots in red the monthly returns of the L-H portfolio in manufacturing. The blue horizontal lines refer
to averages over subsamples. The sample period in both figures runs from July 1991 to June 2016.
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Figure 1.2: U.S. Trade Balances and Growth of Imports/GDP
The left panel plots the U.S. trade balances (i.e., exports minus imports) in goods and services expressed
in 2009 Dollars. Data are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The sample period runs
from 1960 to 2016. The right panel plots the growth of the ratio of imports to the United States from
the world, high-wage countries, China, low-wage countries and low-wage countries excluding China to
U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Details about the calculation of the value of imports from a given
country or countries can be found in the online appendix. Low-wage countries are defined as in Bernard,
Jensen, and Schott (2006a). The sample consists of all imports of manufacturing firms between 1990
and 2015. Trade data are from Schott (2008).
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Figure 1.3: Profits for Different Organizational Choices
This figure plots the profits for different organizational choices against a transformation of idiosyncratic
firm productivity, ϕσ−1. This is convenient, given that firm profits are linear in ϕσ−1. The left panel
plots profits for Western firms and the right panel profits for Eastern firms, assuming that the East has
a comparative cost advantage in producing offshorable tasks.
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Figure 1.4: Mechanism: Positive Shock to A⋆
This figure plots various impulse response functions to a one standard deviation shock to aggregate
productivity in the East, A⋆. The first row shows how the response of aggregate consumption in
both countries changes with risk sharing (exogenously determined by χ). The second row contains
the responses of industry profits (Πs), the fraction of firms that offshore (ζs,O) and import penetration
in the West, IPs with no risk sharing (χ = 0). The three last plots show how the stochastic discount
factor (SDF,M), asset prices and excess returns respond under no and full risk sharing.
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Figure 1.5: Mechanism: Negative Shock to A
This figure plots the impulse response functions of aggregate productivity in the West (A), consumption
(C), the stochastic discount factor (SDF, M), asset prices, industry profits (Πs) and fraction of firms
that offshore (ζs,O) to a negative one standard deviation shock to aggregate productivity in the West,
A.
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Figure 1.6: Panel Regression Coefficients on OFFt−x
This figure plots the regression coefficients of OFFt−x for different lags x. The regressions are identical
to Panel C of table 1.15. Solid lines indicate the regression coefficient point estimates, dashed lines
correspond to the 90% confidence bands and dotted lines correspond to the 95% confidence bands. The
regressions control for firm characteristics (size, Tobin’s Q, leverage, and investment) and include year
fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the firm and year level.
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Figure 1.7: L-H Premium in the Model
This figure plots the model-implied L-H premium as a function of the difference in headquarter intensity
across the two model industries. Differences in headquarter intensity across industries directly map into
differences in offshoring potential across industries. In other words, αL − αH = (1− αH)− (1− αL).
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
risk aversion, γ
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
a
n
n
u
a
li
ze
d
re
tu
rn
s
(%
)
Role of Risk Aversion
2 4 6 8 10 12
average import penetration (%)
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
a
n
n
u
a
li
ze
d
re
tu
rn
s
(%
)
Role of Import Penetration
High Offshorability
Low Offshorability
Figure 1.8: Role of Risk Aversion and Import Penetration
The figures plot averages of simulated model returns for the high and low offshorability industries. The
left panel plots mean returns for different coefficients of risk aversion. The right panel plots returns
for different levels of average import penetration. Average import penetration is calculated as IP =[∑
s ηsIP
1−θ
s
] 1
1−θ , where IPs is the import penetration of a single industry.
From Local to Global: Offshoring and Asset Prices 85
0 10 20 30 40
Quarters
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
Import Competition, ICs
0 10 20 30 40
Quarters
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
Fraction Offshoring, ζs,O
0 10 20 30 40
Quarters
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
Asset Prices
High Offshorability
Low Offshorability
Figure 1.9: Model Counterfactual: Shock to Variable Trade Costs τ⋆
This figure plots the impulse response functions import penetration (IPs), fraction of firms that offshore
(ζs,O) and asset prices to a positive one percent shock to variable trade costs (τ
⋆).
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Figure 1.10: Model Counterfactual: Benchmark vs Low Comparative Ad-
vantage
This figure plots the impulse response functions of industry profits (Πs), asset prices and industry excess
returns to a positive one standard deviation shock to aggregate productivity in the East, A⋆. The solid
lines are the impulse responses in the benchmark economy, while the dashed lines correspond to impulse
responses in an economy in which the comparative cost advantage in offshorable labor of the East is
lower compared to the benchmark calibration.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Sample Construction and Variable Definition
Monthly common stock data is from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP
share code SHRCD = 10 or 11). The sample includes stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX,
and NASDAQ (exchcd = 1 or 2 or 3). Accounting information is from Standard and
Poor’s Compustat annual industrial files. I follow the literature and exclude from my
sample firms with primary standard industrial classifications between 4900 and 4999
(regulated firms) and between 6000 and 6999 (financial firms). Following Zhang (2016),
the firm-level accounting variables and size measures are winsorized at the 1% level to
reduce the influence of possible outliers.
I construct the following variables for every firm:
• Assets is the logarithm of a firm’s total book assets (AT).
• Cash is a firm’s cash holdings defined as cash and short-term investments (CHE)
scaled by total book assets (AT).
• Q is a firm’s Tobin’s Q defined as total book assets (AT) minus common equity
(CEQ) plus the market value of equity scaled by total assets (AT) following Das-
gupta, Noe, and Wang (2011).
• PP&E is net property, plant and investment (PPENT) scaled by total book assets
(AT).
• Size and BooktoMarket are calculated following Fama and French (1992).
• R&D is defined as R&D expenses (XRD) scaled by total book assets (AT).
• Mkt.Leverage is the firm’s financial leverage and defined as the proportion of
total debt of the market value of the firm defined following Fan, Titman, and
Twite (2012). Total debt is the book value of short-term (DLC) and long-term
interest bearing debt (DLTT). The market value of the firm is the market value of
common equity defined as in Fama and French (1992).
• HN and IK are a firm’s hiring and investment rate defined following Belo, Lin,
and Bazdresch (2014).
• CashF low is the cash flow of a firm which is defined following Malmendier and Tate
(2005): earnings before extraordinary items (IB) plus depreciation (DP) divided
by capital stock (PPENT) at the beginning of the following year.
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• Op.Lev is a firm’s operating leverage defined as in Novy-Marx (2011). It is cal-
culated as cost of goods sold (COGS) plus selling, general, and administrative
expenses (SGA) divided by total book assets (AT).
• LaborInt. is a firm’s labor intensity defined as the logarithm of the ratio of the
number of employees divided by gross property, plant and investment (PPEGT)
following Donangelo (2014).
• Profitability is a firm’s gross profitability defined as revenues (REVT) minus cost
of goods sold (COGS) scaled by assets (AT) as defined by Novy-Marx (2011).
• I classify every sample firm in either a domestic, exporter or multinational firm as
in Fillat and Garetto (2015). To do so I use information on geographical company
segments from COMPUSTAT.
• I calculate a firm’s profit and sales volatility following the methodology of Minton
and Schrand (1999). In particular, I use Compustat quarterly for all manufacturing
firms and download quarterly sales, revenues and costs of goods sold. Following
Novy-Marx (2011), I define gross profits as revenues minus costs of goods sold.
I construct the following variables at the industry-level:
• Offshorability is calculated as discussed in the main body of the paper.
• Skill is calculated as in Ochoa (2013):
Skilli,t =
∑
j
λj × empi,j,t × wagei,j,t∑
j empi,j,t × wagei,j,t
, (1.7)
where λj is the skill-level of occupation j. λj is the “job zone” of a given occupation
which ranges between one and five.
• Routine is calculated as follows:
Routinei,t =
∑
j
1{routinej>routinep66} × routinej ×
empi,j,t × wagei,j,t∑
j empi,j,t × wagei,j,t
, (1.8)
where routinej is the routine task score for occupation j which is calculated using
task level content from O*NET as in Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
• Shipping Costs are calculated following Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017).
• Value Share of Imports and Import Penetration are calculated following Bernard,
Jensen, and Schott (2006a). The value share of imports from low wage countries,
for example, is calculated as the total imports from low wage countries in an
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industry divided by the total imports in the same industry. Import penetration
by low wage countries of a given industry i at time t is calculated as follows:
LWPENi,t =
( V Li,t
Vi,t +Qi,t −Xi,t
)
,
where V Li,t and Vi,t represent the value of imports from low wage countries and all
countries, respectively, Qi,t is domestic production, andXi,t represents US exports.
1.8.2 OES Data and Industry Offshorability across Sectors
While the OES survey methodology is designed to create detailed cross-sectional em-
ployment and wage estimates for the U.S., States, metropolitan and nonmetropolitan
areas, across industry and by industry, comparisons of two or more points in time might
be difficult. The time-series interpretation of OES data might be misleading due to
various changes in the construction of the data over time such as changes in the occu-
pational and industrial classification. The nature of these changes are summarized on
the webpage of the Bureau of Labor Statistics as follows:
(Excerpts were downloaded on October 10, 2017 from https://www.bls.gov/oes/oes ques.htm)
Changes in occupational classification: The OES survey used its own occupational
classification system through 1998. The 1999 OES survey data provide estimates for
most of the nonresidual occupations in the 2000 Standard Occupational Classification
(SOC) system. The 2004-2009 OES data provides estimates for all occupations in the
2000 SOC. The May 2010 data provides estimates for most occupations in the 2010 SOC
(for more on the 2010 occupations, see below). Because of these changes, it may be dif-
ficult to compare some occupations even if they are found in both classification systems.
For example, both the old OES system and the 2000 SOC include the occupation ”com-
puter programmers.” However, estimates for this occupation may not be comparable
over time because the 2000 SOC has several computer-related occupations that were
not included in the older classification system. Workers in newly classified occupations,
such as systems software engineers and applications software engineers, may have been
reported as computer programmers in the past. Therefore, even occupations that ap-
pear the same in the two systems may show employment shifts due to the addition or
deletion of related occupations.
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Changes in industrial classification: In 2002, the OES survey switched from the
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system to the North American Industry Classi-
fication System (NAICS). As a result, there were changes in many industry definitions.
Even definitions that appear similar between the two industry classifications may have
differences because of the way auxiliary establishments are treated. For example, un-
der SIC the industry ”grocery stores” included their retail establishments, warehouses,
transportation facilities, and administrative headquarters. Under NAICS, the four estab-
lishment types would be reported in separate industries. Only the retail establishments
would be included in the NAICS industry for ”grocery stores.” The change in industrial
classification also resulted in changes to the occupations listed on the survey form for a
given industry. In 2008, the OES survey switched to the 2007 NAICS classification sys-
tem from the 2002 NAICS. The most significant revisions are in the Information Sector,
particularly within the Telecommunications area. Beginning in 2010, Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) data is included in the Federal Government estimates.
While the main paper shows rankings of industry offshorability for manufacturing and
services separately, table 1.19 reports corresponding rankings across all industries. In
1992, the industries with the highest offshoring potential were almost exclusively man-
ufacturing industries whereas the bottom industries feature mining industries. In 2015,
the industry ranking looks very different. Industries among the top ten are by no means
only related to manufacturing. The bottom industries, however, do not seem to have
drastically changed in their nature compared to 1992. Interestingly, the top ten in 2015
are mostly service industries which is consistent with Jensen (2011), Blinder (2009) and
Amiti and Wei (2009) who discuss that recent advances in communication technologies
increasingly allow for offshoring of service industry jobs. Moreover, this change over
time is in line with recent papers which document that offshoring and replacement of
offshorable jobs with imports have led to a substantial decrease in manufacturing em-
ployment over the recent past.82 This can be seen from figure 1.11 which plots a strongly
negative relationship between U.S. imports as percentage of GDP and the manufactur-
ing employment share. As a result of this, one would expect that the manufacturing
sector becomes relatively less offshorable compared with services over time. Given that
the rankings within manufacturing and services are very persistent over time, the drastic
change in top ten industries in 1992 and 2015 is likely to be due to structural changes
across sectors, i.e. services and manufacturing.
Yet another way to look at this sectoral change in offshorability over time is to plot cross-
sectional correlations of industry offshorability and industry routine-task labor and skill
at different points in time. The results are plotted in figure 1.12. While offshorability
82See among others Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price
(2016) and Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2016).
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and routine are significantly and positively correlated at the beginning of the sample,
the correlation coefficients decrease continuously from 1997 onwards. This pattern is
not due to wage-weighting when constructing the offshorability index. The correlations
look almost identical for the OFF ⋆i,t measure that does not rely on wages (right panel in
figure 1.12). The sudden drop in correlation in 2001 coincides with the sharp decrease in
routine-labor in the U.S. documented by Zhang (2016) and the decrease in manufacturing
employment which was fueled by China’s admission to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 2001 as discussed in Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2016).
Finally, figure 1.13 reports additional evidence on the importance of China for the U.S.
trade deficit in goods. The left panel plots the U.S. trade balance in goods when con-
sidering all countries (solid blue line) and China only (red solid line). The importance
of trades with China for the overall trade balance are striking. In the year 2009, 44.5%
of the U.S. trade deficit in goods was due to trades with China. Interestingly, the right
panel of figure 1.13 shows the trade balance in goods for the U.S. and China, respectively.
Consistent with the interpretation of comparative advantage, the U.S. and Chinese trade
balances in goods look like a mirror image. Of course, this is at best suggestive evidence
because the countries potentially trade with many other countries, i.e. have various and
heterogenous trade partners.
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Figure 1.11: Imports of Goods and Services as a Percentage of GDP
The left figure plots the imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP (left axis) as well as
the manufacturing employment share (right axis). Data are obtained from the World Bank national
accounts data and the OECD National Accounts data files. The sample period runs from 1960 to 2015.
The right figure shows annual U.S. import penetration from low wage countries and China between 1990
and 2011.
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Figure 1.12: Correlation of Offshorability with Skill/Routine over time
This figures plot the cross-sectional correlation coefficients (solid lines) along with 95% confidence in-
tervals (dotted lines) of offshorability and skill and routine, respectively. The correlation coefficient in
a given year is calculated as the Spearman rank correlation between quintiles of offshorability and skill
or routine. The left panel plots the results for the wage-weighted industry offshorability measure and
the right panel for industry offshorability without wage-weighting. The sample period runs from 1990
to 2016.
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Figure 1.13: Trade Balances in Goods
The left panel plots the U.S. trade balances (i.e. exports minus imports) in goods in 2009 Dollars. The
blue solid line refers to the overall trade balance in goods. In other words, trades between the U.S. and
any other country are considered. On the other hand, the red solid line plots the U.S. trade balance in
goods with China only. The right panel plots the overall trade balance in goods both for the U.S. and
China. Data are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The sample period runs from 1960
to 2016.
1.8.3 Robustness: Asset Pricing Results
This section delivers further robustness tests for the asset pricing results in the main
paper. Table 1.20 reports regression results across all industries for the unconditional
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(Panel A) and conditional CAPM (Panel B) as well as the Fama and French (1993)
three factor model (Panel C).
Table 1.21 splits the sample into manufacturing and services industries and reports
regression results for the Fama and French (1993) three factor model.
Table 1.22 reports univariate returns both for the full as well as for various subsamples.
In this robustness test I keep the ranking of industry offshorability fixed over time. In
other words, for the period between 1991 and 2002, I keep the industry offshorability
fixed at the values for 1990, and for the period from 2002 to 2016, I fix offshorability at
the values from the year 2001. Hence, I simply fix offshorability at the first observation
available for the two industry classification regimes in the OES data (as discussed above).
Table 1.23 shows robustness tests for the predictability regressions of the main paper.
Panel A and B report regression results for manufacturing and services for different
industry definitions. While the baseline specification uses industry×year fixed effects
based on 17 industries as defined in Fama and French (1988), I assess the robustness of
the results for 49 industries as defined in Fama and French (1997), industries defined by
one and two digit SIC codes as well as with only year fixed effects.
Table 1.24 shows monthly excess return double sorts on import penetration from China
and offshorability. The results are very similar to the double sorts on import penetration
from low-wage countries and offshorability.
Finally, tables 1.25 and 1.26 report factor model regression results which control for
the globalization risk premium as defined in Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017)
and factors based on foreign exchange exposure from Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan
(2011) and Verdelhan (2017).
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Table 1.18: Occupation Tasks that define Offshorability
This table tabulates the tasks used to calculate occupation offshorability by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux
(2013). The acronyms WA and WC in the third column stand for work activity and work context.
Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2013)
Face-to-Face Contact
4.C.1.a.2.l Face-to-Face Discussions WC
4.A.4.a.4 Establishing and Maintaining Interpersonal Relationships WA
4.A.4.a.5 Assisting and Caring for Others WA
4.A.4.a.8 Performing for or Working Directly with the Public WA
4.A.4.b.5 Coaching and Developing Others WA
On-site
4.A.1.b.2 Inspecting Equipment, Structures, or Material WA
4.A.3.a.2 Handling and Moving Objects WA
4.A.3.a.3 Controlling Machines and Processes WA
4.A.3.a.4 Operating Vehicles, Mechanized Devices, or Equipment WA
4.A.3.b.4 Repairing and Maintaining Mechanical Equipment (*0.5) WA
4.A.3.b.5 Repairing and Maintaining Electronic Equipment (*0.5) WA
Decision-Making
4.A.2.b.1 Making Decisions and Solving Problems WA
4.A.2.b.2 Thinking Creatively WA
4.A.2.b.4 Developing Objectives and Solving Problems WC
4.C.1.c.2 Responsibility for Outcomes and Results WC
4.C.3.a.2.b Frequency of Decision Making
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Table 1.19: Most Offshorable and Non-Offshorable Industries
Panels A and B tabulate the top and bottom ten industries in terms of their offshoring potential, OFFi,t, for the years 1992 and 2015, respectively. Industries are defined
at the three-digit SIC level until 2001 and at the four-digit NAICS level thereafter.
Panel A: 1992 - Top and Bottom Ten Industries by Offshorability
SIC Industry Title OFFi,t SIC Industry Title OFFi,t
8720 Accounting, Auditing, and Bookkeeping Services 2.419 8650 Political Organizations -2.174
2310 Men’s and Boys’ Suits, Coats, and Overcoats 2.392 8620 Professional Membership Organizations -2.213
7250 Shoe Repair Shops and Shoeshine Parlors 2.257 3760 Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles and Parts -2.254
2320 Men’s and Boys’ Furnishings, Work Clothing, and Allied Garments 2.141 3660 Communications Equipment -2.430
2360 Girls’, Children’s, and Infants’ Outerwear 2.120 8730 Research, Development, and Testing Services -2.438
2330 Women’s, Misses’, and Juniors’ Outerwear 1.921 8630 Labor Unions and Similar Labor Organizations -2.631
2340 Women’s, Misses’, Children’s, and Infants’ Undergarments 1.759 1060 Ferroalloy Ores, Except Vanadium -2.715
2340 Hats, Caps, and Millinery 1.649 4820 Telegraph Communication -2.827
3150 Leather Gloves and Mittens 1.543 3810 Aeronautical and Nautical Systems -3.019
2380 Miscellaneous Apparel and Accessories 1.541 1230 Anthracite Mining -3.843
Panel B: 2015 - Top and Bottom Ten Industries by Offshorability
NAICS Industry Title OFFi,t NAICS Industry Title OFFi,t
511200 Software Publishers 3.240 237100 Nonscheduled Air Transportation -1.307
541200 Acccounting, Tax Preparation, Bookkeeping, and Payroll Services 3.150 483200 Utility System Construction -1.307
519100 Other Information Services 3.057 485500 Inland Water Transportation -1.336
541500 Compuer Systems Design and Related Services 3.017 481100 Charter Bus Industry -1.397
523900 Other Financial Activities 2.901 487900 Scenic and Sightseeing Transportation -1.425
334100 Computer and Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing 2.521 212100 Coal Mining -1.458
518200 Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services 2.473 485200 Interurban and Rural Bus Transportation -1.604
541100 Legal Services 2.470 485100 Urban Transport Sytems -1.612
524100 Insurance Carriers 2.450 621200 Offices of Dentists -1.706
511100 Newspaper, Periodical, Book, and Directory Publishers 2.346 621900 Other Ambulatory Health Care Services -1.948
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Table 1.20: CAPM and Three-Factor Model
Panel A reports unconditional CAPM regression results both for equal-weighted (columns 2-8) and value-weighted (columns 10-16) portfolio returns. Panel B tabulates
results for conditional CAPM regressions and Panel C for the Fama and French (1992) three-factor model. Monthly α estimates are expressed in percent. Offshorability
is lagged by 18 months. Returns are at a monthly frequency. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West).
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. Significance levels are denoted by * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%. The sample covers returns from July 1991 to June 2016.
Equal-Weighted Returns Value-Weighted Returns
L 2 3 4 H L-H L 2 3 4 H L-H
Panel A: Unconditional CAPM
Alpha (%) 0.313* 0.160 0.041 -0.335 -0.163 0.476** 0.468*** 0.240* 0.049 -0.169 -0.367** 0.835***
(0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.24) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.18) (0.31)
MKT Beta 1.176*** 1.151*** 1.065*** 1.154*** 0.955*** 0.222*** 0.949*** 0.920*** 0.859*** 0.966*** 0.993*** -0.044
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13)
R2 (%) 76.11 76.60 79.93 78.38 71.81 5.95 65.55 75.85 73.98 69.40 69.35 0.45
Panel B: Conditional CAPM
Avg. Alpha (%) 0.239* 0.107 0.066 -0.233 -0.171 0.411 0.192 0.199 0.100 0.078 -0.215 0.406*
(0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.17) (0.24) (0.27) (0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.28) (0.16) (0.22)
Avg. MKT Beta 1.297*** 1.230*** 1.083*** 1.215*** 0.987*** 0.310 1.093*** 0.858*** 0.774*** 0.853* 0.986*** 0.107
(0.38) (0.31) (0.32) (0.34) (0.31) (0.28) (0.44) (0.30) (0.28) (0.50) (0.39) (0.28)
Avg. R2 (%) 76.32 77.91 78.78 73.35 68.93 11.51 71.92 74.24 72.95 71.42 71.27 3.62
Panel C: Fama and French (2015) Three-Factor
Alpha (%) 0.218* 0.036 -0.042 -0.417*** -0.176 0.394* 0.476*** 0.213* 0.029 -0.148 -0.298* 0.775***
(0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.20) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.28)
MKT Beta 1.031*** 1.043*** 1.006*** 1.065*** 0.906*** 0.125 0.877*** 0.938*** 0.910*** 0.952*** 1.018*** -0.141
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13)
SMB Beta 0.617*** 0.460*** 0.254*** 0.380*** 0.207* 0.410*** 0.301*** -0.072* -0.212*** 0.058 -0.110 0.411***
(0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.15)
HML Beta 0.256*** 0.387*** 0.270*** 0.245*** 0.014 0.242** -0.078 0.113* 0.110** -0.087 -0.236** 0.158
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.10) (0.19)
R2 89.08 87.15 84.35 84.34 73.61 20.81 69.13 76.62 77.20 69.63 71.30 5.66
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Table 1.21: Manufacturing vs. Services: Fama & French Three-Factor Model
Panel A (B) reports Fama and French (1992) three-factor model regression results for the sample of manufacturing (services) industries. Results are tabulated both for
equal-weighted (columns 2-8) and value-weighted (columns 10-16) portfolio returns. Monthly α estimates are expressed in percent. Offshorability is lagged by 18 months.
Returns are at a monthly frequency. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West). R2 is adjusted for
degrees of freedom. Significance levels are denoted by * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%. The sample covers returns from July 1991 to June 2016.
Equal-Weighted Returns Value-Weighted Returns
L 2 3 4 H L-H L 2 3 4 H L-H
Panel A: Manufacturing - Fama and French (2015) Three-Factor
Alpha (%) 0.255* 0.112 0.234 -0.443*** -0.533*** 0.788*** 0.681*** 0.044 0.331** -0.237 -0.458*** 1.139***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22) (0.20) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19) (0.17) (0.32)
MKT Beta 1.079*** 1.021*** 0.927*** 1.085*** 0.819*** 0.259*** 0.890*** 0.825*** 0.656*** 1.113*** 0.854*** 0.036
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
SMB Beta 0.581*** 0.404*** 0.233** 0.282*** 0.265*** 0.315*** 0.303*** -0.083* -0.194*** 0.064 -0.066 0.369**
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.17)
HML Beta 0.309*** 0.412*** 0.285*** 0.320*** 0.241*** 0.068 -0.189* 0.226*** 0.090 -0.076 -0.111 -0.077
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.12) (0.22)
R2 (%) 82.29 80.52 73.57 76.33 67.27 15.60 59.61 64.73 51.64 65.21 59.80 4.25
Panel B: Services - Fama and French (2015) Three-Factor
Alpha (%) 0.190 -0.012 -0.363*** -0.087 -0.103 0.293 0.316* -0.067 -0.173 -0.154 -0.022 0.338
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.19) (0.17) (0.20) (0.18) (0.19) (0.26)
MKT Beta 1.037*** 1.009*** 1.103*** 0.970*** 0.798*** 0.239*** 1.006*** 0.964*** 1.006*** 1.060*** 0.798*** 0.208***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
SMB Beta 0.637*** 0.586*** 0.430*** 0.442*** 0.124 0.512*** 0.248*** -0.018 0.082 -0.004 -0.020 0.268***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11)
HML Beta 0.144** 0.289*** 0.177*** 0.093 0.094 0.051 -0.054 0.121* 0.203** -0.299*** 0.113 -0.167
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12)
R2 (%) 80.27 79.54 83.54 71.49 56.65 22.92 66.21 66.77 62.58 72.73 51.05 9.77
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Table 1.22: Subsample Analysis - Fixed Quintiles
The table reports univariate portfolio sorts for manufacturing industries for different time subsamples.
Panel A tabulates results for equal-weighted returns and Panel B for value-weighted returns. L-H is an
investment strategy that is long the portfolio of firms with low offshorability (L) and short the portfolio
of firms with high offshorability (H). The columnMR reports the p-values of the “monotonic relationship
(MR)” test by Patton and Timmermann (2010). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation (Newey-West). Significance levels are denoted by * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%.
The sample includes manufacturing firms and covers the period from July 1991 to June 2016.
Panel A: Equal-weighted Returns
Offshorability
L 2 3 4 H L-H MR
1991:07 - 2016:06 1.029*** 0.854*** 0.892*** 0.287 0.173 0.856* 0.058*
(0.35) (0.32) (0.33) (0.29) (0.27) (0.45)
1991:07 - 1999:12 1.466*** 0.830** 0.906* 0.723* 0.462 1.004 0.085*
(0.51) (0.38) (0.47) (0.42) (0.41) (0.65)
2000:01 - 2009:12 0.556 0.642 0.641 -0.178 -0.015 0.571 0.181
(0.68) (0.62) (0.65) (0.56) (0.49) (0.84)
2010:01 - 2016:06 1.184** 1.211** 1.260** 0.431 0.085 1.099 0.055*
(0.57) (0.56) (0.54) (0.48) (0.50) (0.75)
2000:01 - 2008:08 0.601 0.737 0.591 -0.203 0.025 0.576 0.261
(0.54) (0.47) (0.54) (0.49) (0.46) (0.71)
Panel B: Value-weighted Returns
Offshorability
L 2 3 4 H L-H MR
1991:07 - 2016:06 1.105*** 0.817*** 0.652*** 0.452 0.207 0.898** 0.000***
(0.38) (0.25) (0.23) (0.29) (0.23) (0.44)
1991:07 - 1999:12 2.173*** 1.065*** 0.793** 0.809** 0.615** 1.557** 0.021**
(0.65) (0.41) (0.40) (0.39) (0.30) (0.71)
2000:01 - 2009:12 0.235 0.420 0.092 -0.033 -0.128 0.363 0.037**
(0.70) (0.45) (0.38) (0.58) (0.47) (0.85)
2010:01 - 2016:06 1.047*** 1.101*** 1.330*** 0.730 0.187 0.859* 0.955
(0.43) (0.40) (0.40) (0.47) (0.30) (0.52)
2000:01 - 2008:08 0.313 0.502 0.077 -0.055 -0.157 0.470 0.018**
(0.76) (0.35) (0.37) (0.53) (0.49) (0.90)
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Table 1.23: Robustness: Industry Specification
This table reports robustness checks for the panel regression results in the main body of the paper. In particular, the table reports the two main regression specifications
(regression specifications 1 and 14 in the main table) for different industry classifications both for manufacturing (Panel A) and services (Panel B). All variables are
standardized. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and year level and reported in parentheses. R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. Significance levels are denoted
by * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%. The sample covers stock returns from July 1991 to June 2016.
Panel A: Manufacturing - Alternative Industry Classifications
Baseline FF49 SIC1 SIC2 No Ind.
OFFt−1 -4.64* -5.73** -2.60** -3.79*** -5.68** -6.77** -3.72* -4.29* -5.61** -7.46**
(2.57) (2.88) (1.30) (1.40) (2.92) (3.06) (2.13) (2.27) (2.54) (3.32)
Firm Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Fixed Effects Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr Yr
Clustered by Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID
N 39,387 25,194 39,387 25,194 39,387 25,194 39,387 25,194 39,387 25,194
R2 10.26 11.23 12.44 14.07 6.79 8.75 10.16 11.80 6.46 8.10
Panel B: Services - Alternative Industry Classifications
Baseline FF49 SIC1 SIC2 No Ind.
OFFt−1 -1.98* -0.96 -0.90 -0.25 -1.91 -0.49 -1.34 -0.25 -2.64* -1.74
(1.21) (1.31) (1.04) (1.14) (1.25) (1.26) (1.33) (1.46) (1.46) (1.44)
Firm Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Fixed Effects Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr Yr
Clustered by Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID
N 33,824 19,912 33,824 19,912 33,824 19,912 33,824 19,912 33,824 19,912
R2 8.69 11.51 10.41 13.54 8.44 11.16 10.65 13.72 5.28 7.51
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Table 1.24: Double-Sorts: Offshorability and China’s Import Penetration
Panel A reports equal- and value-weighted excess returns conditionally double-sorted on import pene-
tration from China and offshorability. In any given month, stocks are first sorted into three portfolios
based on their industry import penetration from China and then into five portfolios based on industry
offshorability. Import penetration from China is calculated as in Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006a).
Due to data availability import penetration can only be calculated until 2011. See appendix for more
details on the calculation of import penetration. The split into low (1), medium (2) and high (3) im-
port penetration industries is based on import penetration terciles calculated each year. Offshorability
is lagged 18 months. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation (Newey-West). The sample includes manufacturing firms from 1991 to 2011. Panel B
tabulates conditional panel regression results identical to the ones in table 9 of the main paper. Low IP
(High IP) refers to regressions based on firms that belong to industries with import penetration below
(above) the median. For each group, results for regression specifications 1 and 10 are reported. All
variables are standardized. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and year level and reported in
parentheses. R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. Significance levels are denoted by * = 10%, ** =
5%, and *** = 1%.
Panel A: Return Double Sorts
Equal-weighted Returns
Offshorability
L 2 3 4 H L-H
Im
p
P
en
et
ra
ti
o
n 1 1.010*** 0.914*** 0.752*** 0.445 0.408 0.602
(0.33) (0.39) (0.30) (0.46) (0.27) (0.43)
2 1.134*** 0.896** 0.778** 0.436 0.188 0.945
(0.41) (0.45) (0.37) (0.39) (0.44) (0.60)
3 1.475*** 1.184*** 0.975 0.036 -0.135 1.610***
(0.47) (0.46) (0.73) (0.39) (0.47) (0.66)
Value-weighted Returns
Offshorability
L 2 3 4 H L-H
Im
p
P
en
et
ra
ti
o
n 1 0.805*** 0.662** 0.621*** 0.461 0.581** 0.224
(0.28) (0.30) (0.26) (0.43) (0.28) (0.39)
2 0.925*** 1.111** 0.812*** 0.264 -0.168 1.093*
(0.35) (0.48) (0.32) (0.36) (0.48) (0.59)
3 1.481*** 0.875 1.319* -0.175 0.021 1.460**
(0.42) (0.56) (0.74) (0.39) (0.46) (0.62)
Panel B: Conditional Panel Regressions
Low IP Low IP High IP High IP
OFFt−1 -1.84 -2.95 -4.77* -5.82*
(2.58) (1.96) (2.57) (3.18)
Firm Control N Y N Y
Fixed Effects Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind Yr x Ind
Clustered by Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID Yr & ID
N 18,661 11,476 16,881 11,100
R2 (%) 10.74 12.55 10.75 12.62
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Table 1.25: Manufacturing - Offshorability and SC Betas
This table replicates the findings of Barrot, Loualiche, and Sauvagnat (2017). Panel A reports mean
excess returns and Sharpe ratios for portfolios sorted on shipping costs. The remaining table reports
time-series regression results with equal-weighted (Panel B) and value-weighted (Panel C) portfolios
returns as dependent variables. The portfolios are sorted on Offshorability which is lagged by 18
months. The long-short shipping costs portfolio (L-H from Panel A), SC, is the only independent
variable in all regressions. Returns are at a monthly frequency. Standard errors reported in parentheses
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West). R2 is adjusted for degrees of
freedom. Significance levels are denoted by * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%. The sample covers
returns of manufacturing industries from July 1991 to June 2016.
Panel A: Portfolio Sorts
Shipping Cost Portfolios
L 2 3 4 H L-H
Mean Excess Retrun (%) 1.517*** 1.209*** 1.144*** 1.100** 0.878* 0.639**
Sharpe Ratio 0.62 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.57 0.48
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Returns
Offshorability
L 2 3 4 H L-H
Alpha (%) 1.009*** 0.919*** 0.888*** 0.327 0.055 0.954***
(0.35) (0.32) (0.29) (0.34) (0.28) (0.23)
SC Beta 0.189*** 0.044 0.085 0.091 0.073 0.116
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
R2 (%) 4.22 0.04 0.98 0.79 0.75 3.32
Panel C: Value-Weighted Returns
Offshorability
L 2 3 4 H L-H
Alpha (%) 1.047*** 0.600** 0.681*** 0.295 -0.078 1.125***
(0.29) (0.26) (0.21) (0.34) (0.29) (0.32)
SC Beta 0.317*** 0.021 0.085 0.258*** 0.185* 0.132
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13)
R2 (%) 13.58 0.24 1.72 7.35 5.94 2.07
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Table 1.26: Manufacturing - Offshorability and FX Betas
This table reports regression results of two factor models based on the US market excess return and three different currency factors, respectively. I use the currency factor
(excess return of high interest rate currencies minus low interest rate currencies) from Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011) in Panel A, the carry factor from Verdelhan
(2017) in Panel B and the dollar factor from Verdelhan (2017) in Panel C. Each model is estimated for equal-weighted (columns 2-7) and value-weighted (columns 8-13)
portfolio returns. Monthly α estimates are expressed in percent. Offshorability is lagged by 18 months. Returns are at a monthly frequency. Standard errors reported
in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West). R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. Significance levels are denoted by * = 10%,
** = 5%, and *** = 1%. The sample covers returns of manufacturing industries from July 1991 to June 2016.
Equal-Weighted Returns Value-Weighted Returns
L 2 3 4 H L-H L 2 3 4 H L-H
Panel A: Currency Factor - Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2011)
Alpha (%) 0.406** 0.330* 0.338** -0.321* -0.345** 0.751*** 0.623*** 0.101 0.418*** -0.323* -0.532*** 1.155***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.23) (0.22) (0.18) (0.15) (0.19) (0.19) (0.35)
MKT Beta 1.109*** 1.029*** 0.907*** 1.102*** 0.811*** 0.298*** 0.937*** 0.787*** 0.612*** 1.118*** 0.868*** 0.070
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12)
FX Beta 0.050 -0.031 0.059 -0.036 -0.031 0.081 0.062 0.000 -0.068 0.088 0.019 0.043
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13)
R2 (%) 70.63 70.00 68.11 71.72 61.87 11.45 54.56 60.95 47.61 65.12 59.48 0.53
Panel B: Carry Factor - Verdelhan (2017)
Alpha (%) 0.592*** 0.401** 0.427 -0.210 -0.251 0.843*** 0.785*** 0.140 0.184 -0.182 -0.469* 1.255***
(0.23) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.18) (0.28) (0.26) (0.20) (0.19) (0.23) (0.25) (0.43)
MKT Beta 1.093*** 0.988*** 0.868*** 1.092*** 0.799*** 0.294*** 0.953*** 0.761*** 0.593*** 1.119*** 0.888*** 0.064
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13)
Carry Beta -0.014 0.008 -0.119 0.018 -0.033 0.019 0.017 -0.004 0.068 -0.106 -0.072 0.089
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.15)
R2 (%) 68.61 67.67 67.57 71.50 62.02 9.29 51.87 58.07 46.25 63.64 59.09 0.44
Panel C: Dollar Factor - Verdelhan (2017)
Alpha (%) 0.602*** 0.416** 0.386** -0.200 -0.269 0.871*** 0.795*** 0.147 0.208 -0.230 -0.501** 1.296***
(0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.18) (0.27) (0.26) (0.21) (0.18) (0.23) (0.24) (0.42)
MKT Beta 1.059*** 0.957*** 0.875*** 1.082*** 0.818*** 0.241*** 0.941*** 0.740*** 0.588*** 1.152*** 0.910*** 0.031
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13)
USD Beta -0.287*** -0.230 -0.129 -0.051 0.098 -0.385*** -0.065 -0.167 0.062 0.099 0.062 -0.127
(0.11) (0.15) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.21)
R2 (%) 69.30 68.21 67.40 71.52 62.12 11.85 51.90 58.48 46.14 63.53 59.01 0.41
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Table 1.27: Low-wage Countries
This table lists the low-wage countries. I follow Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006a) and define a country
as low-wage in year t if its per capita GDP is less than 5% of U.S. per capita GDP.
Afghanistan China India Pakistan
Albania Comoros Kenya Rwanda
Angola Congo Lao PDR Samoa
Armenia Equitorial Guinea Lesotho Sao Tome
Azerbaijan Eritrea Madagascar Sierra Leone
Bangladesh Ethiopia Malawi Somalia
Benin Gambia Maldives Sri Lanka
Bhutan Georgia Mali St. Vincent
Burkina Faso Ghana Mauritania Sudan
Burundi Guinea Moldova Togo
Cambodia Guinea-Bissau Mozambique Uganda
Central African Rep Guyana Nepal Vietnam
Chad Haiti Niger Yemen
1.8.4 Model
1.8.4.1 Demand Side
1st Layer - Sector Demand
In the first layer, households decide how to optimally allocate consumption between
homogenous and differentiated goods:
maxc1−a00 C
a0
T , s.t. PTCT + p0c0 ≤ Y,
where CT is the consumption index aggregated from consumption in the S industries
consisting of differentiated goods, PT is the corresponding price index, c0 and p0 are the
consumption and price of the homogenous good, and Y is the total income of consumers.
First-order conditions imply the following demand functions and the aggregate price
index, P :
c0 = (1− a0)PC
p0
CT = a0
PC
PT
P =
(
PT
a0
)a0 ( p0
1− a0
)1−a0
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The good 0 is produced under constant returns to scale and a production function that
is linear in labor.83 Moreover, the good is freely traded and used as a numeraire in each
country. Its price is set to 1.84 Consequently, productivity changes across countries can
be interpreted as real productivity changes.
2nd Layer - Industry Demand
The aggregation over industry consumption is constant elasticity of substitution with
elasticity θ. The optimization problem is as follows:
max
[∑
s
δ
1
θ
s C
θ−1
θ
s
] θ
θ−1
, s.t.
∑
s
PsCs ≤ PTCT ,
where Ps are industry price levels and ηs are industry taste parameters such that
∑
s ηs =
1. First-order conditions imply demand functions and price indices:
Cs = δs
(
Ps
PT
)−θ
CT
PT =
[∑
s
δsP
1−θ
s
] 1
1−θ
3rd Layer - Product Demand
Demand for the product variety, ω, produced by firms:
cs(ϕ) =
(
ps(ϕ)
Ps
)−σs
Cs
Price index in industry s:
Ps =
[∫
Ωs
ps(ϕ)
1−σsdϕ
] 1
1−σs
83In other words, one unit of labor produces one unit of good 0.
84This normalization also leads to wages being equal to 1 in both countries.
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1.8.4.2 Aggregation - Western Firms
Domestic Production
The fraction of firms that choose not to offshore is:
ζs,D = Prob{ϕ < ϕs,O} = G(ϕs,O) = 1−
(
ϕs,O
ϕmin
)−κs
The average productivity of firms with productivity higher than the minimum produc-
tivity ϕs,min but lower than the cutoff value ϕs,O is equal to:
ϕ¯s,D =
[∫ ϕs,O
ϕs,min
ϕσs−1dGs(ϕ)
G(ϕs,O)
] 1
σs−1
= νs
ϕσs−1min − ϕκsminϕ(σs−1)−kss,O
1−
(
ϕs,min
ϕs,O
)ks

1
σs−1
where νs =
[
κs
ks−(σs−1)
] 1
σs−1 .
Partially Offshored Firms
The fraction of firms that choose to offshore is:
ζs,O = Prob{ϕ > ϕs,O} = 1−G(ϕs,O) =
(
ϕs,O
ϕs,min
)−κs
The average productivity of firms with productivity higher than cutoff value ϕs,O is
equal to:
ϕ¯s,O =
[∫∞
ϕs,O
ϕσs−1dGs(ϕ)
1−G(ϕs,O)
] 1
σs−1
= νsϕs,O
Export: Partially Offshored Firms
This is the relevant case for firms with headquarter in the West. The average produc-
tivity of firms with productivity higher than the cutoff ϕs,X,O is equal to:
ϕ¯s,X,O =
[∫∞
ϕs,X,O
ϕσs−1dGs(ϕ)
1−G(ϕs,X,O)
] 1
σs−1
= νsϕs,X,O
The fraction of firms that choose to offshore is:
ζs,X,O = Prob{ϕ > ϕs,X,O} = 1−G(ϕs,X,O) =
(
ϕs,X,O
ϕs,min
)−κs
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1.8.4.3 Aggregation - Eastern Firms
Domestic Production
All firms engage in domestic production. Hence, the fraction is equal to 1. The average
productivity of firms with productivity higher than the minimum productivity ϕs,min
but lower than the cutoff value ϕs,O is equal to:
ϕ¯⋆s,D =
[∫ ∞
ϕ⋆s,min
ϕσs−1dGs(ϕ)
] 1
σs−1
= νsϕ
⋆
s,min
Export: Purely Domestic Firms
The fraction of firms that choose to export is:
ζ⋆s,X,D = Prob{ϕ > ϕ⋆s,X,D} = 1−G(ϕ⋆s,X,D) =
(
ϕ⋆s,X,D
ϕ⋆s,min
)−κs
The average productivity of firms with productivity higher than the cutoff ϕ⋆s,X,D is
equal to:
ϕ¯⋆s,X,D =
∫∞ϕ⋆s,X,D ϕσs−1dGs(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ⋆s,X,D)
 1σs−1 = νsϕ⋆s,X,D
1.8.4.4 Model Extension: International Bond Trading
In this section, I allow for international sovereign bond trading as in Ghironi and Melitz
(2005). Allowing for bond trading is an important model extension because it allows
model households to smooth consumption intertemporally. In addition, introducing
bonds allows one to study current accounts for the two countries in the model.
Households can trade bonds domestically and internationally. Western (Eastern) bonds
are issued by Western (Eastern) households and denominated in Western (Eastern) cur-
rency. Hence, bonds issued by each country provide a risk-free real return in units of that
country’s consumption basket. International asset markets, however, are incomplete, as
only risk-free bonds are traded across countries. This would imply indeterminacy of
steady-state net foreign assets and non-stationarity. As a remedy, I assume that agents
must pay a convex adjustment cost when adjusting their bond holdings, which can be
interpreted as a fee paid to financial intermediaries. This is sufficient to uniquely pin
down the steady state, and it leads to stationary dynamics of responses to shocks.
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Additional Model Equations
Bond trading affects the households’ budget constraints, which become
PtQD,t+1+PtFtQX,t+1 + Pt
ξ
2
Q2D,t+1 + Pt
ξ
2
FtQ
2
X,t+1 + PtCt
≤ (1 + rf,t)PtQD,t + (1 + r⋆f,t)FtPtQX,t+1 + T ft +Πt(α)
P ⋆t Q
⋆
D,t+1+P
⋆
t
Q⋆X,t+1
Ft
+ P ⋆t
ξ
2
(
Q⋆D,t+1
)2
+ P ⋆t
ξ
2
(
Q⋆X,t+1
)2
Ft
+ P ⋆t C
⋆
t
≤ (1 + r⋆f,t)P ⋆t Q⋆D,t + (1 + rf,t)P ⋆t
Q⋆X,t+1
Ft
+ T ⋆,ft +Π
⋆
t (α),
where Ft =
P ⋆t
Pt
denotes the real exchange rate, QD,t+1 (QX,t+1) denote Western house-
holds’ bond holdings of the Western (Eastern) bond, (ξ/2)Q2D,t+1 is the cost of ad-
justing holdings of the Western bonds, (ξ/2)FtQ
2
X,t+1 is the cost of adjusting holdings
of the Eastern bonds and T ft is the fee rebate, taken as given by the household (note
T ft = (ξ/2)
[
FtQ
2
X,t+1 + FtQ
2
X,t+1
]
in equilibrium). Symmetry implies analogous equa-
tions for Eastern quantities. For simplicity, I assume that the cost parameter ξ is
identical for Western and Eastern bonds and set it to a value of 0.0025, as in Ghironi
and Melitz (2005).
Western and Eastern households maximize their respective intertemporal utility func-
tions subject to the respective constraints. Taking first-order conditions leads to two
Euler equations for the risk-free rate in each country:
1 + ξQD,t+1 = (1 + rf,t+1)E [Mt,t+1]
1 + ξQX,t+1 =
(
1 + r⋆f,t+1
)
E
[
Mt,t+1
Ft+1
Ft
]
1 + ξQ⋆D,t+1 =
(
1 + r⋆f,t+1
)
E
[
M⋆t,t+1
]
1 + ξQ⋆X,t+1 = (1 + rf,t+1)E
[
M⋆t,t+1
Ft
Ft+1
]
The terms related to the stock of bonds on the left-hand side of the Euler equations are
key for determinacy of the steady state and model stationarity. Basically, they ensure
that zero holdings of bonds are the unique steady state in which the product of the SDF
and the gross interest rate equals one in each country such that the economy returns to
this initial position after temporary shocks.
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Moreover, equilibrium requires that Western and Eastern bonds be in global zero net
supply:
QD,t+1 +Q
⋆
X,t+1 = 0
Q⋆D,t+1 +QX,t+1 = 0
Lastly, current accounts can be introduced to the model. Current accounts are, by
definition, equal to the changes in aggregate bond holdings in the two countries:
CAt = QD,t+1 −QD,t + Ft (QX,t+1 −QX,t)
CA⋆t = Q
⋆
D,t+1 −Q⋆D,t +
Q⋆X,t+1 −Q⋆X,t
Ft
The global zero net supply conditions for the bond market imply that a country’s bor-
rowing must equal the other country’s lending, CAt + FtCA
⋆
t = 0.
Table 1.28 reports the results for model simulations with international bond trading. Not
surprisingly, the standard deviation of consumption decreases compared to the baseline
model, as bonds allow households to smooth their consumption intertemporally. This
also leads to a lower overall risk premium, which can be seen from the lower mean
of industry excess returns. Importantly, however, the L-H spread is unaffected by the
introduction of international bond trading. Effectively, trading risk-free bonds allows
households to transfer consumption across time in a state- and industry-independent
manner, which does not help mitigate industry-specific exposure to aggregate shocks.
Similar to table 1.15, Panels C and D of table 1.28 report the moments related to the
two shocks in the model. Also, after introducing bond trading to the model, shocks to
A⋆ make up for roughly 88% of the L-H spread.
Finally, the model with sovereign bonds allows one to examine how productivity shocks
affect the balance of current accounts in each country. Figure 1.14 reports impulse
response functions of CAt and CA
⋆
t to productivity shocks in the West (first row) and
East (second row). As in Ghironi and Melitz (2005), positive productivity shocks in the
East (West) are associated with increases (decreases) in consumption, which leads to a
current account surplus (deficit) in the East and a current account deficit (surplus) in
the West.
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1.8.4.5 Elasticities
Elasticities related to total, sector and industry consumption:
η⋆ (C) = −η⋆ (P ) + Π
L+Π
η⋆ (Π)
η⋆ (CT ) = η
⋆ (C)− (1− a0) η⋆ (PT ) = η⋆ (C)−
(
1
a0
− 1
)
η⋆ (P )
η⋆ (Cs) = −θη⋆ (Ps) + θη⋆ (PT ) + η⋆ (CT ) = −θη⋆ (Ps) + η⋆ (C) + [θ − (1− a0)] η⋆ (PT )
Elasticities related to total and sector price indices:
η⋆ (P ) = a0η
⋆ (PT )
η⋆ (PT ) =
∑
S
δs
(
PT
Ps
)θ−1
η⋆ (Ps)
Elasticities related to offshoring and exporting cutoffs and fractions:
η⋆ (ζs,O) = −κsη⋆ (ϕs,O)
η⋆ (ϕ¯s,O) = η
⋆ (ϕs,O)
η⋆ (ζs,X,O) = −κsη⋆ (ϕs,X,O)
η⋆ (ϕ¯s,X,O) = η
⋆ (ϕs,X,O)
The elasticity of total industry profits is driven by the elasticities of domestic profits
and profits from exports:
η⋆ (Π) = η⋆
(
ΠD
)
+ η⋆
(
ΠX
)
Elasticity of total domestic profits:
η⋆
(
ΠD
)
= − (σs − θ) (−η⋆ (Ps))︸ ︷︷ ︸
competition effect
+ η⋆ (Cs) +
1− a0 − θ
a0
(−η⋆ (P ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
expenditure effect
+
 κs ζs,O (πs,O − πs,D)ΠD︸ ︷︷ ︸
relative benefits from offshoring
− (σs − 1) ζs,Dπs,DΦ+ ζs,Oπs,O
ΠD︸ ︷︷ ︸
industry composition effect
 (−η⋆ (ϕs,O)) +
ζs,Oπs,O
ΠD
(σs − 1) (1− αs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
productivity gain from offshoring
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where
Φ =
ϕκss,min
σs − 1
 ϕσs−κss,O [κs − (σs − 1)]
ϕσs−1s,min − ϕκss,min 1ϕκs−(σs−1)s,O
− κs
ϕκss,O − ϕκss,min

and Φ > 0 and ∂Φ∂ϕs,O > 0. This means that the negative response of domestic profits
after a shock to A⋆ is more pronounced when fewer firms offshore. This result is intuitive,
since firms that offshore directly profit from the increase in productivity, which makes
them more resistant against increases in competition.
Elasticity of total profits from exports:
η⋆
(
ΠX
)
= −σs
[
1 +
κs − (σs − 1)
σs − 1
]
[−η⋆ (P ⋆s )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
price effect
+
[
1 +
κs − (σs − 1)
σs − 1
]
η⋆ (C⋆s )︸ ︷︷ ︸
demand effect
+ (1− αs) κs︸ ︷︷ ︸
productivity gain from offshoring
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Figure 1.14: Responses of Current Accounts
This figure plots the impulse response functions of current accounts CAt and CA
⋆
t to productivity shocks
in the West (first row) and East (second row).
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Table 1.28: Model Simulation Results with International Bond Trading
The table reports simulated moments of macro variables and industry quantities for the extended model
with international bond trading. Column titles “Low” and “High” label low and high offshorability
industries. The model is solved using perturbation methods and is approximated to the 3rd-order
around the deterministic steady state. Moments are calculated based on simulations over 10’000 periods
(with a burn-in period of 1’000 periods).
Macro Moments Industry Quantities
Consumption Risk-free Rate Industry Profits Excess Returns
model data model data model data model data
mean 4.59% 2.63% 0.28 0.32 4.59% 1.64%
std 8.43% 2.00% 0.29% 2.12% 8.10% 3.72% 14.98% 7.24%
cov( ,A) 0.24 0.12 0.07 0.02
cov( ,A⋆) -1.74 -0.80 -0.88 -0.30
cov( ,C) 0.64 0.28 0.06 0.02
Chapter 2
Level and Volatility Shocks to
Fiscal Policy: Term Structure
Implications
Lorenzo Bretscher, Alex Hsu, Andrea Tamoni 1
2.1 Introduction
Fiscal policy shocks and fiscal volatility shocks have first order effects on economic ac-
tivity. Government spending and taxation can impact corporate investment-borrowing
choices, household consumption-saving behavior, and economic aggregates such as in-
flation. The study of fiscal policy commands a large area of literature in economics.2
The majority of papers focuses on optimal taxation or government spending and its
impact on the output multiplier or consumption. Similarly, uncertainty about govern-
ment spending and tax rates can alter the decision-making process faced by economic
agents and firms. Bloom (2009) finds productivity uncertainty shocks produce large
fluctuations in aggregate output and employment. More recently, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde,
1We thank M. Andreasen, R. Barsky, R. Dittmar, F. Gourio, Haitao Li, H. Kung (discussant), P.
Lopez, D. J. Lucas, I. Mitra (discussant), F. Palomino (discussant), G. Segal (discussant), and Min Wei
(discussant) for their helpful suggestions. We also thank seminar participants at Carey-JHU, EDHEC
London, LSE, at the Annual Symposium of the Society for Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics, at
the Econometric Society European Meeting - Lisbon, at the EFA - Mannheim, at the NFA - Halifax, at
the South Carolina FIFI Conference, at the SFS Cavalcade - Nashville and at the WFA - Whistler. We
also thank Mike Chernov and Philippe Mueller for sharing their data on real yields.
2Papers in this field is too numerous to list. See Barro (1974), Aschauer (1985), Aiyagari, Christiano,
and Eichenbaum (1992), Baxter and King (1993), Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Gali, Valles, and Lopez-
Salido (2007), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) for equilibrium examples.
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Guerro´n-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2015) show that unexpected increase
in the return on capital tax rate uncertainty has strong negative impact on output.3
The link between fiscal policy and policy uncertainty with the term structure of interest
rates, on the other hand, is less well established. Dai and Philippon (2005) provide em-
pirical evidence of fiscal deficits driving nominal yield curve dynamics in a no-arbitrage
affine macro-finance model, but the model does not accommodate endogenous inflation,
which Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) document to be the main risk factor in generat-
ing bond risk premia.4 Furthermore, given that monetary policy was at the zero lower
bound (ZLB) until recently and the high political uncertainty in the U.S., the impact
of fiscal level and volatility shocks on bond risk premia has never been more relevant.
In this paper, we estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to
investigate the effects of fiscal policy and policy uncertainty on the term structure of
interest rates and bond risk premia. We focus on two specific aspects of fiscal policy:
government spending and the tax rate on the return of capital.
Through the lens of the estimated model, we document four main findings in this paper.
First, level shocks to government spending generate positive inflation risk premium as
inflation is high precisely when consumption declines. This term structure level effect
is the opposite for level and volatility shocks to the return on capital tax rate: inflation
decreases in bad times producing negative inflation risk premium. Second, volatility
shocks to government spending are observed to have substantial slope effect on the
term structure. Increased volatility to government spending steepens the yield curve,
producing positive term premium. Third, fiscal volatility shocks are the primary factors
in generating term premia fluctuations. Fourth, when the nominal short rate is at
zero, consumption, inflation, and long-term interest rate reactions are more pronounced
following level and volatility shocks to fiscal policy, implying considerable bond risk
premia.
In reduced form empirical analysis, excess return predictive regressions are performed for
nominal bonds across maturities employing estimated fiscal level and volatility shocks as
explanatory variables as well as controlling for bond supply. We document government
spending level and volatility shocks predict positive future excess returns, while capital
tax level and volatility shocks weakly predict negative excess returns. Furthermore, the
3Following the literature (see e.g., (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-
Ramı´rez 2015)) we interpret the unexpected changes in the time-varying volatility of the fiscal instrument
(e.g. government expenditure ) innovations as a representation of unexpected variations in uncertainty
about fiscal policy. We also use the term “uncertainty” as shorthand for what would more precisely be
referred to as “risk”. See also Bachmann, Bai, Lee, and Zhang (2015) where the authors quantify the
welfare costs of fiscal uncertainty in a neo-classical stochastic growth model.
4For the purpose of exposition, “bond risk premia” and “nominal term premia” are used interchange-
ably to denote a combination of “inflation risk premia” (term structure level effect) and “real term
premia” (slope effect).
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government spending volatility shock dominates the other fiscal shocks in terms of return
predictability in the regression specification when all four fiscal shocks are included.
Model implied predictive regressions using simulated data are able to replicate these
findings, further validating the performance of the estimated model.
The theoretical analysis is conducted in a general equilibrium model with production.
Ricardian equivalence in the model is disrupted by introducing distortionary taxation
for return on capital. The representative agent has Epstein and Zin (1989) recursive
preferences. The production sector is in line with the standard New-Keynesian5 stochas-
tic growth model. The production function is Cobb-Douglas employing transitory TFP
shocks and permanent labor productivity shocks. The monetary authority sets the nom-
inal short-term interest rate using a Taylor rule with contemporaneous feedbacks from
inflation and output growth plus a shock which represents any unexpected deviations of
the nominal short rate. The fiscal authority chooses the amount of current period lump-
sum taxes to collect. Government revenue is a combination of the lump-sum transfer
and tax on the return of capital such that the government budget constraint is satis-
fied. Government spending is exogenous and shocks to government spending exhibits
stochastic volatility following an autoregressive process.
There are eight economic shocks driving the dynamics of the theoretical model: tran-
sitory and permanent productivity shocks, volatility shocks to transitory productivity,
monetary policy shocks, as well as level and volatility shocks to government spending
and the tax rate of return on capital. Since the impact of both productivity shocks and
monetary policy shocks have been examined in the equilibrium term structure literature,
our analysis is centered on the four fiscal shocks.6
A positive level shock to government spending drives up demand of output, and it also
crowds out consumption of the agents. The negative wealth effect of lower consumption
increases labor supply and depresses real wage. The precautionary savings motive also
drives investment higher. Increase in return on capital generates a spike in inflation
immediately after the positive level shock is realized, producing positive average inflation
risk premium. On the other hand, a positive shock to government spending volatility
lowers government debt and inflation in our benchmark model. Increase in spending
volatility makes capital investment more attractive over debt for consumption smoothing
because government spending is expected to be high, implying higher future taxes. The
oversupply of capital causes the return on capital to decline, while increase in labor
supply puts downward pressure on real wage. This leads to lower inflation as marginal
5The intermediate-good firms adjust prices according to the Calvo (1983) process, under which only
a fraction of the firms are allowed to maximize present value of their expected profits by choosing the
optimal price each period. This mechanism induces monetary policy non-neutrality with respect to the
real economy allowing us to make comparisons between fiscal policy and monetary policy impacts.
6For example, see Rudebusch and Swanson (2012), Kung (2015), and Hsu, Li, and Palomino (2015).
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cost of production decreases, generating negative average inflation risk premium due to
government spending volatility shocks.
That said, government spending volatility shocks have differential impact on short-
maturity and long-maturity bonds. With higher uncertainty, the decline in real wage
and return on capital are transitory, and the increase in investment and saving are
short-lived. This makes short-maturity government bonds especially valuable as a con-
sumption hedge relative to long-maturity Treasuries. Short-dated bonds become more
expensive compared to the long-dated bonds causing long-term bonds to be risky when
marginal utility is high. As a result, the spending volatility shock steepens the yield
curve and generates positive term premium. From the impulse response functions of the
model, we find the positive term premium dominates the negative inflation risk premium
such that the nominal term premium is positive on average following a positive second
moment shock to spending.
We solve the model using perturbation methods (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)).
We compute a third-order approximate solution7 of the model around its non-stochastic
steady state using the pruning algorithm suggested by Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde,
and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2017) (AFVRR hereafter). Importantly, AFVRR provide closed-
form solutions for first and second moments of the pruned DSGE model. This allows
us to estimate our model using means, variances and contemporaneous covariances of
macro and financial series through generalized method of moments (GMM). Last but not
least, the impulse response functions in an economy approximated to third order depend
on the values of the state variables. Motivated by the situation in the United States
following the financial crisis, we analyze the propagation of fiscal level and volatility
shocks when the model economy is at the zero lower bound (ZLB). We find that, when
the nominal short rate is held at zero for prolonged periods of time after the initial
fiscal shocks are realized, the impulse responses of output, investment and inflation are
greatly amplified relative to normal times. The effects are especially exaggerated for
the government spending volatility shock and the return on capital tax rate level shock.
Each of which produces a decline in output of about 10% and a drop in inflation of more
than 30%.
This paper belongs to a growing literature examining the relation between government
policies, economic activity, and asset prices. The joint modeling of the yield curve and
macroeconomic variables has received much attention since Ang and Piazzesi (2003),
where the authors connect latent term structure factors to inflation and the output gap.
More recently, many term structure studies incorporate monetary policy elements in
7A first-order approximation of the model and bond price (i.e., a log-linearization) eliminates the
term premium entirely and a second-order approximation to the solution of the model and bond price
produces a term premium that is nonzero but constant.
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their models using the fact that the nominal short rate is the monetary policy instrument.
However, these models are generally silent on the effects of fiscal policy on the term
structure despite evidence suggesting that it has nontrivial effects on interest rates. The
primary contribution of this paper is establishing the link between fiscal policy and risk
premia on nominal bonds, namely the term premium and the inflation risk premium.
The model shows loose fiscal policy and high government spending cause investors to
demand higher returns in exchange for holding Treasury securities.
This paper is most closely related to the literature on term structure and bond risk
premia in equilibrium. Campbell (1986) specifies an endowment economy in which
utility maximizing agents trade bonds of different maturities. When the exogenous
consumption growth process is negatively autocorrelated, term premia on long-term
bonds are positive, generating upward sloping yield curves because they are bad hedges
against consumption risk compared to short-term bonds. More recently, Piazzesi and
Schneider (2007), using Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences, show that inflation is the
driver that generates a positive term premium on nominal long-term bonds. Negative
covariance between consumption growth and inflation translates into high inflation when
consumption growth is low and marginal utility to consume is high. Wachter (2006)
generates upward sloping nominal and real yield curves employing habit formation. In
her model, bonds are bad hedges for consumption as agents wish to preserve previous
level of consumption as current consumption declines. Campbell, Pflueger, and Viceira
(2015) study the effect of monetary policy rule and uncertainty on bond risk premium.
They find that intensified monetary policy focus on inflation increases bond risks while
a shifting policy focus to stabilize output does the opposite.
Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) and Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) examine bond risk
premia in general equilibrium where utility-maximizing agents supply labor to profit-
maximizing firms to produce consumption goods. The best-fit model in the latter paper
is successful in matching the basic empirical properties of the term structure using only
transitory productivity shocks. Palomino (2010) studies optimal monetary policy and
bond risk premia in general equilibrium. More specifically, he shows that the welfare-
maximizing monetary policy affects inflation risk premia depending on the credibility of
the monetary authority in the economy as well as the representative agent’s preference.
Kung (2015) builds a equilibrium model with stochastic endogenous growth to explain
the impact of monetary policy shocks on bond risk premium. Hsu, Li, and Palomino
(2015) examine risk premia on real bonds in general equilibrium. Calibrated to TIPS
data, they find that productivity growth shocks alone generate negative term premium
on real bonds, but the presence of wage rigidities makes term premium positive.
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This paper is also related to the literature on the interaction between fiscal policy and
asset pricing. Croce, Kung, Nguyen, and Schmid (2012) study the effects of fiscal poli-
cies in a production-based general equilibrium model in which taxation affects corporate
decisions. They find that tax distortions have negative effects on the cost of equity and
investment. Our interest is different. We analyze the impact of government spending
level and uncertainty shocks on the term structure of interest rates. Our interest in fis-
cal volatility shocks is motivated by Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, Kuester,
and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2015), who uncover evidence of time-varying volatility in tax and
government spending processes for the United States. Using both a VAR and a New
Keynesian model, they document that the fiscal volatility shocks can have a sizable
adverse effect on economic activity. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the
first attempt to evaluate the dynamic consequences on the bond risk premium due to
unexpected changes in fiscal volatility.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section documents the estimation
of the fiscal shocks as well as their impact on bond risk premium using reduced form
regression analysis. Section 2.3 introduces the model. Section 2.4 discusses the data used
for GMM estimation, presents our solution method and estimation approach. Section
2.5 presents detailed analysis of the model and associated term structure. Section 2.6
studies the implications of fiscal shocks at the ZLB on the model. Section 2.7 concludes.
Detailed derivations are deferred to the Appendix.
2.2 Empirical Analysis
In this section we estimate fiscal rules with time-varying volatility using data on taxes
and government spending. The estimated rules will discipline our quantitative exper-
iments by assuming that past fiscal behavior is a guide to assessing current behavior.
We then present our regression results using bond yields and predicted bond returns as
dependent variables to explore their dependence on fiscal shocks.
2.2.1 Fiscal Policy Uncertainty
Our two policy instruments, i.e. government spending as a share of output and tax rates
on capital income, evolve as follows:
xt+1 = (1− φx)θx + φxxt + eσx,t+1ǫx,t+1 (2.1)
σx,t+1 = (1− φσx)θσx + φσxσx,t + σσxǫσ,t+1 (2.2)
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for x ∈ {g, τk} where g is government spending as a share of output, and τk is the tax rate
on capital income. Each policy instrument features stochastic volatility since the log of
the standard deviation of the innovation, σx,t, is random. The parameter θσx determines
the average standard deviation of a fiscal shock to the policy instrument x, σσx√
(1−(φσx )
2)
is the unconditional standard deviation of the fiscal volatility shock to instrument x,
and φσx controls the shock’s persistence. Following (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-
Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2015), we estimate Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2) for each
fiscal instrument separately, and we set the means in equation (2.1) to each instrument’s
average value (see Table 2.3 Panel A). We estimate the rest of the parameters following
a Bayesian approach by combining the likelihood function with uninformative priors
and sampling from the posterior with a Markov Chain Monte Carlo.8 Table 2.3 Panel
B reports the posterior median for the parameters along with 95 percent probability
intervals. Both tax rates and government spending as a share of output are persistent.
E.g., the half-life of government spending is around − log(2)/ log(0.98) = 34 quarters.
Deviations from average volatility last also for some time. The ǫx,ts have an average
standard deviation of 100× exp(−4.84) = 0.79 and 100× exp(−6.03) = 0.24 percentage
point for tax and government spending, respectively. These results are in line with
(Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2015) (see in
particular their Table 1).
Figure 2.1 allows us to build an analytic narrative of fiscal volatility shocks. Panels
2.2(a) and 2.2(b) display the 95 percent posterior probability intervals of the smoothed
fiscal volatility shock to government spending, 100 exp(σg,t), and capital tax rates,
100 exp(στk ,t), over the sample. Next, we focus on government spending volatility and re-
fer the interest reader to (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-
Ramı´rez 2015) for a similar analysis of the fiscal volatility shock to capital income tax
rates. Our smoothed estimate of the government spending volatility was high in 1974-
1975. These were indeed times of unusual fiscal policy uncertainty: for example, in a
talk given at Stanford University on May 13, 1975, George P. Shultz (Secretary of the
Treasury from June 12, 1972 to May 8, 1974) stated that “This is an age of ambiguity ...
And the result is that people are experiencing a great sense of unease and uncertainty.”9
Volatility was climbing again in the early 80s. These years were difficult ones for fiscal
policy, with numerous proposals being floated to address the large fiscal deficits created
during the early years of the Reagan administration. The 1985 Economic Report of the
President made deficit reduction one of the President’s priorities, with an emphasis on
8Specifically, for government spending we adopt a beta distribution for φσg and φg with mean 0.8
and 0.85 respectively, a uniform distribution between −11 and −3 for θσg , and an inverse gamma for σσg
with mean 0.1. Correspondingly, for capital tax we use a beta distribution for φσ
τk
and φτk with mean
0.85 and 0.8 respectively, a uniform distribution between −8 and −3 for θσ
τk
, and an inverse gamma
for σσ
τk
with mean 0.2.
9See “Leaders and Followers in an Age of Uncertainty,” George P. Shultz, pp. 26-27.
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expenditure control. This event is reflected in a “moderation” of our volatility series.
Our fiscal volatility then raises in the period from 2001:II to 2002:I. These quarters wit-
nessed the 9/11 terrorist attacks (with their potentially vast fiscal implications) and the
2001–2002 recession.
2.2.2 Bond Yields, Bond Returns and Fiscal Policy: Basic Tests
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 shows regressions of yield spreads and future returns on our fiscal in-
struments. Throughout we use the filtered series of volatilities to remove any look-ahead
bias present in the smoothed estimates.10 Also, we employ a one-sided filter to remove
a decadal trend in the level of fiscal series, and we use the business cycle component
of government spending and capital tax rates as regressors. Appendix 2.10.2 discusses
in details this transformation, and provides additional robustness and interpretations.
Finally, observations are quarterly.
The results of the yield regression are in Table 2.1. The first row in Panels A and B
provide a benchmark: the government debt supply – as proxied by the maturity-weighted
debt to GDP, see (Greenwood and Vayanos 2014) – is an important determinant of the
slope. The second specification in Panels A and B shows that the level and uncertainty
of government spending improve substantially the fit of the regression with the R2
increasing from 10% to 39%. The third specification shows that capital tax rates do not
appear to play an important role for the slope of the term structure after controlling for
government spending.
We next turn to the results on returns. Table 2.2 shows regressions of future returns on
our fiscal level and volatility series:
rx
(τ)
t+k,k = β0 + β1gt + β2σg,t + β3τ
k
t + β4στk,t +Controls + ut+k
where rx
(τ)
t+k,k is the future k-year return of the τ -year bond in excess of the k-year yield,
and σx,t is our fiscal volatility series, and x ∈ {g, τk}. We perform this regression for
one-year returns for all bonds in our sample, and for three- and five-year returns for the
long-term bond. We report t-statistics using Newey and West (1987) standard errors
and allowing for 6 quarters of lags. Allowing for more lags does not seem to affect the
results.11
10More precisely, we use the median of the filtered volatility series obtained from our Bayesian esti-
mation.
11(Cochrane 2008) suggests using a parametric alternative to the non-parametric Newey-West. (Bauer
and Hamilton 2017) suggest using a bootstrap procedure to address small-sample distortions in bond
returns predictive regressions. Although we use the simple Newey-West approach, our model will shed
further light on the plausibility of our empirical results.
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We again start with a benchmark in Panel A: government debt supply is a strong pre-
dictor for future returns.12 Panel B shows that the government spending level and
uncertainty series more than double the adjusted R2 for 1-year holding period returns
on bond with maturity ranging from 2- to 10-years. We add the capital tax rate level
and volatility series in Panel C. We observe that the R2 are almost identical to those
in Panel B. Similarly, the magnitude and significance of government spending volatility,
and to a lesser extend government spending level, are hardly affected by the inclusion
of capital tax rates. Importantly, both government spending and capital tax seem to
convey independent information about future bond excess returns after controlling for
government debt supply. Across all panels the bond supply is the main driver for 5-year
long-term bond returns consistent with the view that supply captures a lower-frequency
component of expected returns. Our fiscal level and uncertainty instruments instead
seem to capture a complementary, higher-frequency (mainly business cycle) component
of risk premia. The additional robustness checks in Appendix 2.10.2 confirm the picture
drawn by these basic regressions: fiscal policy, and in particular government spending,
is an important determinant of bond risk premia. The discussion that follows will shed
light on the exact mechanism trough the lens of our model.
[Insert Table 2.1 and 2.2 about here.]
2.3 The Benchmark Model
We implement a New-Keynesian13 model with government spending and distortionary
tax on the return of capital for the analysis. The monetary authority implements the
Taylor rule and sets the nominal short rate as a function of inflation and output growth.
On the production side, firms maximize profits under staggered price setting. The model
also features nominal wage rigidities. We leave the description of the optimal investment
decision and staggered wage setting for the appendix.
2.3.1 The Household Problem
The representative agent has the ability to save current income in order to smooth
future consumption by purchasing government bonds. With Epstein and Zin (1989),
12Our results largely replicates those in (Greenwood and Vayanos 2014) despite our use of quarterly
data from 1970-Q1 to 2007-Q4 ((Greenwood and Vayanos 2014) uses monthly observations for the longer
1952-2007 sample period). The main difference lies in R2: This is because (Greenwood and Vayanos 2014)
forecast bond returns, whereas we forecast bond excess returns.
13For a detailed exposition on the New-Keynesian framework, see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999).
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the representative agent maximizes lifetime utility by solving the following:
max V (Ct, Nt) =
{
(1− β)
(
Ct
1−ψ
1− ψ − λt
Nt
1+ω
1 + ω
)
+ βEt
[
V 1−γt+1
] 1−ψ
1−γ
} 1
1−ψ
,
s.t. PtCt + PtInvt +Q
(1)
t Bt(t+ 1) + PtTaxt
= PtWtNt + (1− τkt )PtRktKt−1 +Bt−1(t) + PtΨt.
where β denotes the time discount factor, ψ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (IES), the Epstein-Zin parameter γ is related to the coefficient of relative
risk aversion, and ω is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. λt is the time
varying parameter as a function of the permanent technology shock (A1−ψt ) in order to
achieve balanced path in the wage demand equation.
Ct and Nt are real consumption and labor, respectively. Invt denotes investment in
real terms. Pt is the price level in the economy. Bt(t + 1) is the amount of nominal
bonds outstanding at the end of period t and due in period t+1. Wt refers to real labor
income, which is the same across households in the economy. Taxt is real lump-sum tax
collected by the fiscal authority to keep the real debt process from exploding, and Ψt is
dividend income coming from the firms. Kt is capital and R
k
t is the return on capital.
Vt is the value function of the dynamic programming problem for the representative
agent, and Vt+1 is the “continuation utility” of the value function. The budget constraint
states that the agent has periodic after-tax income from labor, capital, and dividends as
well as bonds maturing at time t. The agent then decides how much to consume after
taxes, how much to invest, and how much to pay for newly issued bonds at time t at
price Q
(1)
t .
The nominal pricing kernel written in terms of return on consumption and return on
labor income with distortionary taxes is
M$t,t+1 =
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−ψ] 1−γ1−ψ ( Pt
Pt+1
)[
(1− sharet)Rct+1 + sharetRlt+1
]ψ−γ
1−ψ
,
where
Rct+1 =
(1 + P ct+1)Ct+1
P ct Ct
and Rlt+1 =
(1 + P lt+1)LIt+1
P ltLIt
.
P c and P l are prices of the consumption and labor claims, and LI is labor income.
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2.3.2 The Firm’s Problem
There is a dispersion of firms, denoted by j, with identical production technology in
the economy. With nominal price stickiness and monopolistic competition, each firm is
faced with the following optimization problem:
max
P ∗t (j)
Et
[
∞∑
s=0
αsM$t,t+s
{
P ∗t (j)Yt+s(j)− Pt+s
[
Wt+sNt+s(j) +R
k
t+sKt+s(j)
]}]
s.t. Yt+s(j) = Zt+sKt+s−1(j)
κ(AtNt+s(j))
1−κ (2.3)
Yt+s(j) =
(
P ∗t (j)
Pt+s
)−η
Yt+s (2.4)
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−ηdj
] 1
1−η
=
[
(1− α)P ∗t 1−η + αP 1−ηt−1
] 1
1−η
. (2.5)
Using Calvo (1983) pricing, a firm can choose to optimally adjust price to P ∗t (j) with
probability (1 − α) each period independent of the time elapsed between adjustments.
The objective function of the firm is simply profit maximization: revenue minus labor
cost and rent on capital. The within-period profits are discounted by the nominal
pricing kernel and the probability that the firm has not been allowed to adjust its price
optimally up to that period. Each period, with probability α, the firm is stuck with
the price from the previous period. The cash-flow stream is discounted by the nominal
stochastic discount factor between times t and t+ s, M$t,t+s. P
∗
t (j)Yt+s(j) is total sales
for firm j at time t+ s. Wt+sNt+s(j) and R
k
t+sKt+s(j) are the real labor cost of and the
real rental cost of capital, respectively. Notice real wage and real return on capital are
determined in equilibrium with the households and are common across all firms.
There are three constraints faced by the firm in optimizing its profit. Equation (2.3)
is the production function of firm j, where Zt is the transitory productivity shock, the
parameter κ is the capital share of input in the Cobb-Douglas production function, and
At is the permanent productivity shock driving growth in the economy. Equation (2.4)
is the demand equation for firm j’s output as a function of the optimal price it sets
at time t. Lastly, equation (2.5) is the price aggregator as a weighted average of the
optimal price at time t and the sticky price from time t− 1.
P ∗t (j) is the optimal price the firm j charges for one unit of the consumption good set at
time t. α is the probability in each period t+ s that the firm is not allowed to adjust its
price optimal so it has to keep charging P ∗t (j). If a firm is not allowed to adjust its price
optimally, then it charges P ∗t (j) at time t+ s, as the price is not indexed. All variables
indexed by j is firm-specific. For example, Yt+s(j) means output of firm j at time t+ s
given the last time firm j was able to set its optimal price was at time t. Without the
index j, the variable is common across all firms, such as the price level Pt+s and the
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productivity shock Zt+s. Finally, η determines the markup charged by the firm when it
sets P ∗t (j) due to monopolistic competition.
Zt is the economy-wide productivity shock on output. Log productivity follows an
exogenous AR(1) process such that
zt+1 = log(Zt) = φzzt + e
σz,t+1ǫz,t+1
σz,t+1 = (1− φσz )θσz + φσzσz,t + σσz ǫzσ,t+1 ,
with ǫz,t ∼ i.i.d. N (0, 1). The log growth rate of the permanent productivity shock
evolves according to an AR(1) process with mean growth rate ga:
∆at = (1− φa)ga + φa∆at−1 + σaǫa,t ,
with ǫa,t ∼ i.i.d. N (0, 1). Note that we allow for stochastic volatility in technology since
uncertainty in transitory productivity has been shown to have a sizable impact on bond
prices (see, e.g., Andreasen, (2012), and Kung, (2015)), and we want our analysis of
fiscal policy implications for term premia to be robust to this alternative channel.14
The firm’s optimal price setting behavior has to satisfy the following equation in the
presence of nominal price rigidities such that it can only adjust its price optimally each
period with probability α.
[
1
1− α
(
1− α
(
1
Πt
)(1−η))] 1(1−η)
Ft =
νκ−κ(1− κ)−(1−κ)RKt κW (1−κ)t Jt
ZtA
1−κ
t
, (2.6)
where ν = ηη−1 is the frictionless markup and Π
∗ is the inflation target of the central
bank. Ft and Jt are recursively defined as
Ft = 1 + αEt
[
Mnomt,t+1
(
Yt+1
Yt
)
Πηt+1Ft+1
]
(2.7)
Jt = 1 + αEt
[
Mnomt,t+1
(
Zt
Zt+1
)(
At
At+1
)1−κ(RKt+1
RKt
)κ(
Wt+1
Wt
)(1−κ)(
Yt+1
Yt
)
Π
(1+η)
t+1 Jt+1
]
(2.8)
2.3.3 The Monetary Authority
Disengaging monetary policy neutrality by augmenting the model with the New-Keynesian
framework, we assess the implications of fiscal policy on bond risk premia in the presence
of an effective monetary authority. The Taylor rule used by the monetary authority to
14(Justiniano and Primiceri 2008a) show that time-varying volatility in permanent productivity ac-
counts for about 20 percent of the variance of GDP growth and real wages but they did not explore
its implications for asset prices. (Segal 2016) provides evidence for productivity volatility of different
sectors as an important determinant of equity prices.
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set the nominal short rate, R
(1)
t , in the model is:
R
(1)
t
R
=
(
R
(1)
t−1
R
)ρr (
Πt
Π∗
)(1−ρr)ρπ ( Yt/At
Yt−1/At−1
)(1−ρr)ρx
eut ,
where R is the steady state nominal rate, Πt =
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
is inflation, Π∗ is the long-run
inflation target, Y is the steady state output, and ut is the monetary policy shock.
The parameter ρr is the autoregressive coefficient used for interest rate smoothing. The
monetary rule is said to satisfy the Taylor principle when ρπ > 1. Finally, the monetary
policy shock follows an autoregressive process of order one
ut = φuut−1 + σuǫ
u
t ,
with ǫut ∼ iid N (0, 1).
2.3.4 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is characterized by the set of market clearing conditions:
composite labor, capital stock, bonds, and final goods. Furthermore, given prices and
wages of other households, each optimizing household chooses the optimal allocation
to solve his/her utility maximization problem. Finally, given wages and prices of other
firms, each firm chooses the optimal production input to solve its profit maximization
problem. In equilibrium, Ndt = Nt. In this economy, total output has to equal to total
private consumption and private investment plus total government spending:
Yt = Ct + Invt +Govt. (2.9)
In the model, because the market is complete and there is a representative marginal
pricer, there exists an unique pricing kernel which allows us to price all assets in the
economy, including long- and short-term bonds.
2.3.5 The Government’s Budget Constraint
The government’s flow budget constraint balances resources with uses:
PtTaxt +Q
(1)
t Bt(t+ 1) = Bt−1(t) + PtGovt,
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where Govt is consumption by the government or government spending. Govt is not
productive in the model economy. Furthermore,
Taxt = τt + τ
k
t R
k
t utKt−1,
such that τt is the lump-sum tax described below. Government spending as a fraction
of output, gt =
Govt
Yt
, and the capital tax rate, τkt , follow two independent AR(1) with
stochastic volatility, c.f. Section 2.2.1, Eqs. (2.1)-(2.2).
The lump-sum tax is meant to be collected to keep the borrowing path of the government
from exploding. Following standard procedure in the literature, we specify the lump-sum
tax as a function of real debt and government spending.
τt = ρbDt−1(t) + ρgGovt,
where D denotes real debt such that Dt−1(t) =
Bt−1(t)
Pt
. The simple fiscal rule is widely
used in the literature on the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy shocks, see Gali,
Valles, and Lopez-Salido (2007) and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, Kuester,
and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2015) for two recent examples. In the previous working version of
the paper, we model long-term bonds directly using a geometrically declining series to
proxy for the maturity structure of government debt similar to Cochrane (2001). We
find that the modeling of long-term bonds using a geometric series did not alter the
term structure implications we focus on here. For simplicity, we abstract away from
that setup to obtain a simpler government budget constraint and fiscal rule.15
2.4 Inference and the Observable Variables
To estimate the parameters of our model we rely on the generalized method of moments
(GMM) using first and second unconditional moments of macroeconomic and financial
data. This section provides a detailed description of the estimation method and discusses
the data used to evaluate the unconditional moments.
2.4.1 Data and Moments for GMM
The time unit is defined to be one quarter. We estimate the model using the following
quarterly time series: (i) log output growth, ∆yt (henceforth, ∆ denotes the temporal
15The maturity structure of government debt is an interesting question to itself. There is no clear
consensus in the literature on how it should be modeled. However, this is a question beyond the scope
of our current paper.
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difference operator); (ii) log investment growth, ∆invt; (iii) log consumption growth, ∆ct;
(iv) inflation, πt; (v) the 1-quarter nominal interest rate, rt; (vi) the 10-year nominal
interest rate, y
(40)
t ; (vii) the slope of the term structure, y
(40)
t − rt. The sample spans
1970.Q1 to 2014.Q2.16 Appendix 2.10.1 gives detailed variable definitions and sources.
To estimate model parameters we use the mean, the variance and the contemporane-
ous covariances in the data as moments.17 Provided the model’s solution is stable,
(Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2017) derive closed-form solu-
tions for first and second unconditional moments of the (non linear) state-space of the
DSGE. This is important since it allows us to compute in a reasonable amount of time
the unconditional moments for our DSGE model solved up to third-order. Appendix
2.10.4 provides additional details.
2.4.2 Inducing Stationarity and Solution Method
The exogenous productivity process At displays a stochastic trend. This random trend
is inherited by the endogenous variables of the model. We focus our attention on equilib-
rium fluctuations around this stochastic trend. To this end, we perform a stationarity-
inducing transformation of the endogenous variables by dividing them by their trend
component. Appendix 2.10.3.7 describes this transformation and presents the complete
set of equilibrium conditions in stationary form.
To analyze the role of fiscal shocks and the implications for time-varying risk premia,
we solve the benchmark DSGE model using perturbation methods (see (Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe 2004)).18
To fit the term structure to data, we compute the yield curve implied by the model
using the fact that bond prices beyond the policy rate, rt = logR
(1)
t , do not affect
allocations and prices. Taking advantage of this property, we follow (Andreasen and
Zabczyk 2015) and first solve the model without bond prices exceeding one period, and
then we recursively compute all remaining bond prices based on
Q
(k)
t = Et
[
M$t,t+1Q
(k−1)
t+1
]
,
16The starting date follows (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramı´rez
2015) and it is dictated by the start of our fiscal series. We have also repeated our estimation exercise
with moments computed from a sample period that exclude the financial crisis, from 1970.Q1 to 2007.Q4,
and find that the results remain qualitatively the same.
17We have also repeated our procedure adding to the first and second moments used in the baseline
estimation the first and fifth autocovariances to capture the persistence in the data. Our point estimates
do not significantly change and the conclusion from model-implied moments remain qualitatively the
same. Results are available upon request.
18Our model has a relatively large number of state variables and eight shocks. Because of this high
dimensionality, discretization and projection methods are computationally infeasible.
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where M$t,t+1 = Mt,t+1
1
Πt+1
denotes the nominal stochastic discount factor, and Mt,t+1
denotes the real stochastic discount factor. We let k = 2, . . . , 40 quarters. The nominal
yield curve with continuous compounding is then given by y
(k)
t = − 1k logQ
(k)
t . We also
compute the real term structure based on
Q
(k)
t,real = Et
[
Mt,t+1Q
(k−1)
t+1,real
]
.
Finally, we define the 10-year nominal term premium to be the difference between the
10-year interest rate and the yield-to-maturity on the corresponding bond under risk-
neutrality. The latter is computed by discounting payments by rt instead of the stochas-
tic discount factor.
2.5 Estimation Results
2.5.1 Parameter Estimates
Given the large scope of the model, we fix a small number of parameters to values
commonly used in the literature, see Table 2.3 Panel A. In particular the rate of de-
preciation on capital is 0.02 as employed by (Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer 2010). This
value implies a steady-state investment-output ratio of 21 percent. The capital share of
intermediate output, κ, is 0.33. The following parameter values are standard in New-
Keynesian models. The price rigidity parameter, α, is 0.66. This means every period,
two thirds of the firms in the economy are not able to adjust their prices to the optimal
level. The higher the α, the stickier the nominal prices are. We also set the wage rigidity
parameter, θ, to 0.66. The price markup parameter resulting from monopolistic compe-
tition, η, and the wage markup parameter in union wage setting, ηw, are both equal to
6. Hence, steady-state price and wage markup are both equal to 20%. Consistent with
previous studies, our calibrated parameters imply a steady-state capital-output ratio,
Y
4K , of about 2. We also set the monetary policy rule coefficient on inflation, ρπ, to the
typical value of 1.5 used in the literature. We set the government spending–output ratio,
θg, to 20.2%, and the mean of the tax rate, θτk , to 40%, according to the data. Finally,
we calibrate the parameters for transitory productivity to values commonly adopted in
the literature, see, e.g., (Andreasen 2012) and (Kung 2015).19
19The only parameter which deserves attention is σσz . We set the volatility of volatility to 0.03 in line
with (Andreasen 2012). We do so for two reasons. First, this value implies an unconditional standard
deviation in σz,t of 0.19, which is the same as one would obtain from fitting a GARCH model on log
productivity. Second, our chosen value for the vol-of-vol parameter lies on the higher hand of those used
in the literature, and makes our results for fiscal policy conservative. Indeed, lower values for σσz would
only increase the relative contribution of fiscal volatility shocks relative to uncertainty in productivity.
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As discussed in Section 2.2.1 we estimate the processes for capital tax rate and for
government spending outside of the model, see Table 2.3 Panel B. This procedure has
the benefit of ensuring that the latent fiscal (tax and government spending) volatility
factors maintain their intended economic interpretation.20
Table 2.3 Panel C reports the estimates of the structural parameters in our model.
[Insert Table 2.3 about here.]
The estimation assigns a relatively high value of 0.995 to β. This value is needed in
order to obtain a sufficiently low mean value for the one-period nominal interest rate.
The parameter γ is estimated to be 181. Since the representative agent in the model
can earn labor income as a mean to smooth consumption, his/her attitude toward risk
is different than those who do not supply labor. Following Swanson (2012), we adjust
the risk aversion parameter by taking into account the labor margin using the closed-
form formula ψ
1+ ψ
ων
+ γ−ψ
1− 1−ψ
1+ω
with ν = ηη−1 . The representative saver’s true coefficient
of relative risk aversion is therefore ≈ 111. This may seem like a high value; however,
other term structure studies using Epstein-Zin preferences also typically estimate a high
coefficient of relative risk aversion: (Piazzesi and Schneider 2007) estimate a value of
57, (van Binsbergen, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Koijen, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2012) a value of
about 66, and (Rudebusch and Swanson 2012) a value near 110.21
The estimation procedure picks a low value for the IES, 1/ψ ≈ 0.53. This value is
consistent with estimates in the micro literature (e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen, (2002)) and
it has also been adopted by (Rudebusch and Swanson 2012) in a general equilibrium
context similar to ours. The low value for the IES helps to make consumption less volatile
and real interest rates more volatile, both of which improve the fit to the macro moments
in the data. The higher interest rate volatility also increases bond price volatility and
improves the model’s fit with respect to the finance moments. Our estimates of the
Frisch elasticity is in line with the literature. The response of the monetary policy
authority to output growth, ρx, is similar to that used in influential studies such as
(Judd and Rudebusch 1998), (Taylor 1999) and (Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler 2000). The
shock persistence and variance for permanent productivity, φz and σz, are broadly in
line with, e.g., the estimates in (Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti 2011). Finally,
20Alternatively we could have used macro and financial variables (bond yields) to estimate the full
fledged model with time-varying volatility in fiscal rules. However, bond yields may potentially compro-
mising the interpretation of the volatility in government spending and capital tax rate. Our approach
disciplines the stochastic volatility to fit the observed government spending and capital tax rate data
only, instead.
21(Andreasen and Jorgensen 2016) propose a slightly modified utility kernel for Epstein-Zin preferences
to address the puzzlingly high relative risk-aversion in DSGE models. We leave the analysis of such a
utility kernel in our setting to future research.
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our estimates imply a substantial degree of adjustment costs in investment, in line with
previous studies (e.g. (Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters 2007) and (Smets
and Wouters 2007)).
2.5.2 Model’s Fit
Given our GMM estimates, how well does the model fit the data? We address this
question by comparing a set of statistics implied by the model to those measured in the
data. Throughout the section we benchmark the model-implied term premium to the
measure provided by (Adrian, Crump, and Moench 2013).
Table 2.4 reports the model-implied as well as the corresponding empirical moments for
two sets of variables: (1) the first set comprises the seven variables used in estimation;
(2) the second set is composed of additional macro (wages and hours) and financial
(3-, 5-, 7-year yields, and the 5- and 10-year term premium) variables whose moments
are not directly targeted in the estimation. The table reports the median and the 90
percent probability intervals that account for parameter uncertainty for the standard
deviation, autocorrelation, and contemporaneous correlation with output.22 Although
in the estimation we target growth rates of output, consumption, and investment, Panel
A displays hp-filtered moments for these macro variables (as well as for wages and hours)
to make our analysis comparable to other studies on fiscal policy (see, e.g., Table 5 in
Fernandez-Villaverde et al., (2015)).
[Insert Table 2.4 about here.]
Our benchmark model matches the mean and standard deviation of yields over the whole
maturity profile, as well as the slope for the nominal term structure (all values fall within
the 90% confidence interval). In particular, the model is able to produce a sizable slope
of 1.2% and to generate a volatile 10-year rate. With respect to term premium, the
model is overall quite successful in reproducing a sizable mean 5-year term premium of
about 0.9%, to be compared to 1.3% in the data. The model is also able to account for
0.61/0.86 ≈ 71% of the term premium unconditional standard deviation.
Furthermore, the model can simultaneously match key business cycle moments for real
variables. In particular, the model matches fairly well the volatility of output, consump-
tion, investment, and inflation. The series of hours, which is not targeted in estimation,
22We draw the structural parameters from a Normal distribution with a variance-covariance matrix
obtained from our second step GMM estimation procedure. The parameters governing the processes for
the fiscal instruments are obtained from the posterior distribution reported in Table 2.3-Panel B. For
each parameter draw, we generate an artificial long sample (5000 quarters) of the observable variables
after discarding 1000 initial observations. Hence we do not account for small sample uncertainty.
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also displays a model-implied volatility quite in line with the data. Finally, although
not reported, the model matches the mean of growth rates in output and consumption,
and it slightly under-predicts that of investment growth, with a (median) value of 2.8%
against 3.5% in the data.
It is worth highlighting the substantial time variation of the nominal short-rate, slope
and term premium within the model generated by stochastic volatility of fiscal instru-
ments rather than higher variance in the shocks to fiscal instruments themselves. In
untabulated results, we consider the benchmark model without stochastic volatilities in
fiscal policies. In particular we set the unconditional variance in shocks to government
spending and capital tax rate σx,t+1 = σx = θσx + σσx , with x ∈ {g, τk}. Doing so
ensures that the unconditional variance in fiscal instruments is comparable to the speci-
fication of our benchmark model with stochastic volatility. The experiment showed that
a model without fiscal uncertainty is not able to quantitatively match the variability
in the short-rate and the slope for the nominal term structure (the model-implied 90%
confidence intervals do not include the data values). Also, a model without time-varying
uncertainty produces much lower term premium volatility. Overall, time-varying volatil-
ity in fiscal shocks seem to be an important driver for variation in the U.S. yield curve
and term premia.
Turning to the persistence of quantities and prices, Table 2.4 reports the first-order
autocorrelation coefficient while Figure 2.2 displays the entire autocovariance function
of the data (black line) and the model (blue line), along with the 90 percent intervals
that account for parameter uncertainty.23 Again, the figure includes all the observable
quantities used to estimate the model, as well as additional macro (wages and hours)
and financial (3-, 5-, 7-year yields, and term premia) variables whose moments are not
directly targeted in the estimation. Overall, the model captures the decaying autocor-
relation structure of real and financial variables reasonably well. The success is partic-
ularly impressive for the long-term rates (maturities ≥ 5 years) and the term premium,
for which the data auto-correlations are always within the model-implied confidence
bands. The model does a satisfactory job for output, consumption, and investment, but
it generates slightly too much persistence in inflation and in the nominal short-term
interest rate.
[Insert Figure 2.2 about here.]
We conclude this section by discussing a few more quantitative implications of the model
that will support the interpretation of our model-implied term structure.24 First, our
23These moments are not used in the estimation and constitute an out-of-sample test of the model’s
fit.
24We thanks Gill Segal for raising these points to our attention.
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model is able to match the empirical correlation of consumption growth and inflation. In
our dataset, these two series are negative correlated at −0.14 over the 1970:Q1–2014:Q2
sample period; this negative correlation doubles and is equal to −0.30 over the period
1970:Q1–2007:Q4, which excludes the financial crisis. Consistently with the data, our
model implies a negative correlation of −0.29. We will return to this negative correlation
in our discussion of government spending level shocks and inflation risk premium, see
Section 2.5.3.25
[Insert Table 2.5 about here.]
To further discipline the model, we investigate its implications for the real term structure.
Table 2.5 displays the means, volatilities, and first autocorrelations of real bond yields
of different maturities and the ten-year minus two-year yield spread from the model. We
compare these statistics with the real term structure obtained by splicing together yields
data from (Chernov and Mueller 2012) and from (Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright 2010).26
The volatility of real yields for all maturities is in line with the data, although the
average level of the real yield curve in our model is slightly higher than in the data.
More importantly, the model-implied average slope and its standard deviation are close
to the data, and particularly so for the period that does not comprise the financial crisis.
Both in the data and in our model, the average slope of the real yield curve is positive.
Similarly, (Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira 2009) report that the real yield on long-term
US TIPS has always been positive (see also discussion in Beeler and Campbell, (2012)).
An upward-sloping real yield curve implies that long-maturity real bonds have lower
payoffs than short-maturity ones when expected consumption growth is low. We will
return to this fact in our interpretation of government spending volatility shocks and
the term premium.
2.5.3 Impulse Responses
A large literature in financial economics finds that bond risk premia are substantial
and vary significantly over time (see (Campbell and Shiller 1991) and (Cochrane and
25Although mostly negative, the magnitude of this correlation varies in the literature depending on
the sample period. E.g. (Kung 2015) finds in the data an even stronger negative correlation between
inflation and consumption growth equal to -0.56. A reconciliation of these facts is provided by (David
and Veronesi 2013) who provide a regime switching model with learning where the correlation between
earnings and inflation change stochastically over time, in both magnitude and direction.
26The data from (Chernov and Mueller 2012) spans 1971:Q3 to 2002:Q4. We merge this data with
those from (Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright 2010). Throughout, we remove data for 2003 due to a high
illiquidity premium. For the same liquidity reason, we also consider a shorter sample that excludes the
financial crisis. The relative (il)liquidity of TIPS from their inception until 2003, when the Treasury
reaffirmed its commitment to the TIPS program, and in the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy in
late 2008, which resulted in its considerable TIPS inventory being released into the market, have been
discussed in (Sack and Elsasser 2004) and (Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira 2009) among others.
Level and Volatility Shocks to Fiscal Policy: Term Structure Implications 131
Piazzesi 2005)); however, the economic forces that can justify such large and variable
term premium are less clear. In this section, we shed some light on this issue by exam-
ining the model’s impulse responses to shocks.
To understand the role of shocks for the term premium, Figure 2.3 shows the impulse
responses of the stochastic discount factor (SDF, henceforth), inflation, long-term bond
yield, and term premium to a positive one-standard-deviation shock to government
spending level (column 1) and volatility (column 2), and to capital tax rate level (col-
umn 3) and volatility (column 4); Figure 2.4 shows the impulse responses to shocks in
transitory productivity and its time-varying volatility (columns 1 and 2, respectively),
to permanent productivity (column 3) and monetary policy shocks (column 4).
[Insert Figures 2.3 and 2.4 about here.]
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show that fiscal shocks together with innovations in transitory pro-
ductivity represent the main drivers of bond risk premia. On the other hand term pre-
mium fluctuations induced by permanent productivity and monetary shocks are minimal.
Comparing the last row in Figure 2.3 with that in Figure 2.4, we see that fluctuations in
term premium due to government spending volatility shocks are larger than those gen-
erated by volatility in productivity. Government spending level shocks too stand out as
a source of term premium as important as level shocks in transitory productivity. Both
government spending level and volatility shocks demand a positive, and quite persistent
term premium.
Next, we investigate the behavior of inflation risk premium induced by government
spending shocks. To this end, we look at the response of the SDF and inflation. A key
and novel result conveyed by Figure 2.3 is that the relationship between consumption
and inflation depends critically on the nature of the underlying fiscal shocks: govern-
ment spending level shocks imply a negative correlation between consumption growth
and inflation, while government spending uncertainty shocks imply exactly the oppo-
site relation. Therefore, in our model, an increase in government spending level implies
that inflation is high exactly when agents wish to consume more; but high inflation
makes payoffs on nominal bonds low in real terms, and the positive covariance between
marginal utility of consumption and inflation generates positive inflation risk premia.
On the other hand, following a positive government spending uncertainty shock, con-
sumption growth and inflation move in the same direction, which in turn delivers an
average negative inflation risk premia.
Figure 2.3 further shows that both the level and volatility shocks to government spend-
ing have positive impact on the nominal term premium for long-term bonds. This is
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straightforward to rationalize for level shocks since inflation risk premium is positive.
The fact that government spending volatility shocks command a positive nominal term
premium in the second column despite the negative inflation risk premium suggests
that long-term nominal bonds are riskier relative to short-term nominal bonds. In other
words, when the marginal utility is high (spike in the SDF), long-term bond price appre-
ciates less than the price of short-term bonds. The overall implication of the government
spending volatility shock on the nominal term structure is that it has a negative level
effect but a positive slope effect. The steepening of the nominal yield curve due to a
positive spending volatility shock is confirmed in Figure 2.6(b) by observing the large
decline in the 1-quarter nominal yield.
Turning to capital tax shocks in the third and fourth columns of Figure 2.3, inflation
risk premia are negative on average and nominal term premia fall in response to both
level and uncertainty shocks to tax rate. When the marginal utility to consume is high
following tax shocks, inflation declines thus making nominal bonds an effective hedge
against real consumption risk, resulting in a negative inflation risk premium. The third
row of Figure 2.3 shows long-term nominal yields drop significantly exactly when the
stochastic discount factor spikes, resulting in further decline in the 5-year nominal term
premium. In sum, both level and volatility shocks to the return on capital tax rate have
negative level effects on the nominal term structure.
Our discussion here based on the impulse responses of the model can be validated in the
regression analysis in Table 2.2 in several dimensions. First, government spending level
and volatility shocks command positive term premium, in line with positive coefficient
estimates β1 and β2 from the predictive regressions (see Panel B and C). Second, return
on capital tax rate level and volatility shocks command negative term premium with
large error bands, consistent with coefficient estimates β3 and β4, which are mostly nega-
tive or statistically insignificant (Panel C). Third, government spending volatility shocks
dominate level shocks in driving term premium variation. This is similarly reflected in
the comparison of statistical significance between β1 and β2 in Panel C of Table 2.2.
We conclude this section by quantifying the contribution of each shock to the variability
of macroeconomic and financial variables.27
[Insert Table 2.6 about here.]
27The task of measuring the contribution of each of the eight shocks in our model to aggregate
fluctuations is complicated because, with a third-order approximation to the policy function and its
associated nonlinear terms, we cannot neatly divide total variance among the shocks as we would do in
the linear case. We follow (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011)
and set the realizations of seven of the shocks to zero and measure the volatility of the economy with
the remaining shock.
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Table 2.6 Panel B shows that, consistent with the results in Table 2.1, uncertainty in
government spending is the single most important source of variation in the slope of the
term structure. Government spending uncertainty is also as important as volatility in
productivity to generate movements in term premium. On the other hand, level shocks in
transitory productivity generate negligible variability in term premium, a result which
contrasts with (Rudebusch and Swanson 2008). All shocks are important drivers of
nominal yields movements, except for permanent productivity, whose effects are puny,
and monetary shocks, whose effects dissipate quickly along the term structure of interest
rates. Turning to the real side of the economy, Table 2.6 Panel A shows that transitory
productivity level shocks are a key determinant of consumption and output volatilities.
However, spending and capital tax (level and volatility) shocks generate sizable effects
on investment, hours and inflation.
To summarize, we find that stochastic volatility in government spending shocks can
generate sizable variation in the term premium without distorting the ability of the
model to match key macroeconomic moments.
2.5.4 Model Implied Return Predictability
We compare the predictability of bond excess returns in the data to that obtained from
simulations of our fiscal model28 in Table 2.7. Panel A of Table 2.7 shows that, similar
to the data, the government debt level is an important predictor of bond excess returns.
Panel B shows that the loadings on the level and volatility of government spending
are positive and statistically significant in the model regressions. Panel C, shows that
adding capital tax rates leaves unaffected the conclusion on the level and volatility of
government spending. Moreover the level of capital tax rate enters almost always with
a negative coefficient, albeit the point estimate is insignificant. All these implications
from our model are in line with the data, see Table 2.2.
Before concluding we remark that Table 2.7 shows population results from a long sim-
ulation of the model where parameters are fixed at their point estimates; so our model-
implied predictive regressions do not account for parameter uncertainty and small sample
uncertainty. Accounting for these two sources of uncertainty would close the gap be-
tween the estimated coefficients on government spending level and volatility in the data
(Table 2.2) and those implied by the model. In fact, in untabulated results, we show
that the 90% confidence interval from finite sample simulation always include the point
28In the data, we use the maturity-weighted debt to GDP ratio and the filtered volatility from our
Bayesian procedure to proxy for the supply of debt and fiscal uncertainty. In the model-implied regres-
sions we use instead the real maturing debt Dt−1(t) and the true volatility process for fiscal instruments.
Also, we apply a (one-sided) hp-filter to the level of the fiscal variables within the model as we did in
the data.
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estimate in the data for the level of government spending, and gets closer to that for
uncertainty. Similarly, finite sample simulations deliver a 90% interval for R2 in Panel
C equal to [11%, 24%] for one-year holding period returns (across maturities), which
encompasses s the R2 ≈ 21% measured in the data.
2.5.5 Economic Intuition of Inflation Risk Premium from Government
Spending
The decomposition of nominal bond yields consists of real yields, expected inflation, and
inflation risk premium. In closed form:
i
(n)
t = r
(n)
t +
1
n
{
Et [πt,t+n] + covt(mt,t+n, πt,t+n)− 1
2
vart(πt,t+n)
}
,
where the conditional covariance of the marginal rate of consumption substitution be-
tween times t and t+n with inflation during the same period gives us the compensation
for inflation risk for holding n-period to maturity nominal bonds. To derive some intu-
ition on inflation risk premium in the current model, we study this covariance term by
examining the impact of fiscal shocks on mt,t+1 and on πt,t+1.
The real stochastic discount factor can be written in logs such that,29
mt−1,t =
1− γ
1− ψ
[
log(β)− ψ (cot − cot−1)]+ ψ − γ1− ψ log(Rclt ),
where Rclt is the return on the wealth (consumption and labor income) portfolio of the
representative saver. Because the representative household is Ricardian with respect
to government spending, positive level shocks to government spending increase saving
while crowding out consumption. The resulting high marginal utility state generates
higher mt−1,t because consumption growth (ct − ct−1) is low.
To decipher the impact of government spending shocks on inflation, we loglinearize the
Phillips curve in Equation (2.6) after detrending the growth variables to get,
α
1− απt + ft = log(νκ
−κ(1− κ)−(1−κ)) + κrKt + (1− κ)w˜t + jt − zt, (2.10)
where the tilde above a variable indicates stationarity. Therefore, w˜t = log
(
Wt
At
)
. The
first term can be obtained by assuming the steady state log inflation, π, is zero. The
interpretation of this equation is that inflation is not only functions of the contempora-
neous marginal cost to the firm (rKt and w˜t), but also expected inflation and expected
29For the ease of exposition, the remainder of this section contains lower case variables denoting the
log-version of their upper case counterparts.
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marginal cost, according to Equations (2.7) and (2.8), during the period before the
optimal price can be set again.
Rearrange Eq. (2.10), we have30
α
1− απt
= log(νκ−κ(1− κ)−(1−κ)) + κrKt + (1− κ)w˜t − zt + jt − ft
≅ log(νκ−κ(1− κ)−(1−κ)) + κrKt + (1− κ)w˜t︸ ︷︷ ︸
contemporaneous marginal cost
−zt
+const
Et
 πt+1︸︷︷︸
inflation expectation
−∆zt+1 + κ∆rKt+1 + (1− κ)∆w˜t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected marginal cost
+jt+1 − ft+1] + 1
2
[
vart(∆zt+1) + κ
2vart(∆r
K
t+1) + (1− κ)2vart(∆w˜t+1)
+ (1− 2η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
vart(πt+1) + vart(jt+1) + vart(ft+1)
 . (2.11)
Recall the last equality is an approximation after dropping the remaining covariance
terms. There are a number of takeaways from this derivation. First, higher expected
inflation raises current inflation. Second, higher expected marginal cost also raises cur-
rent inflation. Third, stochastic volatility, which increases conditional variance of the
endogenous variables, generally increases current inflation with the except of inflation
variance since η is much greater than 1.
Figure 2.5–Panel (a) shows the impulse responses of endogenous variables to spending
shocks and it allows us to inspect further the mechanism. Following a positive gov-
ernment spending level shock, output rises according to the market clearing condition,
Equation (2.9). Firms intend to produce more in order to meet the demand by increas-
ing labor and capital input. On the supply side, labor supply is high deriving from the
negative wealth effect of the households due to lower consumption, but capital supply
is low stemming from the desire of the households to invest in Treasury bonds over
capital because they are safer. The result is a drop in real wage, but a strong increase
in the return on capital, hiking the marginal cost for the firm. The increase in contem-
poraneous and expected marginal cost drive up inflation according to the loglinearized
Phillips curve. Recall the same positive government spending level shock pushes up
marginal utility by lowering consumption growth, thus the covariance generated by the
30Given the linearized functional forms of ft and jt in Appendix 2.10.3.5, we can simplify the loglinear
Phillips curve in Eq. (2.10)). First notice constf = constj = const since steady state Υ = Φ by assuming
π = 0. Second, we ignore the covariance terms in the decomposition of the variance terms within ft
and jt to keep the intuition simple. Furthermore, many of these covariance terms will cancel out in
calculating jt − ft.
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government spending level shock between mt,t+1 and πt+1, covt(mt,t+1, πt+1), is positive
implying positive inflation risk premium.
Similar to the level shock, a positive government spending volatility shock also raises the
marginal utility of consumption. Under the lognormal framework, the second moment
shock works through the expectation channel in the following way:
Et[Gt+1] = Et[e
gt+1 ] = eEt[gt+1]+
1
2
vart(gt+1).
Uncertainty about government spending affects the expectation of future government
spending, amplifying household’s precautionary savings motive making current con-
sumption fall. Unlike the level shock, however, because the volatility shock increases the
expected return on capital causing marginal Q to rise through the investment equation,
the savers prefer investment in capital as opposed to Treasury bonds. Firms, on the other
hand, also anticipate the increase in expected demand and coordinate by shifting pro-
duction from today to tomorrow. By decreasing labor and capital inputs today, current
marginal cost goes down resulting in a decline in inflation. The fall in inflation is fur-
ther reinforced by the increase of the conditional variance of inflation in Equation (2.11)
stemming from the government spending volatility shock. Because (1− 2η) < 0, higher
inflation uncertainty translates into lower current inflation according to the loglinear
Phillips curve. On average, the second moment shock to government spending gener-
ates low inflation in high marginal marginal state of the world making covt(mt,t+1, πt+1)
negative.
2.5.6 Term Premium and Government Spending Volatility Shocks
The bottom row of Figure 2.3 shows that fiscal policy shocks have significant impact
on the nominal term premium. The variation is especially pronounced for volatility
shocks in the second column. After the realization of a positive one standard deviation
government spending volatility shock, the 5-year term premium increases by about 25
bps, on average. Recall that term premium stems from the relative riskiness of long-
maturity bonds vs. short maturity bonds. Intuitively, the term premium is positive
(negative) when the return for long-maturity bonds is lower (higher) than the return for
short-maturity bonds in high marginal utility states. Translating into yields, this implies
long-term yields increase (decrease) more (less) compared with short-term yields, thus
creating a yield curve steepening effect.
Figure 2.5–Panel (b) presents government spending volatility shock impulse responses
for the real economy and the nominal short rate. Notice the 1-quarter nominal rate drops
significantly relative to the decline in the 5-year nominal rate in the second column of
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Figure 2.3, implying short-dated bonds have greater price increase in bad times making
long-dated bonds risky. To get some intuition on what is driving the relative change
in bond prices, assume a positive government spending volatility shock is realized at
the beginning of time t so the SDF is elevated (M$t−1,t ↑). We compare the price of a
one-period to maturity bond to the price of a n-period to maturity bond under CRRA
utility:
P
(1)
t
x = e−r(1)t
y
= Et
[
M$t,t+1
]
= Et
[
e−γ∆ct+1−πt+1
]
,
P
(n)
t ↑= e−r
(n)
t ↓ = Et
[
M$t,t+1M
$
t+1,t+2 . . .M
$
t+n−2,t+n−1P
(1)
t+n−1
]
= Et
[
e−γ∆ct+n−πt+n
]
,
where the length of the arrows denotes magnitude. For the price of the one-period
to maturity bond to increase more in comparison to the n-period to maturity bond,
it has to be the case that the one-period expected consumption growth declines more
than the n-period expected consumption growth (assuming inflation differential is trivial
for now). Figure 2.5 panel (b) shows that the positive government spending volatility
shock causes a temporary decrease in real wage and increase in saving (real debt) in the
short-run. However, in the long-run, wage rebounds and debt level falls persistently.
The implications of these impulse responses are consistent with a large drop in short-
term expected consumption growth and a less dramatic decline in long-term expected
consumption growth, which steepens the yield curve and raises term premium.
[Insert Figures 2.5 about here.]
2.5.7 Inspecting the Mechanism due to Capital Tax Rate Shocks
The third and fourth columns of Figure 2.3 document that level and volatility shocks
to the return on capital tax rate induce substantial negative nominal term premia. To
decipher the mechanism, we examine the impulse response functions to the real economy
of the these shocks in panels (a) and (b) in Figure 2.6. In panel (a), a positive level shock
to the tax rate lowers output and investment as the marginal return on capital decreases.
As a result, marginal cost declines causing inflation to be low when consumption is also
low. Moreover, debt issuance drops as the tax revenue increases driving up (down)
bond prices (yields), especially at the short-end of the maturity curve. The negative
level effect generated by the positive capital tax level shock results in negative inflation
risk premium. It is interesting to note that the 1-quarter nominal rate in panel (a)
of Figure 2.6 experiences a much more significant drop relative to the 5-year rate in
the third column of Figure 2.3. The steepening of the yield curve implies a positive
term premium, and yet the overall nominal term premium is negative following the tax
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rate level shock. Therefore, we conclude that the negative term structure level effect
dominates the positive slope effect in this case.
[Insert Figures 2.6 about here.]
Opposite to the government spending volatility shock, the term premium driven by tax
rate volatility shock is negative. A positive one standard deviation shock to the return on
capital tax rate volatility leads to a 30 bps fall in the 5-year term premium in the fourth
column of Figure 2.3. This is reflected in panel (b) of Figures 2.6. Following a positive
one standard deviation volatility shock to the return on capital tax rate, households cut
investment immediately because tax rate is expected to be high tomorrow. At the same
time, real wage gets a temporary bump up while savings start to decline. Over the long
horizon, investment recovers, and wage falls as aggregate demand stays below its steady
state. In contrast to panel (a), the decrease in investment is more attenuated for tax rate
volatility shocks compared to level shocks, and marginal cost actually increases slightly
due to higher wage. However, in the long-run, as wage declines, expected marginal cost
also lessens to produce lower inflation. This is a pure term structure level effect as the
positive tax rate volatility shock induces a parallel shift downward of the yield curve.
The 1-quarter short rate decreases by roughly the same magnitude in panel (b) of Figure
2.6 as the 5-year nominal rate in the last column of 2.3.
Furthermore, the impulse response functions to a volatility shock of the capital return tax
rate are broadly in line with the empirical findings documented by (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde,
Guerro´n-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2015). Notably our model replicates
both the decrease in inflation (see Figure 2.3, column 4) and nominal interest rate
documented in (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramı´rez
2015), a fact that was challenging to obtain in their baseline model economy. Intuitively,
faced with higher tax uncertainty, households want to save more. At the same time
households invest less because of the increased probability of higher tax rate on capital
income. The increased uncertainty surrounding capital tax raises the demand for bonds
leading to decline in yields across maturities.
2.5.8 The Importance of Fiscal Shocks for the Term Premium
Ex ante, productivity, fiscal and monetary policy shocks could all be very important
drivers of the term premium. Table 2.6 has already highlighted that, in fact, fiscal
volatility shocks turn out to be a key driver of variation in term premium within our
model. To further substantiate our claim that fiscal shocks represent a key determinant
of the term premium, we feed our model with the filtered shocks from the estimated
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government spending and capital tax rate dynamics, see Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2). Figure
2.8(a) compares the model’s prediction for the term premium to the empirical measure of
term premium obtained in (Adrian, Crump, and Moench 2013). The left Panel presents
the term premium obtained when we feed into our model shocks to government and
capital rate level only; the right Panel presents the premium when we feed our model
with both fiscal level and volatility shocks.31
[Insert Figure 2.7 about here.]
The figure shows how the fiscal level shocks make the model able to track the average
term premium whereas the volatility shocks helps in capturing the variability of the term
premium. Also, the interaction of shocks to level and volatility captures the trending
down in the late 90s. Finally, our model captures the increase in term premium around
the financial crisis. To our eyes, (the fiscal shocks in) the model provides a tantalizing
account of the cyclical and longer-term fluctuations in the term premium.
We also quantify the relative contribution of real and inflation risk premia to the overall
nominal compensation. Figure 2.8(b) shows the result. The Figure superimposes the
model-implied nominal and real term premium, as well as their difference, the inflation
risk premium. The left panel shows that fiscal level shocks generate both a sizable level
effect via real term premium and, more importantly, substantial variability through
movements in inflation risk premium. Looking at the right chart, we observe that
adding fiscal volatility shocks leads to remarkable fluctuations in real term premia. In
all, the compensation investors require for bearing real interest rate risk – the risk that
real short rates don’t evolve as they expected – represent a force behind movements in
nominal term premia as important as inflation risk premium according to our model.
This finding bodes well with the reduced form results in (Abrahams, Adrian, Crump,
Moench, and Yu 2016).
2.6 Fiscal Shocks at the ZLB
In this section we study the propagation of fiscal shocks when the economy is already at
the zero lower bound (ZLB) such that the nominal interest rate is zero. In the aftermath
of the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Bank aggressively lowered the Fed funds
rate to close to zero as a response in order to stimulate economic activity. This led
to the longest episode of zero interest in modern U.S. history until interest rate liftoff
31We estimate the parameters in Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2) following a Bayesian approach. The particle
filter delivers draws for the shocks. We feed each draw into the model; then, we compute the median
and 95 percent probability intervals for the model-implied premium.
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in late 2015. Over the last decade, the ZLB interest rate economy has been of intense
interest to macroeconomists and financial economists alike. The study of fiscal policy
at the zero lower bound is especially relevant as the central bank loses its main policy
instrument which is the nominal short rate.
The expansionary impact of the fiscal policy response in the absence of monetary policy
coordination has been the subject of great debate. In a well cited paper, Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) find that the government spending multiplier, or the
dollar-to-dollar increase in GDP per dollar spent, is much larger when the nominal
interest rate is at the ZLB. In our analysis here, we document that this amplifying effect
of the ZLB on the real economy not only holds for government spending level shocks,
but the effect is even more pronounced for government spending volatility shocks as well
as capital income tax shocks. Implications of the impulse responses due to fiscal shocks
at the ZLB lead to intensification of bond risk premia when the nominal short rate is at
zero for a prolonged period.
To implement the ZLB analysis in our model, we follow (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-
Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2015) and Sims (2017) by treating the lower
bound as an interest rate peg at zero. More precisely, employing news shocks in the
Taylor rule of a standard DSGE model, Sims (2017) demonstrates how to solve for the
news shocks that allow the interest rate to be held at a constant over various horizons.
This technique lets the model produce conditional IRFs at the ZLB. Appendix 2.10.5
provides additional details regarding the implementation. In our analysis of the impact
of fiscal level and volatility shocks at the ZLB, we perform two experiments. Assuming
the interest rate is already at zero, we perturb the economy with fiscal shocks while
forcing the interest to stay at the ZLB for 4 and 8 quarters. In this setting, there
is no uncertainty about when departure from the zero interest rate is going to take
place, which greatly reduces the complexity of the ZLB analysis. The 4-quarter peg
is motivated by the evidence in (Swanson and Williams 2014) that until the Fed put
an explicit date for the ZLB into its communications (through fall 2011), professional
forecasters expected the ZLB to bind for four quarters. The second scenario of 8 quarters
instead strikes a compromise between the ex ante views of professional forecasters and
the actual realization of events (which turned out to be roughly 28 quarters).
Figure 2.8 presents the impulse responses following a one standard deviation positive
government spending level shock, panel (a), and a one standard deviation positive spend-
ing volatility shock, panel (b), conditional on the nominal short rate stays at zero for
4 quarters (long dashed line, ZLB 4Q) and 8 quarters (short-long dashes, ZLB 8Q) af-
ter the initial shock. The subplots also overlay the unconditional responses from the
benchmark economy (solid line) for comparison purposes. Figure 2.8 panel (a) shows
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that following a positive level shock to government spending, output increases by more
than 2% under ZLB 8Q relative to the benchmark rise of 1%, consistent with Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011). The increases in investment and inflation are
even more pronounced: 4% and 3% respectively under ZLB 8Q compared with less than
1% for both under the benchmark. The drastic increase in output under ZLB 8Q leads
to an immediate rise in real wage whereas the benchmark response shows a decline in
wage. Higher wage combined with higher return on capital cause marginal cost to in-
crease by more than 1%. On the other hand, the significant rise in investment when the
lower bound is binding makes saving less attractive for consumption smoothing, thus
the increase in debt is less relative to the benchmark case. Moreover, the ZLB has term
structure implications for the spending level shock. The spike in the SDF following a
positive spending level shock are similar across the three scenarios so we do not illustrate
the impulses here.32 The fact that the spending shock generates much higher inflation
when the lower bound is binding implies the covariance between the SDF and inflation
is also higher at the ZLB resulting in greater inflation risk premium. Panel (a) further
shows that with the nominal short rate held at zero for multiple periods after the initial
shock, the long-term yield rises but not as much as the benchmark case. Whereas the
level spending shock has a flattening effect on the yield curve in the benchmark case,
the same shock steepens the yield curve slightly at the ZLB.
[Insert Figure 2.8 about here.]
Figure 2.8 panel (b) displays the impulse responses following a positive government
spending volatility shock. The first striking result is that the impact of the volatility
shock is greatly exacerbated when the ZLB is binding. The declines in output, invest-
ment, wages, inflation and marginal cost are orders of magnitude larger for ZLB 8Q than
the benchmark. For example, with the short rate held at zero for 8 quarters following
the initial shock, output drops by nearly 10% during that window, consistent with the
finding of Nakata (2017). Following an uncertainty shock at the zero lower bound, gov-
ernment debt is in high demand as investment falls and precautionary savings motive
kicks into high gear. The 30% decline in inflation under ZLB 8Q implies a lower average
inflation risk premium stemming from the spending volatility shock. Finally, the IRFs
for short rate and the 5-year rate demonstrate the steepening effect of the uncertainty
shock on the yield curve for ZLB 8Q, resulting in higher nominal term premium.
Next, we examine the consequences of capital return tax rate shocks at the ZLB. Figure
2.9 presents the IRFs for capital tax level and volatility shocks, in panels (a) and (b),
32This is the case for all four fiscal shocks we examine at the ZLB. Therefore, the SDF IRFs are
omitted in Figures 2.8 and 2.9.
Level and Volatility Shocks to Fiscal Policy: Term Structure Implications 142
respectively. Two takeaways are worth pointing out. First, the ZLB amplifies the impact
of return to capital tax rate shocks on output, investment, wages, inflation and marginal
cost by comparing ZLB 8Q and the benchmark in both panels. Second, unlike the
government spending shocks in Figure 2.8, the positive level shock to the capital income
tax rate is much more significant than the positive volatility shock in depressing the
economy. When the nominal short rate is held at zero for prolonged period of time, a
positive one standard deviation shock to the tax rate level causes output to decline by
more than 10%, investment by more than 30% and inflation by almost 40% in panel (a).
The corresponding declines in panel (b) are 2%, 8% and 4%. On the term structure,
Figure 2.9 exhibits low inflation when the SDF is high for both level and volatility shocks
to the capital income tax rate, suggesting inflation risk premium is more negative at the
ZLB due to these shocks. Furthermore, with the nominal short rate held at zero after
the shocks are realized, the 5-year yields dip in both panels (a) and (b). The flattening
of the nominal yield curve following capital tax rate level and volatility shocks generates
negative term premium when the ZLB is binding.
[Insert Figure 2.9 about here.]
Together, Figures 2.8 and 2.9 establish the amplified impact of fiscal policy shocks on
the real economy at the ZLB. Consistent with the findings of Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo (2011), a positive government spending level shock creates a substantial
economic boom shifting savings from government debt to investment, which drives up
inflation and inflation risk premium. On the other hand, a positive government spending
volatility shock generates a severe economic downturn, pushing the demand curve for
debt significantly outward when the zero interest rate is binding, in line with Nakata
(2017). Since ZLB only binds temporarily and the shock is transitory, this causes long-
term yields to rise as the short rate is fixed. The steepening yield curve in turn produces
positive nominal term premium. Lastly, positive shocks to the level and volatility of
capital income tax rate also result in economic depressions at the ZLB, but the nominal
yield curves tend to flatten following those shocks, making nominal term premia negative.
2.7 Conclusion
We document that our DSGE model featuring fiscal policy and policy uncertainty is
successful in matching both macroeconomic and financial moments in the data. Impor-
tantly for our purpose, the model is quite successful in reproducing the average 5-year
term premium, as well as its dynamic properties as captured by the autocorrelation func-
tion. Stochastic volatility in government spending allows to capture up to 70% of the
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overall term premium variability, whereas a model with no stochastic volatility would
account for at most 13% of the term premium volatility.
We also show that the relationship between consumption and inflation depends critically
on the nature of the underlying fiscal shocks: government spending level shocks imply
a negative correlation between consumption and inflation, while government spending
uncertainty shocks imply exactly the opposite relationship. Since the empirical relation
between consumption and inflation was large and negative in the 1970s and early 1980s,
but much smaller in the 1990s and 2000s (see (Piazzesi and Schneider 2007) and (Benigno
2007)), our finding suggests that the relative importance of transitory technology and
government level shocks may have been larger in the 1970s and early 1980s than over the
rest of the sample where monetary and government spending uncertainty shocks may
have become dominant.
Finally, our analysis at the zero lower bound (ZLB) of the nominal interest rate reveals
the following three points. First, effects of fiscal shocks on macroeconomic variables are
amplified when the ZLB is binding. Second, this amplification is particularly sharp for
government spending volatility shocks and capital income tax rate level shocks. Third,
bond risk premia implications due to fiscal shocks remain substantial at the ZLB.
In all, we view our estimated DSGE model as an important step forward to understand
what state variables drive variation over time in bond risk premia. Our finding speak
to the key role played by shocks to the level and the uncertainty about fiscal policy.
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2.8 Figures
Figure 2.1: Smoothed Fiscal Uncertainty
(a) Government Spending Volatility.
(b) Capital Tax Rates Volatility.
The figure displays the 95 percent posterior probability intervals of the smoothed fiscal volatility shock
to policy instruments, 100exp(σx,t), over the sample. The panel shows by how many percentage points a
one-standard-deviation innovation to the fiscal shock would have moved the government spending (Panel
A) and the capital income tax rate (Panel B) at different moments.
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Figure 2.2: Autocorrelation Functions
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Autocorrelation function of the observable variables in the baseline model and the data. The black line
is the data. The blue line is the model’s median and the dashed lines are the model’s 5th and 95th
percentiles. The sample period for the data runs from 1970.Q1 to 2014.Q2.
Level and Volatility Shocks to Fiscal Policy: Term Structure Implications 146
Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses to Structural Shocks
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This figure plots the impulse responses of the stochastic discount factor, inflation, long-term bond yields
and the term premium to positive one standard deviation shocks to government spending level (gt),
government spending volatility (σg,t), capital income tax level (τ
k) and capital income tax volatility
(στk,t).
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Responses to Structural Shocks
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This figure plots the impulse responses of stochastic discount factor, inflation, long-term bond yields
and the term premium to positive one standard deviation shocks to transitory productivity level (zt)
and volatility (σzt ), to permanent productivity (∆at) and to monetary policy (ut)
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Figure 2.5: IRFs to Government Spending Shock
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(a) Government spending level (gt).
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(b) Government spending volatility (σg,t).
This figure plots the impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to government spending level
(gt) and volatiltiy (σg,t).
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Figure 2.6: IRFs to Capital Income Tax Shock
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(a) Capital income tax level (τkt ).
5 10 15 20
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
pe
rc
en
t
    Output     
5 10 15 20
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
σ
τ
t  shock
  Investment   
5 10 15 20
-0.4
-0.2
0
     Wages     
5 10 15 20
quarters
-0.5
0
0.5
pe
rc
en
t
     Hours     
5 10 15 20
quarters
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Marginal Costs 
5 10 15 20
quarters
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
bp
s
Nominal Rate 1Q
(b) Capital income tax volatility (στk,t).
This figure plots the impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to capital income tax level
(τk) and volatility (στk,t).
Level and Volatility Shocks to Fiscal Policy: Term Structure Implications 150
Figure 2.7: Counterfactual Analysis
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(a) Term Premium - Counterfactual Analysis.
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(b) Nominal vs Real Term Premium.
Panel A plots the model-implied term premium against the actual term premium for the period from
1970.Q1 to 2014.Q4. The solid blue line is the median, while the dashed lines are the 5th and 95th
percentiles. The correlation between the data and the model-implied term premium is 0.50 in the left
panel and 0.54 in the right panel. Panel B plots the model-implied nominal and real term premium as
well as the inflation risk premium. The green line is the difference between the median nominal and
median real term premium.
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Figure 2.8: IRFs to Government Spending Shock at ZLB
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(a) Government spending level (gt).
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(b) Government spending volatility (σg,t).
This figure plots the impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to government spending level
(gt) and volatiltiy (σg,t). The solid lines show the responses under the benchmark case (zero lower
bound not binding), the dashed lines under a four period peg, and the dashed-dotted lines under an
eight period peg.
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Figure 2.9: IRFs to Capital Income Tax Shock at ZLB
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(a) Capital income tax level (τkt ).
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(b) Capital income tax volatility (στk,t).
This figure plots the impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to capital income tax level
(τk) and volatility (στk,t). The solid lines show the responses under the benchmark case (zero lower
bound not binding), the dashed lines under a four period peg, and the dashed-dotted lines under an
eight period peg.
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2.9 Tables
Table 2.1: Bond yields and Fiscal Policy:
Quarterly time-series regressions. The dependent variable is the slope of the yield curve as measured
by the difference between the 5-year and the 1-year rates, y
(20)
t − y
(4)
t (Panel A), or the 10-year and the
1-year rates, y
(40)
t − y
(4)
t (Panel B). The independent variable are the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP
ratio (MWD/GDP, see Greenwood-Vayanos, 2014), the level of government spending (gt) and capital
tax rate (τk), and the filtered volatilities of government spending (σg,t) and capital income tax (στk,t)
series. The t -statistics, reported in parentheses, is based on Newey-West standard errors, with 12 lags.
The coefficient on MWD/GDP is multiplied by 100.
Panel A: y
(20)
t − y
(4)
t = β0 + β1gt + β2σg,t + β3τ
k
t + β4στk,t + c MWD/GDPt + ǫt+k
β1 β2 β3 β4 c R2
0.24 0.10
(2.04)
0.48 0.18 0.34 0.39
(3.62) (3.84) (2.99)
0.38 0.13 -0.10 0.00 0.39 0.43
(3.24) (2.49) (-1.76) (1.37) (3.45)
Panel B: y
(40)
t − y
(4)
t = β0 + β1gt + β2σg,t + β3τ
k
t + β4στk,t + c MWD/GDPt + ǫt+k
β1 β2 β3 β4 c R2
0.37 0.12
(2.24)
0.71 0.19 0.46 0.39
(3.49) (2.71) (3.01)
0.60 0.12 -0.13 0.00 0.52 0.42
(3.76) (1.96) (-1.33) (0.57) (3.37)
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Table 2.2: Bond returns and Fiscal Policy:
Quarterly time-series regression. The dependent variable is the one-year, three-year, or five-year excess return of the τ -year bond. The independent variable are the
maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio (MWD/GDP, see Greenwood-Vayanos, 2014), the level of government spending (gt) and capital tax rate (τ
k), and the filtered
volatilities of government spending (σg,t) and capital income tax (στk,t) series. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, is based on Newey-West standard errors with 6
lags. The coefficient on MWD/GDP is multiplied by 100.
Panel A: rx
(τ)
t+k,k = β0 + c MWD/GDPt + ǫt+k
1-yr, 2-yr bond 1-yr, 3-yr bond 1-yr, 4-yr bond 1-yr, 5-yr bond 1-yr, 10-yr bond 3-yr, 10-yr bond 5-yr, 10-yr bond
MWD/GDP 0.41 0.75 1.08 1.38 2.69 2.04 1.41
(1.81) (1.92) (2.05) (2.17) (2.47) (3.50) (4.15)
R¯2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.25 0.37
Panel B: rx
(τ)
t+k,k = β0 + β1 gt + β2 σg,t + c MWD/GDPt + ǫt+k
1-yr, 2-yr bond 1-yr, 3-yr bond 1-yr, 4-yr bond 1-yr, 5-yr bond 1-yr, 10-yr bond 3-yr, 10-yr bond 5-yr, 10-yr bond
MWD/GDP 0.60 1.06 1.47 1.85 3.59 2.47 1.48
(3.30) (3.24) (3.29) (3.37) (3.73) (4.94) (4.65)
Govnt Sp Lev. 0.68 1.22 1.65 2.02 3.49 2.15 0.83
(2.81) (2.76) (2.75) (2.74) (2.61) (3.18) (2.51)
Govnt Sp Vol. 0.38 0.62 0.80 0.97 1.82 0.93 0.22
(3.27) (3.12) (3.05) (3.03) (3.03) (2.34) (1.39)
R¯2 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.47 0.43
Panel C: rx
(τ)
t+k,k = β0 + β1 gt + β2 σg,t + β3 τ
k
t + β4 στk,t + c MWD/GDPt + ǫt+k
1-yr, 2-yr bond 1-yr, 3-yr bond 1-yr, 4-yr bond 1-yr, 5-yr bond 1-yr, 10-yr bond 3-yr, 10-yr bond 5-yr, 10-yr bond
MWD/GDP 0.71 1.30 1.82 2.31 4.48 2.74 1.77
(3.49) (3.46) (3.49) (3.55) (3.81) (5.81) (6.27)
Govnt Sp Lev. 0.45 0.75 0.96 1.13 1.77 1.68 0.40
(1.56) (1.44) (1.37) (1.32) (1.13) (1.98) (1.18)
Govnt Sp Vol. 0.30 0.45 0.56 0.65 1.16 0.77 0.01
(2.90) (2.53) (2.33) (2.21) (2.07) (1.95) (1.18)
Capital Tax Lev. -0.13 -0.28 -0.43 -0.57 -1.22 -0.45 -0.60
(-1.06) (-1.24) (-1.33) (-1.40) (-1.56) (-1.64) (-3.18)
Capital Tax Vol. 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.00 -0.01
(1.46) (1.50) (1.54) (1.55) (1.50) (-0.13) (-1.10)
R¯2 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.49 0.53
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Table 2.3: Calibrated and Estimated Parameters:
This table reports the parameter values for the baseline model.
Panel A: Calibrated Parameters Panel B: Separately Estimated Parameters Panel C: Estimated Parameters
Coefficient Description Value Coefficient Description Value Coefficient Description 1. Step GMM 2. Step GMM
δ capital depreciation 0.02 φg autocorrelation of government spending level 0.98 β time discount parameter 0.995 0.994
[0.95;0.99] (0.022) (0.000)
κ capital share of production 0.33 φσg autocorrelation of government spending volatility 0.92 ψ inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1.901 1.876
[0.80;0.96] (3.048) (0.062)
α share of firms with rigid prices 0.65 θσg steady-state of government spending volatility -6.03 γ risk aversion 181.421 185.024
[-6.31; -5.83] (46.843) (2.755)
θ share of firms with rigid wages 0.65 σσg volatility of government spending volatility 0.31 ω inverse of Frisch labor elasticity 0.452 0.450
[0.08;0.42] (3.861) (0.085)
η markup parameter 6.00 ζ capital adjustment cost 2.001 2.068
(1.976) (0.087)
ρr interest-rate smoothing coefficient 0.35
ρπ Taylor rule coefficient on inflation 1.5 ρx Taylor rule coefficient on output gap 0.098 0.072
(1.490) (0.013)
ηw markup parameter 6.00 φτ autocorrelation of capital tax level 0.98
[0.92;0.99]
θg steady-state government spending level 0.20 φστ autocorrelation of capital tax volatility 0.78 ρb fiscal response to debt 0.650 0.662
[0.58;0.89] (2.207) (0.839)
θτ steady-state capital tax level 0.37 θστ steady-state of capital tax volatility -4.84 ρg fiscal response to government spending 0.125 0.124
[-5.21; -4.70] (2.592) (0.417)
φz autocorrelation of transitory productivity level 0.98 σστ volatility of capital tax volatility 0.54 φa autocorrelation of permanent productivity shock 0.180 0.150
[0.32;0.70] (0.755) (0.081)
φσz autocorrelation of transitory productivity volatility 0.99 ga steady-state of permanent productivity shock 0.007 0.007
(0.049) (0.000)
θσz steady-state of transitory productivity volatility -4.82 σa volatility of permanent productivity shock 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.000)
σσz volatility of transitory productivity volatility 0.03 σu volatility of monetary policy shock 0.003 0.002
(0.038) (0.000)
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Table 2.4: Empirical and Model-Based Unconditional Moments:
This table reports the mean, standard deviations and correlations for observable vari-
ables in the baseline model. The sample period for the data is 1970.Q1 to 2014.Q2. All
data, except nominal interest rates, term premium and inflation, are in logs, HP-filtered,
and multiplied by 100 to express them in percentage deviation from trend. In Panel B,
interest rates and the term premia are expressed at an annual rate. The slope is proxied
by the spread between the ten-year and one-quarter rates.
Panel A: Macro Moments
Model Data
SD AR(1) Cor(.,yt) SD AR(1) Cor(.,yt)
Output 1.49 0.71 1.00 1.54 0.87 1.00
[1.44; 1.58] [0.71; 0.72]
Consumption 1.23 0.70 0.26 1.27 0.89 0.88
[1.16; 1.39] [0.70; 0.70] [0.13; 0.36]
Investment 7.01 0.71 0.61 7.07 0.85 0.92
[5.69; 9.21] [0.70;0.71] [0.58; 0.63]
Wages 1.16 0.90 0.39 1.13 0.78 -0.29
[1.14; 1.21] [0.90;0.90] [0.30; 0.46]
Hours 1.49 0.73 0.61 1.94 0.93 0.87
[1.37; 1.67] [0.72;0.73] [0.57; 0.65]
Inflation 0.69 0.93 0.05 0.61 0.89 0.11
[0.61; 0.80] [0.92;0.93] [0.01; 0.09]
Panel B: Finance Moments
Model Data
Mean SD AR(1) Cor(.,yt) Mean SD AR(1) Cor(.,yt)
Nominal Rate 1Q 5.62 4.09 0.99 0.06 5.62 3.88 0.94 0.22
[5.00; 6.59] [3.60; 4.80] [0.98; 0.99] [0.02; 0.10]
Nominal Rate 3Y 6.39 3.22 0.97 0.10 6.04 3.26 0.97 0.04
[5.98; 7.04] [2.80; 3.88] [0.97; 0.97] [0.07; 0.14]
Nominal Rate 5Y 6.53 2.85 0.97 0.10 6.34 3.06 0.97 0.00
[6.14; 7.09] [2.44; 3.52] [0.97; 0.98] [0.06; 0.14]
Nominal Rate 7Y 6.65 2.54 0.97 0.10 6.58 2.90 0.97 -0.02
[6.31; 7.06] [2.20; 3.16] [0.97; 0.98] [0.06; 0.14]
Nominal Rate 10Y 6.84 2.18 0.97 0.09 6.84 2.71 0.97 -0.05
[6.35; 7.12] [1.88; 2.80] [0.97; 0.98] [0.04; 0.13]
Slope 1.23 2.17 0.92 -0.02 1.23 2.09 0.77 -0.47
[0.37; 1.63] [2.00; 2.36] [0.92; 0.93] [-0.05; 0.14]
Term Premium 5Y 0.86 0.61 0.93 0.04 1.29 0.86 0.91 -0.34
[0.38; 1.10] [0.32; 1.01] [0.91; 0.95] [0.02; 0.09]
Term Premium 10Y 1.16 0.72 0.95 0.04 1.95 1.07 0.92 -0.32
[0.30; 1.56] [0.40; 1.28] [0.94; 0.97] [0.02; 0.09]
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Table 2.5: Real term structure of interest rates:
This table presents the mean, standard deviation, and first autocorrelation of the
two-year (RY8), three-year (RY12), five-year (RY20), seven-year (RY28), and ten-year
(RY40) real yields, and the 10-year and two-year spread from the model and the data.
Interest rates are expressed at an annual rate.
Model
Slope RY8 RY12 RY20 RY28 RY40
mean: 0.48 3.42 3.69 3.78 3.83 3.90
std: 0.75 1.48 1.22 1.07 0.95 0.81
AC1: 0.91 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Data:1971:3 - 2007:4
Slope RY8 RY12 RY20 RY28 RY40
mean: 0.47 2.33 2.41 2.56 2.67 2.80
std: 0.75 1.51 1.36 1.17 1.05 0.92
AC1: 0.76 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.94
Data:1971:3 - 2014:2
Slope RY8 RY12 RY20 RY28 RY40
mean: 0.62 1.87 1.96 2.19 2.33 2.49
std: 0.84 1.80 1.67 1.43 1.29 1.13
AC1: 0.76 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.94
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Table 2.6: Variance Decomposition - The Effect of Structural Shocks:
This table reports the variance decomposition for the different structural shocks in the baseline model. A and Z stand for permanent and
transitory productivity, respectively. G stands for government spending. In Panel B, the one-quarter, three-year, five-year, seven-year, ten-year
nominal yields, the slope (ten-year and one-quarter spread), and the term premia are expressed at an annual rate.
Panel A: Macro Moments
Output Consumption Investment Wages Hours Inflation
All Shocks 1.49 1.23 7.01 1.16 1.49 0.69
Only A 0.51 0.48 0.69 0.31 0.24 0.04
Only Monetary 0.15 0.10 0.38 0.04 0.22 0.03
Only Z Level 0.96 0.80 1.75 1.01 0.28 0.22
Only Z Uncertainty 0.10 0.04 0.50 0.03 0.15 0.29
Only G Level 0.45 0.30 0.34 0.19 0.68 0.07
Only G Uncertainty 0.12 0.15 1.41 0.13 0.16 0.21
Only Tax Level 0.44 0.20 3.60 0.17 0.65 0.21
Only Tax Uncertainty 0.12 0.23 2.01 0.11 0.17 0.08
Panel B: Finance Moments
Nominal Yields Slope Term Premia
1Q 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 10Y-1Q 5Y 10Y
All Shocks 4.09 3.22 2.85 2.54 2.18 2.17 0.61 0.72
Only A 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.00 0.00
Only Monetary 0.53 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.51 0.00 0.00
Only Z Level 1.12 0.88 0.84 0.80 0.75 0.51 0.02 0.02
Only Z Uncertainty 1.75 1.49 1.37 1.26 1.10 0.65 0.29 0.44
Only G Level 0.42 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.20 0.03 0.05
Only G Uncertainty 1.22 0.69 0.47 0.33 0.21 1.05 0.34 0.37
Only Tax Level 1.23 0.97 0.84 0.73 0.60 0.66 0.07 0.10
Only Tax Uncertainty 0.45 0.48 0.46 0.42 0.36 0.11 0.37 0.33
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Table 2.7: Bond returns and Fiscal Policy:
Model-implied regression. The dependent variable is the one-year, three-year, or five-year excess return of the τ -year bond. The independent variable are the maturing
debt level Dt−1(t), the level of government spending and capital tax rate, and the filtered volatilities of government spending and capital tax rate series. The t-statistics,
reported in parentheses, is based on Newey-West standard errors with 6 lags.
Panel A: rx
(τ)
t+k,k = β0 + c MWD/GDPt + ǫt+k
1-yr, 2-yr bond 1-yr, 3-yr bond 1-yr, 4-yr bond 1-yr, 5-yr bond 1-yr, 10-yr bond 3-yr, 10-yr bond 5-yr, 10-yr bond
MWD/GDP 1.97 3.56 4.87 5.97 9.06 9.23 5.40
(6.95) (7.00) (6.98) (6.94) (6.68) (5.33) (2.97)
R¯2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01
Panel B: rx
(τ)
t+k,k = β0 + β1 gt + β2 σg,t + c MWD/GDPt + ǫt+k
1-yr, 2-yr bond 1-yr, 3-yr bond 1-yr, 4-yr bond 1-yr, 5-yr bond 1-yr, 10-yr bond 3-yr, 10-yr bond 5-yr, 10-yr bond
MWD/GDP 1.96 3.56 4.88 5.97 9.02 9.31 5.65
(7.01) (7.07) (7.05) (7.01) (6.73) (5.68) (3.32)
Govnt Sp Lev. 0.33 0.50 0.65 0.80 1.63 2.33 1.23
(2.55) (2.16) (2.06) (2.07) (2.62) (2.53) (1.35)
Govnt Sp Vol. 0.13 0.22 0.29 0.36 0.63 1.30 1.25
(6.05) (5.88) (5.84) (5.84) (5.94) (5.75) (5.76)
R¯2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06
Panel C: rx
(τ)
t+k,k = β0 + β1 gt + β2 σg,t + β3 τ
k
t + β4 στk,t + c MWD/GDPt + ǫt+k
1-yr, 2-yr bond 1-yr, 3-yr bond 1-yr, 4-yr bond 1-yr, 5-yr bond 1-yr, 10-yr bond 3-yr, 10-yr bond 5-yr, 10-yr bond
MWD/GDP 1.92 3.47 4.75 5.81 8.81 8.84 5.04
(7.18) (7.22) (7.20) (7.17) (6.94) (5.75) (3.06)
Govnt Sp Lev. 0.34 0.51 0.67 0.83 1.68 2.41 1.32
(2.67) (2.28) (2.18) (2.20) (2.75) (2.74) (1.50)
Govnt Sp Vol. 0.13 0.22 0.29 0.36 0.63 1.30 1.25
(6.10) (5.92) (5.87) (5.86) (5.97) (5.78) (5.82)
Capital Tax Lev. -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 0.02 -0.36 -0.96
(-0.11) (-0.26) (-0.27) (-0.24) (0.05) (-0.54) (-1.34)
Capital Tax Vol. -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.12 -0.10
(-2.58) (-2.57) (-2.58) (-2.59) (-2.65) (-3.36) (-3.59)
R¯2 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.09
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2.10 Appendix
2.10.1 Data
We follow (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2015)
and construct the macroeconomic observable variables used in the estimation as:
1. Output is real GDP (GDPC1).
2. Consumption is real personal consumption expenditures (PCECC96).
3. Investment is real gross private domestic investment (GPDIC96).
4. Civilian Noninstitutional Population (CNP16OV, quarterly averages).
5. Real Per Capita GDP = (1) / (4).
6. Real Per Capita Consumption = (2) / (4).
7. Real Per Capita Investment = (3) / (4).
8. Inflation is GDP deflator (GDPDEF).
9. Hourly real wage is compensation per hour in the business sector (HCOMPBS)
divided by the GDP deflator (GDPDEF).
10. Hours per capita are measured by hours of all persons in the business sector
(HOABS).
Data for the period 1970:Q1–2014:Q2 are taken from the St. Louis Fed’s FRED database
(mnemonics are in parentheses).
Government spending and capital tax rates data are from (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-
Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2015). In particular, the tax data are con-
structed from national income and product accounts (NIPA) as in (Leeper, Plante,
and Traum 2010) (see also Appendix B in (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana,
Kuester, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2015) for details). Government spending is government
consumption and gross investment, both from NIPA.
With regard to the financial variables, the Treasury yield data are from (Gurkaynak,
Sack, and Wright 2007) (data are available for download on the website
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2006/200628/feds200628.xls) and the
series for the 10-year Term premia is from (Adrian, Crump, and Moench 2013) (data
available at
Level and Volatility Shocks to Fiscal Policy: Term Structure Implications 161
https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/data_indicators/term_premia.html). We
thank the authors for making these data available for download.
2.10.2 Predictive regressions: Robustness
We perform a number of robustness tests. Table 2.8 shows that our results for the (level
and volatility of) government spending and capital tax rate series remain significant
after controlling for the one-year yield ((Gertler and Karadi 2015) suggest to take the
one-year government bond rate as the relevant monetary policy indicator, rather than
the federal funds rate), and for trend inflation (see (Kozicki and Tinsley 2001) show that
highly persistent expected inflation dynamics determines the level of interest rates in
the long run and across maturities; see also (Cieslak and Povala 2015)).
Table 2.8: Quarterly time-series regression for bond returns
The dependent variable is the one-year, three-year, or five-year return of the τ -year bond. The inde-
pendent variable is the filtered government spending volatility series. The regressions control for the
MWD/GDP (see Greenwood-Vayanos, 2014), the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio and for the one-
year yield (Panel A) and an inflation trend (Panel B). The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, is based
on Newey-West standard errors with 6 lags. The coefficient on MWD/GDP is multiplied by 100.
Panel A: r
(τ)
t+k,k = β0 + β1 g
BC
t + β2 σg,t + β3 τ
k
t + β4 στk,t + c MWD/GDPt + d y
4
t + ǫt+k
1-yr, 2-yr bond 1-yr, 3-yr bond 1-yr, 4-yr bond 1-yr, 5-yr bond 1-yr, 10-yr bond 3-yr, 10-yr bond 5-yr, 10-yr bond
MWD/GDP 0.73 1.32 1.85 2.34 4.51 2.80 1.90
(1.89) (1.33) (1.00) (0.78) (0.39) (3.43) (3.05)
Govnt Sp Lev. 0.67 1.04 1.27 1.43 2.04 2.23 0.57
(2.36) (1.96) (1.73) (1.56) (1.21) (2.52) (1.54)
Govnt Sp Vol. 0.32 0.48 0.59 0.68 1.19 0.82 0.08
(2.77) (2.39) (2.21) (2.12) (2.06) (2.08) (0.49)
Capital Tax Lev. -0.07 -0.20 -0.34 -0.49 -1.15 -0.31 -0.43
(-0.61) (-0.90) (-1.08) (-1.22) (-1.57) (-1.22) (3.32)
Capital Tax Vol. 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 -0.01 -0.01
(1.01) (1.14) (1.24) (1.30) (1.38) (-0.55) (-1.05)
1-yr yield 0.16 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.42 0.36
(3.87) (3.70) (3.67) (3.69) (3.86) (6.88) (6.44)
R¯2 0.28 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.54 0.65
Panel B:
r
(τ)
t+k,k = β0 + β1 g
BC
t + β2 σg,t+ β3 Capital Tax Lev.t+ β4 Capital Tax Vol.t+ c MWD/GDPt+ dτ
CPI + ǫt+k
1-yr, 2-yr bond 1-yr, 3-yr bond 1-yr, 4-yr bond 1-yr, 5-yr bond 1-yr, 10-yr bond 3-yr, 10-yr bond 5-yr, 10-yr bond
MWD/GDP 0.72 1.29 1.80 2.27 4.39 2.74 1.81
(3.46) (3.39) (3.41) (3.47) (3.75) (5.68) (6.26)
Govnt Sp Lev. 0.46 0.69 0.83 0.90 1.15 1.68 0.40
(1.60) (1.30) (1.13) (1.01) (0.72) (2.01) (1.12)
Govnt Sp Vol. 0.30 0.45 0.54 0.62 1.09 0.77 0.02
(2.81) (2.49) (2.35) (2.27) (2.20) (1.94) (0.14)
Capital Tax Lev. -0.13 -0.32 -0.51 -0.71 -1.60 -0.45 -0.55
(-0.97) (-1.28) (-1.48) (-1.65) (-2.09) (-1.76) (-3.54)
Capital Tax Vol. 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.08 -0.00 -0.01
(1.47) (1.66) (1.80) (1.90) (2.02) (-0.13) (-1.18)
Infl. Trend 0.01 -0.11 -0.27 -0.44 -1.19 0.01 0.16
(0.08) (-0.32) (-0.57) (-0.76) (-1.16) (0.02) (0.54)
R¯2 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.48 0.54
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Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.9 use the business cycle component of government spending and
capital tax rates. The components are obtained using the one-sided filter of (Ortu,
Tamoni, and Tebaldi 2013). The filter amounts to remove from the gt series an 8-
year (equally weighted) moving average based on past observation. Table 2.9 shows an
alternative interpretation of this result. We focus on government spending for ease of
exposition. Panel A in Table 2.9 shows regressions of bond returns on the business cycle
component of government spending and its volatility, after controlling for the maturity-
weighted debt to GDP, and a time trend. Panel B shows the results when we replace
the business cycle component of government spending with the raw series. Despite the
the time trend being strongly statistically significant in Panel B, the two panels depicts
the same picture, with R2 that are almost identical for maturities 3- to 10-years.
Table 2.9: Quarterly time-series regression for bond returns
The dependent variable is the one-year, three-year, or five-year return of the τ -year bond. The indepen-
dent variable are the government spending level and the filtered government spending volatility series.
The regressions control for the MWD/GDP (see Greenwood-Vayanos, 2014), the maturity-weighted-
debt-to-GDP ratio and for a time trend. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, is based on Newey-
West standard errors with 6 lags. The coefficients on MWD/GDP and the time trend are multiplied by
100.
Panel A: r
(τ)
t+k,k = β0 + β1 g
BC
t + β2 σg,t + c MWD/GDPt + d Time trend + ǫt+k
1-yr, 2-yr bond 1-yr, 3-yr bond 1-yr, 4-yr bond 1-yr, 5-yr bond 1-yr, 10-yr bond 3-yr, 10-yr bond 5-yr, 10-yr bond
MWD/GDP 0.65 1.11 1.49 1.84 3.37 2.07 1.10
(2.68) (2.53) (2.54) (2.60) (2.90) (3.04) (3.12)
Govnt Sp Lev. 0.72 1.25 1.67 2.01 3.32 2.00 0.88
(3.06) (2.82) (2.66) (2.53) (2.12) (2.82) (2.83)
Govnt Sp Vol. 0.36 0.60 0.80 0.97 1.88 0.99 0.26
(3.30) (3.20) (3.18) (3.20) (3.24) (2.54) (1.60)
Time Trend -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-.41) (-.21) (-0.08) (0.04) (0.39) (1.03) (2.05)
R¯2 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.48 0.45
Panel B: r
(τ)
t+k,k = β0 + β1 gt + β2 σg,t + c MWD/GDPt + d Time trend + ǫt+k
1-yr, 2-yr bond 1-yr, 3-yr bond 1-yr, 4-yr bond 1-yr, 5-yr bond 1-yr, 10-yr bond 3-yr, 10-yr bond 5-yr, 10-yr bond
MWD/GDP 0.55 0.94 1.27 1.58 2.93 1.77 1.23
(2.12) (2.01) (2.03) (2.09) (2.45) (2.65) (3.26)
Govnt Sp Lev. 0.45 0.81 1.12 1.37 2.35 1.10 0.02
(1.71) (1.79) (1.85) (1.87) (1.80) (1.45) (1.05)
Govnt Sp Vol. 0.35 0.58 0.77 0.94 1.82 0.97 0.27
(2.77) (2.68) (2.68) (2.71) (2.85) (2.13) (1.30)
Time. Trend 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.01
(1.52) (1.66) (1.80) (1.91) (2.27) (2.12) (0.78)
R¯2 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.40 0.39
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The understand this result it is useful to think of the time trend in Panel B as a filtering
device on its own, trying to remove the decadal trend in the raw government spending
series. This is easily seen in Figure 2.10 where we show the government spending series,
its business cycle component, and the series gt + 0.03 × Time Trend. The correlation
between the two filtered series is about 85%. Indeed, conclusions would be unchanged
had we included a time trend as a regressor in Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.9, and used the raw
series of government spending.
Figure 2.10: Government Spending and the Business Cycle
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
The figure displays the government spending series (solid, blue line), the business cycle component
obtained using the decomposition of Ortu et al. (2013) (red, dashed line), and the detrended government
spending series implied by the regressions in Panel B, Table 8 (green line with circles).
2.10.3 Solving the Benchmark Model
2.10.3.1 Households with Epstein-Zin Preference
The savers’ optimization problem is:
max V (Ct, Nt) =
{
(1− β)U(Ct, Nt)1−ψ + βEt
[
V 1−γt+1
] 1−ψ
1−γ
} 1
1−ψ
s.t. Et
[
∞∑
s=0
M$t,t+sPt+sCt+s
]
≤ Et
[
∞∑
s=0
M$t,t+s(Wt+sPt+sNt+s − Pt+sTt+s + Pt+sΨt+s)
]
,
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where
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
Ct(j)
θ−1
θ dj
] θ
θ−1
and
U(Ct, Nt) =
[
C1−ψt
1− ψ −A
1−ψ
t
N1+ωt
1 + ω
] 1
1−ψ
.
The first order conditions are:
∂Vt
∂Ct
:
1
1− ψ
[
V 1−ψt
] 1
1−ψ
−1
(1 − β)C−ψt − λM
$
t,tPt = 0 (2.12)
∂Vt
∂Nt
:
1
1− ψ
[
V 1−ψt
] 1
1−ψ
−1
(1 − β)(−A1−ψt N
ω
t ) + λM
$
t,tWtPt = 0 (2.13)
∂Vt
∂Ct+1
:
1
1− ψ
[
V 1−ψt
] 1
1−ψ
−1
β
(
1− ψ
1− γ
)
Et
[
V 1−γt+1
] 1−ψ
1−γ
−1
(1 − γ)V −γt+1
∂Vt+1
∂Ct+1
− λM$t,t+1Pt+1 = 0.(2.14)
Furthermore,
∂Vt+1
∂Ct+1
=
1
1− ψ
[
V 1−ψt+1
] 1
1−ψ
−1
(1− β)C−ψt+1. (2.15)
Combining (2.12) and (2.13), I have the household’s intratemporal consumption and
labor supply optimality condition:
λ(1− ψ)
V ψt (1− β)
=
C−ψt
Pt
=
A1−ψt N
ω
t
WtPt
⇒Wt = A1−ψt Cψt Nωt .
Finally, combining (2.12) ,(2.14) and (2.15), I obtain the intertemporal consumption
optimality condition:
λ(1− ψ)
V ψt (1− β)
=
C−ψt
Pt
= β
(
C−ψt+1
Pt+1
)(
V ψ−γt+1
M$t,t+1
)
Et
[
V
1
1−γ
t+1
] γ−ψ
1−γ
.
To get the nominal pricing kernel, I solve for M$t,t+1,
M$t,t+1 = β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−ψ (Pt+1
Pt
)−1 [ Vt+1
Et[V
1−γ
t+1 ]
1
1−γ
]ψ−γ
. (2.16)
2.10.3.2 Wage Rigidities and Optimal Wage Setting
Optimal price setting in the presence of wage stickiness is done through the following
optimization problem. There is a continuum of optimizing households in the economy,
indexed by k. Each period, only a fraction, 1− θ, of the optimizing households has the
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ability to adjust wage demand optimally. The objective function is:
max
W $,∗t (k)
Et
[
∞∑
s=0
θsM$t,t+s
{
Iwt,t+sW
$,∗
t (k)Nt+s(k)− Pt+sMRSt+s(k)Nt+s(k)
}]
s.t. Nt+s(k) =
(
W $,∗t (k)
W $t+s
)−ηw
Ndt+s
W $t =
[∫ 1
0
Wt(k)
1−ηwdk
] 1
1−ηw
=
[
(1− θ)W $,∗t
1−ηw
+ θ(Iwt−1,tW
$
t−1)
1−ηw
] 1
1−ηw
,
whereW $,∗t (·) is the optimal nominal wage chosen at time t and Iwt+s is the wage index in
the case whenW $,∗t is not adjusted optimally in following periods. ηw is the wage markup
parameter. MRSt+s(k) is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
labor dis-utility. W $t is the prevailing nominal market-clearing wage at time t, and
Ndt+s is the aggregate labor demand. The Calvo (1983) style staggered wage setting is
standard in the macroeconomic literature.
The optimal wage demand equation is:
[
1
1− θ
{
W 1−ηwt − θ
(
Iwt−1,t
Wt−1
Πt
)1−ηw}] 11−ηw
Ht = νwA
1−ψ
t Ct
ψNt
ωGt,
where
Ht = 1 + θEt
[
Mnomt,t+1I
w
t,t+1
−ηw
(
Ndt+1
Ndt
)(
Πt+1
Wt+1
Wt
)ηw
Ht+1
]
Gt = 1 + θEt
[
Mnomt,t+1I
w
t,t+1
−ηw
(
At+1
At
)1−ψ (Ct+1
Ct
)ψ (Nt+1
Nt
)ω (Ndt+1
Ndt
)
×Π1+ηwt+1
(
Wt+1
Wt
)ηw
Gt+1
]
.
In the above formulation, Wt is real wage, Πt is inflation, and νw =
ηw
ηw−1
is the wage
markup. The equilibrium condition states that the optimal real wage is equal to the
marginal cost of providing an extra unit of labor (A1−ψt Ct
ψNt
ω) multiplied by a time-
varying markup
(
νw
Gt
Ht
)
stemming from the monopolistic behavior of the agents in the
labor market.
2.10.3.3 The Investment Decision
The households rent out capital to the firms in exchange for earning the return on capital,
Rkt . The capital accumulation equation is standard with convex quadratic adjustment
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cost, Φ:
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +Φ
(
Invt
Kt−1
)
Kt−1,
where δ is the rate of capital depreciation.
The representative agent’s optimal investment strategy has to satisfy the following equa-
tion :
Qinvt = Et
[
Mt,t+1
[
(1− τkt )Rkt+1 +Qinvt+1
{
(1− δ) + Φ
(
Invt+1
Kt
)
−Φ′
(
Invt+1
Kt
)
Invt+1
Kt
}]]
,
where Qinvt is the shadow price of investment, and Φ
′ is the first derivative of the
quadratic adjustment cost function.
Similar to the standard investment first order condition from Q-theory, we derive here
the intertemporal relationship of investment’s Q as a function of the return on capital,
the rate of depreciation, and the marginal rate of investment adjustment cost.
2.10.3.4 Monopolistic Producers and Price Rigidities
There is a dispersion of firms, denoted by j, with identical production technology in
the economy. With nominal price stickiness and monopolistic competition, each firm is
faced with the following optimization problem:
max
P ∗t
Et
[
∞∑
s=0
αsM$t,t+s
(
P ∗t (Π
∗)sYt+s|t(j) −Wt+s|t(j)Pt+sNt+s|t(j)
)]
(2.17)
s.t. Yt+s|t(j) = Zt+sNt+s|t(j) (2.18)
Yt+s|t(j) =
(
P ∗t (Π
∗)s
Pt+s
)−θ
Yt+s (2.19)
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−θdj
] 1
1−θ
=
[
(1− α)P ∗t 1−θ + α(Pt−1Π∗)1−θ
] 1
1−θ
. (2.20)
Using Calvo (1983) pricing, a firm can choose to optimally adjust price to P ∗t with
probability (1 − α) each period independent of the time elapsed between adjustments.
Furthermore, t+ s|t denotes the value in period t+ s given that the firm last adjusted
price in period t. Π∗ is the natural level of inflation that firms use to adjust their prices
to from period to period if they cannot optimally set the price, and Zt is the productivity
shock on output. Log productivity is an exogenous AR(1) process such that
zt+1 = ln(Zt+1) = φzzt + σzǫz,t+1.
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The first order condition for firm j is:
Et
[
∞∑
s=0
αsM$t,t+sYt+s|t(j)
(
P ∗t (Π
∗)s − νPt+s
Wt+s|t(j)
Zt+s
)]
= 0, (2.21)
where ν = θθ−1 is the frictionless markup in the absence of price adjustment constraint.
Utilizing (2.19) and the fact that Wt+s|t(j) =Wt+s, (2.21) can be rewritten as:(
P ∗t
Pt
)
Ft = ν
Wt
Zt
Jt
or after manipulating (2.20):
[
1
1− α
(
1− α
(
Π∗
Πt
)1−θ)] 11−θ
Ft = ν
Wt
Zt
Jt. (2.22)
Ft can be recursively expressed as:
Ft = 1 + Et
[
∞∑
s=1
(αΠ∗)sM$t,t+1M
$
t+1,t+s
(
Yt+s
Yt+1
)(
Yt+1
Yt
)(
PtΠ
∗
Pt+1
)−θ (Pt+1(Π∗)s−1
Pt+s
)−θ]
= 1 +
αΠ∗Et
[
M$t,t+1
(
Yt+1
Yt
)(
PtΠ
∗
Pt+1
)−θ
Et+1
[
∞∑
s=1
(αΠ∗)s−1M$t+1,t+s
(
Yt+s
Yt+1
)(
Pt+1(Π
∗)s−1
Pt+s
)−θ]]
= 1 + αΠ∗Et
[
M$t,t+1
(
Yt+1
Yt
)(
Π∗
Πt+1
)−θ
Ft+1
]
,
Similarly, Jt has the following recursive formulation:
Jt = 1 + αΠ
∗Et
[
M$t,t+1
(
Zt
Zt+1
)(
Wt+1
Wt
)(
Yt+1
Yt
)(
Π∗
Πt+1
)−1−θ
Jt+1
]
.
2.10.3.5 Loglinearized Phillips Curve
To linearize Ft and Jt, we apply Taylor series expansion to the expectation terms in the
following steps for Equation (2.7). First, define Υt = logEt
[
emt,t+1+∆y˜t+1+∆at+1+(η−1)πt+1+ft+1
]
.
Then,
Ft = 1 + αEt
[
Mnomt,t+1
(
Yt+1
Yt
)
Πηt+1Ft+1
]
Feft = 1 + αΥe
logEt
[
emt,t+1+∆y˜t+1+∆at+1+(η−1)πt+1+ft+1
]
f + ft = log(1 + αΥe
Υt)
= log(1 + αΥeΥ) +
αΥeΥ
1 + αΥeΥ︸ ︷︷ ︸
constf
(Υt −Υ).
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Notice a variable without a time subscript implies the non-stochastic steady state of the
variable. In steady state, f = log(1 + αΥeΥ), so
ft = constfΥt − constfΥ
= constf logEt
[
emt,t+1+∆y˜t+1+∆at+1+(η−1)πt+1+ft+1
]
− constfΥ
= constf {Et [mt,t+1 +∆y˜t+1 +∆at+1 + (η − 1)πt+1 + ft+1]
+
1
2
vart (mt,t+1 +∆y˜t+1 +∆at+1 + (η − 1)πt+1 + ft+1)
}
− constfΥ,
in which the last equality relies on the lognormality assumption.
For Jt, define Φt = logEt
[
emt,t+1−∆zt+1+κ∆r
K
t+1+(1−κ)∆w˜t+1+∆y˜t+1+∆at+1+ηπt+1+jt+1
]
, then
the same procedure as above gives us the loglinearized Equation (2.8):
jt
= constjΦt − constjΦ
= constjlogEt
[
emt,t+1−∆zt+1+κ∆r
K
t+1+(1−κ)∆w˜t+1+∆y˜t+1+∆at+1+ηπt+1+jt+1
]
− constjΦ
= constj
{
Et
[
mt,t+1 −∆zt+1 + κ∆rKt+1 + (1− κ)∆w˜t+1 +∆y˜t+1 +∆at+1 + ηπt+1 + jt+1
]
+
1
2
vart
(
mt,t+1 −∆zt+1 + κ∆rKt+1 + (1− κ)∆w˜t+1 +∆y˜t+1 +∆at+1 + ηπt+1 + jt+1
)}
−constjΦ,
where constj =
αΦeΦ
1+αΦeΦ
.
2.10.3.6 The System of Equations for the Model with Growth
The full model presented in this section has thirty-one endogenous variables:
{M,Rcl, Rc, Rl, share, P c, P l, C, LI,N,W, Tax, τ,H,G, Iw ,D,K, Inv, Y,Φ,Φ′, RI , RK ,
Q, P real,Π, F, J,Mnom, R(1)}. I have a system of thirty-three equations resulting from
equilibrium conditions, first order conditions and policy rules:
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Pricing kernel,
Mt−1,t =
[
β
(
Ct
Ct−1
)−ψ] 1−γ1−ψ [
Rclt
]ψ−γ
1−ψ
(2.23)
Rclt = (1− sharet−1)Rct + sharet−1Rlt (2.24)
sharet =
1(
1− (1+ω)P ct Ct
(1−ψ)P ltLIt
) (2.25)
Rct =
(1 + P ct )Ct
P ct−1Ct−1
(2.26)
1 = Et[Mt,t+1R
c
t+1] (2.27)
Rlt =
(1 + P lt )LIt
P lt−1LIt−1
(2.28)
1 = Et[Mt,t+1R
l
t+1] (2.29)
Labor income,
LIt = WtNt (2.30)
Fiscal rule,
Taxt = τt + τ
k
t R
k
tKt−1 (2.31)
τt = ρbDt−1(t) + ρgGovt (2.32)
Wage setting of the saver,
[
1
1− θ
{
W 1−ηwt − θ
(
Iwt−1,t
Wt−1
Πt
)1−ηw}] 11−ηw
Ht = νwA
1−ψ
t Ct
ψNt
ωGt
Ht = 1 + θEt
[
Mnomt,t+1I
w
t,t+1
−ηw
(
Ndt+1
Ndt
)(
Πt+1
Wt+1
Wt
)ηw
Ht+1
]
Gt = 1 + θEt
[
Mnomt,t+1I
w
t,t+1
−ηw
(
At+1
At
)1−ψ (
Ct+1
Ct
)ψ (
Nt+1
Nt
)ω (
Ndt+1
Ndt
)
Π1+ηwt+1
(
Wt+1
Wt
)ηw
Gt+1
]
Wage indexing,
Iwt−1,t = e
ga (2.33)
Production function,
Yt = ZtK
κ
t−1(AtNt)
1−κ (2.34)
Capital accumulation,
Kt = ((1 − δ) + Φt)Kt−1 (2.35)
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Capital adjustment cost,
Φt = b1 +
b2
(1− 1/ζ)
(
Invt
Kt−1
)1−1/ζ
(2.36)
Φ′t = b2
(
Invt
Kt−1
)−1/ζ
(2.37)
Return on investment,
1 = Et[Mt,t+1R
I
t+1] (2.38)
RItQt−1 = (1− τkt )RKt +Qt
(
1− δ +Φt − Φ′t
Invt
Kt−1
)
(2.39)
1 = QtΦ
′
t (2.40)
Market clearing condition,
Yt = Ct + Invt +Govt (2.41)
Government budget constraint,
Dt−1(t) = Taxt −Govt + P realt Dt(t+ 1) (2.42)
Capital labor ratio,
Wt =
(1− κ)
κ
RKt
Kt−1
Nt
(2.43)
Optimal price setting,
[
1
1− α
(
1− α
(
1
Πt
)(1−η))] 1(1−η)
Ft =
νκ−κ(1− κ)−(1−κ)RKt
κ
W
(1−κ)
t Jt
ZtA
1−κ
t
Ft = 1 + αEt
[
Mnomt,t+1
(
Yt+1
Yt
)
Πηt+1Ft+1
]
Jt = 1 + αEt
[
Mnomt,t+1
(
Zt
Zt+1
)(
At
At+1
)1−κ (
RKt+1
RKt
)κ(
Wt+1
Wt
)(1−κ) (
Yt+1
Yt
)
Π
(1+η)
t+1 Jt+1
]
Nominal pricing kernel,
Mnomt−1,t =
Mt−1,t
Πt
(2.44)
Euler equation,
1
R
(1)
t
= Et[M
nom
t,t+1] (2.45)
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Real bond price,
P realt = Et[Mt,t+1] (2.46)
Taylor rule,
R
(1)
t
R
=
(
R
(1)
t−1
R
)ρr (
Πt
Π∗
)(1−ρr)ρπ ( Yt/At
Yt−1/At−1
)(1−ρr)ρx
eut , (2.47)
where gt, ut and zt are exogenous shocks to government spending, monetary policy and
productivity, respectively:
gt+1 = (1− φg)θg + φggt + eσg,t+1ǫg,t+1
σg,t+1 = (1− φgσ)θgσ + φgσσg,t + σgσǫgσ,t+1
τkt+1 = (1− φτk)θτk + φτkτkt + eστk,t+1ǫτk,t+1
στk,t+1 = (1− φτ
k
σ )θ
τk
σ + φ
τk
σ στk ,t + σ
τk
σ ǫ
τk
σ,t+1
zt+1 = φzzt + e
σz,t+1ǫz,t+1
σz,t+1 = (1− φzσ)θzσ + φzσσz,t + σzσǫzσ,t+1
∆at+1 = (1− φa)ga + φa∆at + σaǫa,t+1
ut+1 = φuut + σuǫu,t+1.
2.10.3.7 The Stationary Model
To make the model stationary, output, consumption, investment, capital stock, real
wage, real debt, government revenue, and government spending need to be detrended
by the permanent component of productivity, At.
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Pricing kernel,
Mt−1,t =
β( CtAtAt
Ct−1
At−1
At−1
)−ψ
1−γ
1−ψ [
Rclt
]ψ−γ
1−ψ
(2.48)
=⇒Mt−1,t =
β( C˜t
C˜t−1
e∆at
)−ψ
1−γ
1−ψ [
Rclt
]ψ−γ
1−ψ
(2.49)
Rclt = (1− sharet−1)Rct + sharet−1Rlt (2.50)
sharet =
1(
1− (1+ω)P
c
t
Ct
At
(1−ψ)P lt
LIt
At
) =⇒ sharet = 1(
1− (1+ω)P ct C˜t
(1−ψ)P lt L˜It
) (2.51)
Rct =
(1 + P ct )
Ct
At
P ct−1
Ct−1
At−1
At
At−1
=⇒ Rct =
(1 + P ct )C˜t
P ct−1C˜t−1
e∆at (2.52)
1 = Et[Mt,t+1R
c
t+1] (2.53)
Rlt =
(1 + P lt )
LIt
At
P lt−1
LIt−1
At−1
At
At−1
=⇒ Rlt =
(1 + P lt )L˜It
P lt−1L˜It−1
e∆at (2.54)
1 = Et[Mt,t+1R
l
t+1] (2.55)
Labor income,
LIt
At
=
Wt
At
Nt =⇒ L˜It = W˜tNt (2.56)
Fiscal rule,
Taxt
At
=
τt
At
+ τkt R
k
t
Kt−1
At−1
At−1
At
=⇒ T˜ axt = τ˜t + τkt Rkt K˜t−1e−∆at (2.57)
τt
At
= ρb
Dt−1(t)
At−1
At−1
At
+ ρg
Govt
At
=⇒ τ˜t = ρbD˜t−1(t)e−∆at + ρgG˜ovt (2.58)
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Wage setting of the saver,
[
1
1− θ
{
W 1−ηwt − θ
(
Iwt−1,t
Wt−1
Πt
)1−ηw}] 11−ηw
Ht = νwA
1−ψ
t Ct
ψNt
ωGt
=⇒
 1
1− θ
W˜t1−ηw − θ
(
Iwt−1,t
W˜t−1
Πt
At−1
At
)1−ηw
 11−ηw Ht = νwC˜tψNtωGt
Ht = 1 + θEt
Mnomt,t+1Iwt,t+1−ηw
(
Ndt+1
Ndt
)Πt+1 Wt+1At+1Wt
At
At+1
At
ηw Ht+1

=⇒ Ht = 1 + θEt
[
Mnomt,t+1I
w
t,t+1
−ηw
(
Ndt+1
Ndt
)(
Πt+1
W˜t+1
W˜t
e∆at+1
)ηw
Ht+1
]
Gt = 1 + θEt
Mnomt,t+1Iwt,t+1−ηw
 Ct+1At+1
Ct
At
At+1
At
ψ (Nt+1
Nt
)ω (Ndt+1
Ndt
)
Π1+ηwt+1
(
At+1
At
)1−ψ Wt+1At+1
Wt
At
At+1
At
ηw Gt+1

=⇒ Gt = 1 + θEt
Mnomt,t+1Iwt,t+1−ηw
(
C˜t+1
C˜t
)ψ (
Nt+1
Nt
)ω (Ndt+1
Ndt
)
Π1+ηwt+1
(
At+1
At
)1+ηw ( W˜t+1
W˜t
)ηw
Gt+1

Wage indexing,
Iwt−1,t = e
ga (2.59)
Production function,
Yt
At
= Zt
(
Kt−1
At−1
)κ
N1−κt
(
At−1
At
)κ
=⇒ Y˜t = Zt
(
K˜t−1e
−∆at
)κ
N1−κt (2.60)
Capital accumulation,
Kt
At
= ((1− δ) + Φt)Kt−1
At−1
(
At−1
At
)
=⇒ K˜t = ((1− δ) + Φt)K˜t−1e−∆at (2.61)
Capital adjustment cost,
Φt = b1 +
b2
(1− 1/ζ)
(
Invt
At
Kt−1
At−1
At
At−1
)1−1/ζ
=⇒ Φt = b1 + b2
(1− 1/ζ)
(
I˜nvt
K˜t−1
e∆at
)1−1/ζ
(2.62)
Φ′t = b2
(
Invt
At
Kt−1
At−1
At
At−1
)−1/ζ
=⇒ Φ′t = b2
(
I˜nvt
K˜t−1
e∆at
)−1/ζ
(2.63)
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Return on investment,
1 = Et[Mt,t+1R
I
t+1] (2.64)
RItQt−1 = (1− τkt )RKt +Qt
(
1− δ +Φt − Φ′t
Invt
At
Kt−1
At−1
At
At−1
)
(2.65)
=⇒ RItQt−1 = (1− τkt )RKt +Qt
(
1− δ +Φt − Φ′t
I˜nvt
K˜t−1
e∆at
)
(2.66)
1 = QtΦ
′
t (2.67)
Market clearing condition,
Yt
At
=
Ct
At
+
Invt
At
+
Govt
At
=⇒ Y˜t = C˜t + I˜nvt + G˜ovt (2.68)
Government budget constraint,
Dt−1(t)
At−1
At−1
At
=
Taxt
At
−
Govt
At
+ P realt
Dt(t+ 1)
At
=⇒ D˜t−1(t)e
−∆at = T˜ axt − G˜ovt + P
real
t
˜Dt(t+ 1)
Capital labor ratio,
Wt
At
At
At−1
=
(1− κ)
κ
RKt
Kt−1
At−1Nt
=⇒ W˜te∆at = (1− κ)
κ
RKt
K˜t−1
Nt
(2.69)
Optimal price setting,
[
1
1− α
(
1− α
(
1
Πt
)(1−η))] 1(1−η)
Ft =
νκ−κ(1− κ)−(1−κ)RKt
κ
(
Wt
At
)(1−κ)
Jt
Zt
=⇒
[
1
1− α
(
1− α
(
1
Πt
)(1−η))] 1(1−η)
Ft =
νκ−κ(1− κ)−(1−κ)RKt
κ
(
W˜t
)(1−κ)
Jt
Zt
Ft = 1 + αEt
Mnomt,t+1
 Yt+1At+1
Yt
At
At+1
At
Πηt+1Ft+1

=⇒ Ft = 1 + αEt
[
Mnomt,t+1
(
Y˜t+1
Y˜t
e∆at+1
)
Πηt+1Ft+1
]
Jt = 1 + αEt
Mnomt,t+1( ZtZt+1
)(
At
At+1
)1−κ (RKt+1
RKt
)κ Wt+1At+1
Wt
At
At+1
At
(1−κ) Yt+1At+1
Yt
At
At+1
At
Π(1+η)t+1 Jt+1

=⇒ Jt = 1 + αEt
Mnomt,t+1( ZtZt+1
)(
RKt+1
RKt
)κ(
W˜t+1
W˜t
)(1−κ)(
Y˜t+1
Y˜t
e∆at+1
)
Π
(1+η)
t+1 Jt+1

Nominal pricing kernel,
Mnomt−1,t =
Mt−1,t
Πt
(2.70)
Level and Volatility Shocks to Fiscal Policy: Term Structure Implications 175
Euler equation,
1
R
(1)
t
= Et[M
nom
t,t+1] (2.71)
Real bond price,
P realt = Et[Mt,t+1] (2.72)
Taylor rule,
R
(1)
t
R
=
(
R
(1)
t−1
R
)ρr (
Πt
Π∗
)(1−ρr)ρπ ( Y˜t
Y˜t−1
)(1−ρr)ρx
eut , (2.73)
where gt, ut and zt are exogenous shocks to government spending, monetary policy and
productivity, respectively:
gt+1 = (1− φg)θg + φggt + eσg,t+1ǫg,t+1
σg,t+1 = (1− φgσ)θgσ + φgσσg,t + σgσǫgσ,t+1
τkt+1 = (1− φτk)θτk + φτkτkt + eστk,t+1ǫτk,t+1
στk,t+1 = (1− φτ
k
σ )θ
τk
σ + φ
τk
σ στk ,t + σ
τk
σ ǫ
τk
σ,t+1
zt+1 = φzzt + e
σz,t+1ǫz,t+1
σz,t+1 = (1− φzσ)θzσ + φzσσz,t + σzσǫzσ,t+1
∆at+1 = (1− φa)ga + φa∆at + σaǫa,t+1
ut+1 = φuut + σuǫu,t+1.
2.10.3.8 The Steady State System of the Model with Growth
The steady state of the pricing kernel block, with the exception of share, can be deter-
mined right away by noting M = βe−ψga : Pricing kernel,
M = βe−ψga , (2.74)
Rcl =
1
βe−ψga
, (2.75)
Rc =
1
βe−ψga
, (2.76)
P c =
βe(1−ψ)ga
1− βe(1−ψ)ga , (2.77)
Rl =
1
βe−ψga
, (2.78)
P l =
βe(1−ψ)ga
1− βe(1−ψ)ga . (2.79)
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In steady state, capital cancel out in the capital accumulation equation such that
Φ = ega + δ − 1. (2.80)
Given Φ = δ, the investment-capital ratio and Φ′ can be found using the adjustment
cost functions
I˜nv =
[
(ega + δ − 1− b1)(1 − 1/ζ)
b2
]ζ/(ζ−1)
e−gaK˜ (2.81)
Φ′ = b2
[
(ega + δ − 1− b1)(1− 1/ζ)
b2
]−1/(ζ−1)
. (2.82)
Return on investment is also 1
βe−ψga
which allows us to find the rental cost of capital,
RI =
1
βe−ψga
(2.83)
Q =
1
b2
[
(ega + δ − 1− b1)(1 − 1/ζ)
b2
]1/(ζ−1)
(2.84)
RK =
1
1− τk
[
1
βe−ψga
− ega + [(ega + δ − 1− b1)(1 − 1/ζ)]
]
Q. (2.85)
To solve for the steady state inflation, we notice the following:
Mnom =
βe−ψga
Π
(2.86)
R(1) =
Π
βe−ψga
(2.87)
P real = βe−ψga . (2.88)
From the Taylor rule,
Π =
(
R
βe−ψga
Π∗ρπ
) 1
1−ρπ
. (2.89)
With steady state inflation given, equilibrium wage offer is:
F =
1
1− αβe(1−ψ)gaΠη−1 (2.90)
J =
1
1− αβe(1−ψ)gaΠη (2.91)
W˜ =

[
1
1− α
(
1− α
(
1
Π
)(1−η))] 1(1−η) κκ(1− κ)(1−κ)F
νJ
RK
−κ

1
(1−κ)
. (2.92)
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With steady state inflation given, equilibrium wage demand is:
H =
1
1− θβe−ψgaΠηw−1 (2.93)
G =
1
1− θβe(1−ψ)gaΠηw (2.94)
W˜ = C˜ψNω νw
G
H
[
1
1− θ
{
1− θ
(
1
Π
)1−ηw}] −11−ηw
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ
. (2.95)
Capital labor ratio delivers capital in terms of labor input,
K˜ =
κ
1− κ
W˜ega
RK
N. (2.96)
Combining the production function and the market clearing condition, we can solve for
steadying state labor by writing consumption, investment, and capital in terms of labor:
(K˜e−ga)κN1−κ =
C˜ + I˜nv
1− θg[
κ
1− κ
W˜
RK
]κ
N =
1
1− θg

(
W˜
NωΨ
)1/ψ
+
[
(ega + δ − 1− b1)
(1 − 1/ζ)
b2
]ζ/(ζ−1) κ
1− κ
W˜
RK
N
(
W˜
NωΨ
)1/ψ
=
{
(1− θg)
[
κ
1− κ
W˜
RK
]κ
−
[
(ega + δ − 1− b1)
(1 − 1/ζ)
b2
]ζ/(ζ−1) κ
1− κ
W˜
RK
}
N
W˜
NωΨ
=
{
(1− θg)
[
κ
1− κ
W˜
RK
]κ
−
[
(ega + δ − 1− b1)
(1 − 1/ζ)
b2
]ζ/(ζ−1) κ
1− κ
W˜
RK
}ψ
Nψ
Nψ+ω =
W˜
Ψ
{
(1− θg)
[
κ
1− κ
W˜
RK
]κ
−
[
(ega + δ − 1− b1)
(1 − 1/ζ)
b2
]ζ/(ζ−1) κ
1− κ
W˜
RK
}−ψ
N =
W˜
Ψ
{
(1− θg)
[
κ
1− κ
W˜
RK
]κ
−
[
(ega + δ − 1− b1)
(1 − 1/ζ)
b2
]ζ/(ζ−1) κ
1− κ
W˜
RK
}−ψ 1ψ+ω ,
where the second equality uses the fact that W˜ = C˜ψNωΨ. Labor is now written in
terms of parameters and known variables. Steady state captial can be calcualted using
the capital labor ratio. Steady state investment can be found using the adjustment cost
function relating investment to capital.
Production function delivers the steady state output,
Y˜ = (K˜e−ga)κN1−κ. (2.97)
Market clearing condition pins down the steady state aggregate consumption,
C˜ = (1− θg)Y˜ − I˜nv. (2.98)
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Steady state real debt can be calculated from the fiscal rule and the government budget
constraint:
D˜e−ga = T˜ ax− θgY˜ + βe−ψgaD˜
D˜e−ga = ρbD˜e
−ga + ρgθgY˜ + (1− µ)τkRkK˜e−ga − θgY˜ + βe−ψgaD˜
(e−ga − ρbe−ga − βe−ψga)D˜ = (ρg − 1)θgY˜ + θτkRkK˜e−ga
D˜ =
(1− ρg)θgY˜ − θτkRkK˜e−ga
(βe−ψga + ρbe−ga − e−ga) .
Steady state lump-sum transfer is:
τ˜ =
[
ρb
(1− ρg)θgY˜ − θτkRkK˜e−ga
(βe(1−ψ)ga + ρb − 1)
+ ρgθgY˜
]
. (2.99)
Tax revenues are:
T˜ ax = τ˜ + θτkR
kK˜e−ga (2.100)
(2.101)
Finally, the following steady states are trivial:
L˜I = W˜N (2.102)
share =
1
1− 1+ω1−ψ PcC˜PlL˜I
. (2.103)
2.10.4 Solution and Estimation
To estimate model parameters we use the mean, the variance and the contemporaneous
covariances in the data as moments. Hence, we let
qt =

datat
diag
(
datatdata
′
t
)
vech
(
datatdata
′
t
)
 .
Letting θ contain the structural parameters, our GMM estimator is given by
θGMM = argminθ∈Θ
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
qt − E [qt (θ)]
)′
W
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
qt − E [qt (θ)]
)
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Here, W is a positive definite weighting matrix and E [qt (θ)] contains the model-implied
moments computed as described in the following subsection. We use the conventional
two-step implementation of GMM by lettingWT = diag
(
Sˆ−1
)
in a preliminary first step
to obtain θ̂step 1 where Sˆ denotes the long-run variance of 1T
∑T
t=1 qt when re-centered
around its sample mean. Our final estimates θ̂step 2 are obtained using the optimal
weighting matrix WT = diag
(
Sˆ−1
θˆstep 1
)
, where Sˆθˆstep 1 denotes the long-run variance of
our moments re-centered around E
[
qt
(
θ̂step 1
)]
. The long-run variances in both steps
are estimated by the Newey-West estimator using 10 lags, but our results are robust to
using more lags.
Given our interest in analyzing time-varying risk premia, we employ a third-order Taylor
approximation of the policy functions that characterize the equilibrium dynamics of the
model. However, higher-order terms may generate explosive sample paths thus preclud-
ing any estimation method that, like GMM, relies on finite moments from stationary and
ergodic probability distribution (see e.g. (Sims, Kim, Kim, and Schaumburg 2008) for a
discussion of this issue within the context of second-order approximations). To ensure
stable sample paths (and existence of finite unconditional moments) we adopt the pruned
state-space system for non-linear DSGE models suggested by (Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2017). Intuitively, pruning means we are going to omit
terms of higher-order effects than the considered approximation order (third-order, in our
case) when the system is iterated forward in time.33 Provided the linearized solution is
stable, (Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2017) derive closed-form
solutions for first and second unconditional moments of the pruned state-space of the
DSGE. This is important since it allows us to compute in a reasonable amount of time
the unconditional moments for our DSGE model solved up to third-order.34
33For details on the pruning method, see (Sims, Kim, Kim, and Schaumburg 2008) for second-order
and (Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2017) for higher-order approximations to the
solutions of DSGE models.
34Although we solve the model by a third-order perturbation, we verified that our model moments
are similar when we use a higher-order approximation and no pruning. In particular we checked that
our results do not change when we use a fifth order solution to our DSGE model. To obtain a fifth
order solution we use the tensor approach proposed by (Levintal 2017). The corresponding results are
available upon request.
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2.10.5 Conditional IRF at the Zero Lower Bound
To implement an interest rate peg in the model we follow Sims (2017). In particular we
augment the Taylor rule with “news” shocks as follows:35
it = i
∗ + φπ (πt − π∗) + e(0)t +
H−1∑
j=1
e
(1)
t−j
where e
(j)
t−j , for j > 0 are news shocks, i.e. shocks known to agents in advance of them
actually impacting the policy rule.
We can impose an interest rate peg as follows. First, solve the model as described
in Section 2.4.2 but where we replaced the Taylor rule with one augmented with news
shocks.36 Second, we simulate a long path of T −1 observation so that all state variables
are at their ergodic mean in absence of shocks (EMAS). Starting at the EMAS, we
compute the IRFs of the economy to, e.g., a government spending shock (at this stage
we still have e
(j)
t−j = 0). We then solve for the value of the news shocks e
(j)
t−j , for
j = 0, . . . ,H − 1, which keeps the nominal rate pegged for a desired length of time, i.e.
iT+s = iT−1 ≡ iEMAS for s = 0, . . . ,H − 1. Effectively, we can think about the effects
of a shock under an interest rate peg as being something like the sum of the direct
effect of the shock, plus the effects of current and anticipated monetary policy shocks
so as to keep the nominal the interest rate unresponsive to a shock for the current and
subsequent H − 1 periods, for a total of H periods. We refer to H as the peg period.
In Section 2.6 we discuss two policy scenarios: a H = 4 period interest rate peg, and a
H = 8 period interest rate peg.
Few final remarks are in order. First, an important advantage of this approach is that
one can still solve the model with perturbations above first order. Second, it is important
to write the innovations in the policy rule as anticipated shocks since this guarantees
that, at the time of another shock, agents will anticipate that the interest rate will be
unresponsive for H total periods. Third, the algorithm so far described is similar to
the one used in (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramı´rez
2015). Whereas (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramı´rez
2015) use a combination of innovations to preference and productivity shocks to force
the economy to the ZLB, we instead solve for the news shocks which keep the interest
rate unresponsive.
35For expository purposes, we consider a simplified Taylor rule with no interest rate smoothing and
no reaction to output growth.
36To augment the Taylor rule with news shocks is reasonably straightforward in Dynare. To do so,
one simply needs to create some auxiliary state variables. E.g. suppose one wants a four period peg,
H = 4. Then one would introduce four new state variables.
Chapter 3
Risk Aversion and the Response
of the Macroeconomy to
Uncertainty Shocks
Lorenzo Bretscher, Alex Hsu, Andrea Tamoni 1
3.1 Introduction
Risk matters. A growing strand of literature in economics is focused on documenting
the effects of volatility shocks (uncertainty) on macroeconomic dynamics in equilibrium
settings. For example, (Bloom 2009) provides evidence of time-varying second mo-
ment to productivity growth causing significant distortions in output and employment.
(Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) estimate an
open-economy model to demonstrate the impact of real interest rate volatility shocks on
a number of macro variables. These papers find that time-varying risk (or uncertainty)
can substantially alter the response of the macroeconomy to exogenous variations. If
risk matters, then it is straight forward to conclude that the economic agent’s attitude
towards risk (or risk aversion) should also matter.2 We document empirically that in-
creased risk aversion exacerbated the fall in output and investment during the financial
1 We thank Nick Bloom, Brent Bundick, Sulkhan Chavleishvili (Discussant), Anthony Diercks (Dis-
cussant), and Jesus Ferna´ndez-Villaverde for valuable comments. We also thank seminar participants at
the SITE Conference – Stanford, at the 25th Finance Forum Conference – Universitat Pompeu Fabra,
at the 49th Money, Macro, and Finance Conference – King’s College London, and at 2018 MFA Annual
Meeting.
2This might appear to be a trivial point, but (Tallarini 2000), in a model with (Epstein and Zin
1989) – (Weil 1990) recursive preferences and where the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is unity,
numerically demonstrates the insignificance of the degree of risk aversion in generating macroeconomic
fluctuations in an equilibrium model.
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crisis of 2008. Consistently, in standard DSGE models, not only risk matters to equi-
librium outcomes, but perhaps more importantly, the degree of risk aversion determines
the magnitude of these outcomes. To the extent that a given uncertainty shock induces
a nontrivial response in the economy, higher risk aversion can amplify the effect of the
uncertainty shock to be on par with that of the level, or first moment, shock. Our find-
ing has significant ramification for general equilibrium modeling in monetary economics
(to understand the Great Moderation, for example) and in asset pricing (to extend
the (Bansal and Yaron 2004b) long-run risk mechanism from endowment to produc-
tion economies), both of which rely on the presence of stochastic volatility to generate
endogenous economic implications.
The notion of time-varying risk aversion has gained traction in the macroeconomics
and finance literature in recent decades. Grounded in theoretical models with habit
((Abel 1990), (Constantinides 1990), and (Campbell and Cochrane 1999)) or hetero-
geneous agents ((Dumas 1989)), aggregate risk aversion in the economy can exhibit
countercyclical variation as evidenced by the countercyclical risk premium in stock re-
turns.3 Employing the Smoothed Local Projection (SLP) method of (Barnichon and
Brownlees 2016), we show that conditional on the fact that risk aversion was elevated
during the 2008 crisis, the fall in output and investment driven by uncertainty was
deepened by 21%4 and 16%,5 respectively. Our empirical proxies for risk aversion used
in the forecasting regressions are intermediary leverage and dividend-price ratios taken
from the literature. These two variables further demonstrate the causal channel through
which financial market conditions led to the deterioration of the macroeconomy during
the crisis.
Theoretically, we demonstrate the interaction between risk aversion and uncertainty us-
ing two leading models from the recent literature on uncertainty: the demand shock
model of (Basu and Bundick 2017) (BB (2017) henceforth) and the small open economy
model of (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011)
(FGRU (2011) henceforth). We establish the following three main findings. First, risk
aversion amplifies the magnitude of the response of macroeconomic quantities to un-
certainty shocks. Precisely speaking, suppose there are two regime in the economy:
low and high risk aversion. Our results suggest that uncertainty shocks are in general
much more impactful when risk aversion is high. Second, the risk aversion implication
on the economic effects stemming from level shocks is model-dependent: higher risk
3See (Chan and Kogan 2002).
4Depending on the risk aversion proxy and the forecasting horizon, the amplifying effect on output
can be as high as 50% and as low as 20%.
5Depending on the RA proxy and the forecasting horizon, the amplifying effect on investment can
be as high as 23% and as low as 7%.
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aversion can amplify or dampen macroeconomic responses through changing consump-
tion growth expectations. Third, the source of uncertainty is crucial in generating the
dynamic response of the model such that risk matters.
The first model of interest is BB (2017). The authors employ a standard New-Keynesian
model augmented by Epstein-Zin-Weil utilities with level and volatility shocks to the
time discount factor to generate observed comovements in components of aggregate
output following uncertainty shocks. The second model under study is the small open-
economy proposed by FGRU (2011) where the real interest rate process displays time-
varying volatility. We replace the CRRA utility function with Epstein-Zin-Weil recursive
utility to separate the effect of risk aversion from that of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (EIS). Furthermore, we modify BB (2017) to accommodate conditional
volatility shocks to productivity.6
We conclude that, in both models, the endogenous macroeconomic response stemming
from volatility shocks is amplified when agents display higher level of risk aversion. In
FGRU (2011), however, the combination of level and volatility shocks to the real interest
rate actually has a weaker impact on macroeconomic dynamics when risk aversion is high.
This is because the level shock to the real interest rate increases consumption growth
expectation by lowering the price of the internationally traded bond. When risk aversion
is high, this downward pressure on bond price is less reflected in expected consumption
growth, thus generating a dampened current macroeconomic reaction. Moreover, vari-
ance decomposition of endogenous variables in these models show that the interaction
of uncertainty shocks and risk aversion are much more pronounced due to demand and
interest rate shocks relative to technology shocks. This suggests the source of uncer-
tainty is important in the class of DSGE models we consider, and uncertainty shocks
to preferences are more effective in driving the dynamic response of macroeconomic
quantities.
In a closely related paper, (Gourio 2012)7 examines the joint implication of risk aversion
and time-varying risk on macroeconomic dynamics, but we differ in the source of risk in
our models. Rather than focusing on the time-varying probability of disaster risk as in
(Gourio 2012), we explore the interaction between stochastic volatility and risk aversion.
(Gourio 2012) derives the isomorphic relationship between time-varying disaster proba-
bility and level shocks to the time discount factor with constant volatility. Conversely,
6With conditional volatility shocks in productivity instead of demand, BB(2017) effectively becomes
a standard New-Keynesian DSGE model with production uncertainty.
7(Gourio 2013) extends the application to credit spreads.
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the models discussed in this paper contain stochastic volatility to preference shocks that
directly affect the stochastic discount factor.8
Our finding potentially has important applications in multiple areas of research. In mon-
etary economics, for example, (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-
Ramı´rez 2010) estimate a DSGE model with stochastic volatility and drifting parameters
in the Taylor rule to examine the origins of the easing in business cycle fluctuations in the
U.S. data between 1984 to 2007 (the Great Moderation). They find that modifications in
monetary policy implementation contributed to the observed decline in macroeconomic
volatility. However, the literature is inconclusive in the source of the Great Moderation
as (Cogley and Sargent 2005) and (Sims and Zha 2006) have argued otherwise and show
that fundamental changes in the volatility process is driving the decline. (Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2010) employ log utility with simple
habit in the estimation of conditional volatility processes. Given our documented joint
determination of risk aversion and uncertainty shocks, the preference specification is
non-trivial, and recursive utility with regime dependent risk aversion can be an essential
ingredient in the structural model for the purpose of volatility estimation.
High-order perturbation techniques have become one of the standard method for solving
DSGE models.9 It is also well know that risk premiums are unaffected by first-order
terms and completely determined by those second- and higher-order terms. A widespread
macro-finance separation paradigm, first proposed by (Tallarini 2000), suggests that the
moments of macroeconomic quantities are not very sensitive to the addition of second-
order and higher-order terms. This result is important since it implies that by varying
the risk aversion parameter while holding the other parameters of the model constant,
one is able to fit the asset pricing facts without compromising the model’s ability to fit
the macroeconomic data.10 Our paper suggests that risk aversion not only determines
the level of asset returns, but it also matters in calibrating the model to match the
standard deviations of macroeconomic variables to those in the data. The simultaneity
of risk aversion and uncertainty in driving macroeconomic dynamics poses an additional
challenge in our understanding of time-varying expected returns as risk cannot be filtered
solely by observing macroeconomic volatilities. The macro-finance separation does not
hold in DSGE models featuring stochastic volatility when the solution technique takes
into account the non-linearity of the model.
8The demand shock in BB (2017) effectively produces a stochastic discount factor with time-varying
time discount factor. The shock to the real international risk-free rate in FGRU (2011) is a stochastic
shock to the expectation of the stochastic discount factor.
9See (Aruoba, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2006) for a discussion about perturbation
and alternative solution methods.
10Risk aversion only appears in the perturbation solution in higher than first-order terms, see (Koijen,
van Binsbergen, Rubio-Ramı´rez, and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde 2008).
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Our paper is linked with different streams of literature in economics. The use of time-
varying uncertainty has a long history in the financial economics literature. E.g. (Kandel
and Stambaugh 1991) study the implications for asset returns of time-varying first and
second moments of consumption growth in a model with a representative Epstein-Zin
investor. In a similar spirit, (Bansal and Yaron 2004b) incorporate time-varying first and
second moments of consumption growth and recursive preferences in an endowment asset
pricing model, and show that stochastic volatility not only generated time-variation in
risk premiums but also significantly increased the mean equity risk premium. As already
discussed, our result adds another dimension of complication in extending these types
of macro-finance models that employ stochastic volatility from endowment economies
to full general equilibrium as macroeconomic and asset pricing moments need to be
calibrated simultaneously.
An increasing body of research has studied how uncertainty fluctuations influence busi-
ness cycle dynamics. Within the framework of irreversible investment (see (Bernanke
1983), (Dixit and Pindyck 1994), (Abel and Eberly 1996), (Hassler 1996)), (Bloom 2009)
studies the propagation of firm-level uncertainty shocks. Following an increase in un-
certainty about future profitability, firms will slow down activities that cannot be easily
reversed, i.e. they “wait and see”. After the heightened uncertainty is resolved, pent-
up demand for capital goods leads to an investment boom. Another growing litera-
ture stresses the interaction of risk and economic activity propagated through financial,
rather than physical frictions. Using a model with financial frictions, (Gilchrist, Sim,
and Zakrajsek 2014) argue that increases in firm risk lead to an increase in bond premia
and the cost of capital which, in turn, triggers a decline in investment activity and mea-
sured aggregate productivity. (Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe 2016) show that firms downsize
investment projects to avoid default when faced with higher risk. Finally, (Christiano,
Motto, and Rostagno 2014) analyze the macroeconomic implications of volatility shocks
in the context of a financial accelerator model adapted from (Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist 1999). Our analysis shows that when risk aversion is elevated, uncertainty
shocks have larger and more prolonged impact. Although we take the increase in risk
aversion to be exogenous, our analysis supports the literature that points to financial
market frictions as an additional channel through which volatility fluctuations can af-
fect macroeconomic outcomes: if risk aversion rises with tightening financial constraints,
uncertainty may affect the economy via an increase in the risk premium.
More recently, the literature has also started investigating the impact of shocks to
aggregate uncertainty. (Justiniano and Primiceri 2008b) and (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde
and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2007) estimate dynamic equilibrium models with heteroskedastic
shocks and show that time-varying volatility helps to explain the Great Moderation be-
tween 1984 and 2007. (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and
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Uribe 2011) and (Born and Pfeifer 2014) find that risk shocks are an important fac-
tor in explaining business cycles in emerging market economies. (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde,
Guerro´n-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2015) document the important role of
fiscal volatility for output fluctuations. (Basu and Bundick 2017) study the interac-
tion of aggregate risk shocks with precautionary saving in an environment with nominal
rigidities. Building on this literature, our paper investigates the interaction of aggregate
uncertainty with risk aversion and emphasizes the importance of the source of uncer-
tainty (productivity vs. demand shocks).
A number of papers have also investigated the possibility that spikes in uncertainty
may be the result of adverse economic conditions rather than being a driving force
of economic downturns, see e.g. (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 2006, Fostel and
Geanakoplos 2012, Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims 2013). In this paper we study the
amplification role of risk aversion for exogenous impulses to uncertainty, and we leave the
analysis of the interaction between risk aversion with endogenous response of uncertainty
as an interesting avenue for future research.
Finally, our paper is closely related to (Gorodnichenko and Ng 2017) who use the insight
from higher-order perturbation of policy functions to empirically separate the level from
the volatility factors. (Gorodnichenko and Ng 2017) conclude that “[T]he interaction
between the first- and second-order dynamics is worthy of more theorizing in light of the
evidence for non-trivial second-moment variations.” Our analysis of level and volatility
shocks and their interaction with risk aversion is a first step in this direction.
3.2 Risk Aversion and Uncertainty: Empirical Evidence
In this section we estimate the dynamic responses of macroeconomic quantities to an
uncertainty shock, conditional on risk aversion being low or high. The estimation of
state-dependent impulse response functions have recently been the subject of expressed
interest in macroeconomics, see e.g. (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012b), (Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko 2012a), and (Ramey and Zubairy 2018) for investigations of the size
of fiscal multipliers when the economy is in recession, or more broadly, during periods
of economic slack. (Tenreyro and Thwaites 2016) examine the response of the U.S.
economy to monetary policy shocks predicated on the state of the business cycle. To
the best of our knowledge, the role of risk aversion as a state variable concerning the
macroeconomic response to uncertainty shocks is unexplored so far.
To estimate the state-dependent IRFs, we rely on the smoothed version of local pro-
jections proposed by (Jorda 2005). More precisely, we apply the technique developed
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by (Barnichon and Brownlees 2016).11 The Smooth Local Projections (SLP) strikes
a balance between the efficiency of Vector Autoregressions (VAR) and the robustness
(to model misspecification) of the Local Projections (LP) approach. In practice, SLP
consists in estimating LP under the assumption that the impulse response is a smooth
function of the forecast horizon. Specifically, we estimate an h-step ahead predictive
regressions,
yt+h = αh + (β0,h + β1,hRAt)UNCt +
p∑
i=0
γi,hwt−i + ut+h (3.1)
where h ranges from 0 to H and i is the number of lags used for the control variables, wt.
yt+h is the h period ahead realization of the macroeconomic variable of interest. RAt is
the state variable. UNCt is our measure of uncertainty. To capture state dependence,
the response of yt+h to uncertainty at time t is a linear function, β0,h + β1,hRAt, of risk
aversion. In what follows, the β1,h coefficient capturing the amplification/contraction
effect due to risk aversion is called the state multiplier. We are interested in knowing
whether uncertainty shock has a larger effect on, e.g., output during high risk aversion
states. We estimate the state-dependent dynamic multiplier, β0,h+β1,hRA, of yt+h with
respect to a change in UNCt, keeping all other variables constant.
For our empirical application, we follow (Basu and Bundick 2017) and include gross
domestic product (GDP), consumption, investment, hours worked, the GDP deflator, the
M2 money stock, and a measure of the stance of monetary policy as control variables. We
employ VXO as the uncertainty proxy because it is a well known and readily-observable
measure of aggregate uncertainty. Since the VXO data start in 1986, we estimate our
baseline empirical model using quarterly data over the 1986−2014 sample period. We
choose p = 2, and let all other variables enter in log levels with the exception of the
monetary policy measure. Finally, we use a recursive identification scheme with the
VXO ordered first.12
To estimate the state dependent IRFs, we follow (Barnichon and Brownlees 2016) and
include the set of controls wt and their interaction with the state variable, RAt. We
report the estimation for two different proxies of risk aversion. Relying on the intuition
of the habit models (?, see)]Campbell:Cochrane:1999,Santos:Veronesi, we use either the
leverage variable proposed by (He, Kelly, and Manela 2017) (see Figure 3.1), or the
dividend-price ratio (see Figure 3.2).13 We discretize the log dividend-price ratio and
11We thank C. Brownless for clarifying various aspects about the SLP technique.
12Appendix 3.10.3 shows that the linear SLP methodology delivers responses that are almost identical
to those obtained by BB (2014) using a VAR of order four.
13(Campbell and Cochrane 1999) note that the price-dividend ratio is nearly linear in the surplus
consumption ratio (see their Figure 3), the key state variable in the habit model. Our measure of
leverage is based on market prices (market leverage) and, in the model of (Santos and Veronesi 2016),
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the leverage ratio, and let RAt take value equal to 1 when the risk aversion proxies are
above the 75% percentile, RAt is equal to -1 when they are below the 25% percentile,
and RAt is set to zero otherwise. We then standardize both variables. Very similar, yet
slightly noisier, results are obtained when we use the continuous version of these proxies.
[Insert Figures 3.1 and 3.2 about here.]
The left column in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot the responses of GDP, consumption, and
investment to an uncertainty shock that is realized (i) in a high risk aversion state
(RAt = 1), (ii) in an average state (RAt = 0), and (iii) in a low risk aversion state
(RAt = −1). The right column in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot the state multipliers obtained
from SLP. Recall that the state multiplier, β1,h, captures the extent to which the state
variable, namely risk aversion, affects the IRF at each horizon. A negative value of the
state multiplier implies that the IRF response to a positive uncertainty shock is more
negative when the risk aversion is high in the economy (RAt = 1).
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 deliver a clear message about the state-dependent nature of uncer-
tainty shocks: the response of the macroeconomic aggregate to a VXO shock is substan-
tially larger when risk aversion is heightened. The peak decline in output, consumption,
and investment when RAt = 1 is roughly twice as large as the decline obtained in a low
risk aversion environment when RAt = −1. In general, the impulse responses obtained
in a low risk aversion state return to zero after about two years, whereas those in a high
risks aversion state tend to stay low for longer.
To quantify the amplifying effect of increased risk aversion on the economic impact of
uncertainty shocks, we use the estimates from Eq. (3.1) to generate the fitted values
of output and investment with and without elevated risk aversion. In other words, we
construct fitted values with the state multiplier, β1,h, set to either the estimated value
(high RA) or to zero (average RA). Specifically, we examine output and investment
declines during the financial crisis using the post 2007Q4 sample and choose the forecast
horizon, h, to be four quarters.14
Figure 3.3 presents the time series plots of realized and fitted values of output, while
Figure 3.4 presents the same plots for investment. In both figures, subplot (a) is derived
from the SLP where leverage is the risk aversion proxy, and subplot (b) is derived from
the SLP where dividend-price ratio is the proxy. Focusing on output in Figure 3.3, we see
the debt-to-wealth ratio is monotonically decreasing in the surplus consumption ratio (see their Corollary
13).
14Our results here are robust to using various other forecast horizons. Four quarters is chosen since it
corresponds to the maximal impact on output, consumption, and investment in the uncertainty shock
IRFs in figures 3.1 and 3.2. Furthermore, given the short sample period, long horizon forecasts are less
appropriate.
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the one-year ahead forecast of output (dashed line) from the SLP matches the realized
path of output (solid line) in both subplots well. In particular, the forecasted maximal
drop in output appears within two quarters of the actual minimal output during the
financial crisis. Next, we set the state multiplier to zero and repeat the forecast while
keeping all other coefficient estimates from the SLP. The resulting fitted output path
(square-dashed line) is plotted along the original forecast for counter-factual analysis.
Figure 3.3 subplot (a) shows that relative to the level of output at the onset of the
crisis, the maximal decline in output due to uncertainty is exacerbated by roughly 50%
conditional on high risk aversion (dashed vs. square-dashed lines), as proxied by leverage.
In subplot (b), the amplifying effect is roughly 21% conditional on high risk aversion, as
approximated by dividend-price ratio.
Quantitatively, heightened risk aversion during the financial crisis generates significantly
larger decline in investment due to uncertainty. Figure 3.4 presents the realized (solid
line), the actual one-year ahead forecast (dashed line), and the counter-factual forecast
(square-dashed line) of investment. Similar to Figure 3.3, the SLP forecast of investment
matches reasonably well with the realized path, especially in subplot (a) when leverage
is used as the risk aversion proxy. Relative to the level of investment at the end of
2007, Figure 3.4 shows the maximal forecasted decline in investment is 23% and 16%
greater, in subplots (a) and (b) respectively, when we allow for risk-aversion-dependence
of uncertainty in the SLP.
Overall, the economic significance of risk aversion on macroeconomic dynamics can-
not be overlooked. Our results from applying the SLP methodology to examine the
financial crisis can perhaps be viewed in one of two ways. First, in the absence of state-
dependence, the econometrician cannot decipher the true impact of uncertainty shocks
on economic aggregates. Second, conversely, intensified risk aversion aggravated the
depth of the recession by causing uncertainty shocks to be more effective through some
general equilibrium mechanism. In the next section, we explore the interaction between
risk aversion and uncertainty in relation to the macroeconomy in a structural setting
employing DSGE models.
3.3 Quantitative Effects of Risk Aversion and Uncertainty
in Structural Models
This section quantifies the effects of risk aversion on the dynamics of real quantities
in DSGE models with time-varying volatility. To study how uncertainty shocks and
risk aversion jointly determine business cycle moments we consider impulse response
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functions (IRFs) and variance decomposition analysis. Appendix 3.8 discusses the tech-
nical details behind the computation of IRFs and variance decompositions in general
equilibrium models featuring stochastic volatility.
We consider two models: (1) the (Basu and Bundick 2017) model, BB (2017), that fea-
tures a stochastic volatility shock to the representative household’s intertemporal pref-
erences; (2) the (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe
2011) model, FGRU (2011), that allows for time-varying volatilities affecting the real in-
terest rate. In addition, we investigate the interplay of risk and risk aversion in a model
that introduces stochastic volatility in the stationary technology shock by modifying BB
(2017).
3.3.1 The Basu-Bundick (2017) Model
(Basu and Bundick 2017) build a small-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model with monopolistic competition and sticky prices and show that demand uncer-
tainty can generate a substantial fall in output, consumption, and investment. BB (2017)
adopt a recursive structure for intertemporal utility, where a representative household
chooses sequences of consumption, Ct, and labor, Nt, to maximize
Ut =
[
at
(
Cηt (1−Nt)1−η
) 1−γ
θ + β
(
EtU
1−γ
t+1
) 1
θ
] θ
1−γ
where θ ≡ (1− γ)/(1−ψ), γ determines the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ψ is the
inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution, β is the subjective discount factor, and
η determines the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The model is calibrated to quarterly
frequency by matching impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in the
VXO from a vector autoregression (see Figure D.1 in Appendix D.3). We use the values
listed in Basu and Bundick (2017) – Table I (these are also reported in Table 3.7 for
the reader’s convenience).Next we describe how (Basu and Bundick 2017) model the
demand uncertainty channel.
3.3.1.1 Stochastic Volatility in Household’s Intertemporal Preferences
The coefficient on current utility, at, is a preference shock that follows
at = (1− ρa) a+ ρaat−1 + eσa,tεa,t (3.2)
σa,t = (1− ρσ) σa + ρσσa,t−1 + σσεσa,t (3.3)
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where εa,t and εσa,t are uncorrelated. Importantly, the standard deviation of the prefer-
ence shock, σa,t introduces time-varying demand uncertainty into the model.
3.3.1.2 Volatility Shocks, Risk Aversion and Macro Dynamics
Figures 3.5(a) and 3.5(b) show the IRFs to a level and volatility shock to the represen-
tative household’s intertemporal preferences, respectively.
[Insert Figure 3.5 about here.]
Figure 3.5(a) shows that IRFs to level shocks are hardly affected by the level of risk
aversion, whereas Figure 3.5(b) shows that in response to a volatility shock the decline
in output, consumption, and investment is stronger the greater the risk aversion. Thus,
the effects of volatility shocks on the real economy are intertwined with the magnitude
of the risk aversion coefficient.
To gauge the contribution of the volatility shocks to aggregate fluctuations for different
levels of risk aversion, it is instructive to consider a variance decomposition. Table 3.1
shows the variance decomposition of output, consumption, investment, and hours among
different shocks. Each column corresponds to a specific simulation: (1) the benchmark
case with all three shocks (productivity, level and volatility shocks to the representative
household’s intertemporal preferences); (2) when we have a shock only to productivity;
(3) when we have shocks to the level and the volatility of the household’s intertemporal
preferences; (4) when we have shocks only to the level of the household’s intertemporal
preferences; and (5) when we have shocks only to the volatility (pure demand uncertainty
channel).
[Insert Table 3.1 about here.]
The last column shows that volatility alone makes a relatively important contribution
to the fluctuations of real variables; more importantly doubling the risk aversion almost
doubles these contributions. Looking at the second to last column we observe that risk
aversion amplifies not only the simulation with volatility shocks (column 5) but also the
simulation where both level and volatility shocks are simultaneously active (column 4).
For example, doubling risk aversion raises investment volatility by about 13% (5.29/4.68)
in a simulation with level and volatility shocks. To sum up, we have documented that
within the BB (2017) economy: (1) volatility shocks are amplified when risk aversion is
high; (2) the amplification effect of risk aversion is also present, although attenuated, in
a simulation where both level and volatility shocks are active.
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3.3.1.3 Intuition on the Interaction of Risk Aversion and Uncertainty
Utilizing the setup of the illustrative model of Section ?? in the Online Appendix,
we shed light on the mechanism through which elevated risk aversion exaggerates the
macroeconomic response to uncertainty shocks, specifically capital accumulation through
investment. We start by augmenting the q equation under rational expectation in Equa-
tion ?? with a stochastic discount factor including the demand shock term:
Et
[
β
(
at+1
at
)
C−ψt+1V
ψ−γ
t+1
{
αezt+1Kα−1t+1 − (1− δ)
}− C−ψt Et [V 1−γt+1 ]ψ−γ1−γ ] = 0,
where γ is risk aversion and ψ is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution. Recall this is a model with no capital adjustment cost, and Vt is the value
function of Epstein-Zin-Weil utility. Furthermore, the within period utility is additive
in consumption and labor dis-utility.
After rearranging the terms, we get the familiar looking investment equation:
Et

β
(
at+1
at
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective Demand
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−ψ  Vt+1
Et
[
V 1−γt+1
] 1
1−γ

ψ−γ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Epstein-Zin-Weil SDF
 αezt+1Kα−1t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Return on Capital
−(1− δ)


= 1.
Notice the risk aversion parameter, γ, governs the curvature of the continuation util-
ity. As γ increases, given Vt+1 is concave and differentiable everywhere, the difference
between Vt+1 and Et
[
V 1−γt+1
] 1
1−γ
also widens causing marginal utility to rise.
A positive shock to demand uncertainty raises the expected effective demand, Et [at+1].
Holding risk aversion constant and shutting down the transitory productivity shock
(zt+1 = 0), higher expected demand implies higher marginal utility tomorrow, which
lowers the return on capital, αKα−1t+1 . As a result, the household reduces investment
at time t to bring down the stock of capital at time t + 1 after demand uncertainty is
realized.
As we elevate the risk aversion, the Epstein-Zin-Weil stochastic discount factor increases
causing the return on capital to decline since capital is a hedge against consumption risk.
This implies that as the return on capital is depressed by higher risk aversion, the drop
in investment is even more severe following the uncertainty shock to effective demand
at time t which pushes marginal utility even higher at time t + 1. The result is the
exacerbated response of macroeconomic dynamics under the high risk aversion scenario
in Figure 3.5 Panel (b). Lastly, notice risk aversion, γ, distorts the time t expectation
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of the continuation utility term from its actual value at time t+ 1. On the other hand,
level shocks to effective demand have contemporaneous impact on consumption but are
less consequential to the continuation utility. Therefore, broadly speaking, a level shock
to effective demand at time t does not result in differential response under high and low
risk aversion calibrations as reflected in Figure 3.5 Panel (a).
3.3.2 The FGRU (2011) Model
The FGRU (2011) model is a standard small open economy business cycle model cali-
brated to match data from four emerging economies: Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and
Venezuela. The small open economy is populated by a representative household.15 Dif-
ferently from FGRU (2011), the preferences of the household are described by a recursive
utility function (see (Epstein and Zin 1989) and (Weil 1990)). We do so because we want
to separate the effect of the risk aversion from that of the intertemporal substitution.
Trivially, when the risk aversion equals the inverse of the elasticity of substitution we
obtain exactly the same results of FGRU (2011) (see Table 3.8 in Appendix 3.10.1). The
household can invest in two types of assets: the stock of physical capital, Kt, and an
internationally traded bond, Dt. The stock of capital evolves according to the law of
motion with adjustment costs:
Kt+1 = (1− δ) +
(
1− φ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2)
It .
Firms rent capital and labor from households to produce output in a competitive envi-
ronment according to the technology Yt = K
α
t
(
eXtHt
)1−α
, where Xt corresponds to a
labor-augmenting productivity shock that follows an AR(1) process
Xt = ρxXt−1 + σxux,t , (3.4)
where ux,t is a normally distributed shock with zero mean and variance equal to one.
Firms maximize profits by equating wages and the rental rate of capital to marginal
productivities. Thus,
Yt − Ct − It = Dt − Dt+1
1 + rt
+
ΦD
2
(Dt+1 −Dt)2
where ΦD > 0 is a parameter that controls the costs of holding a net foreign asset
position.
15For the interested reader, a detailed derivation of the model equations, and steady states is available
in (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011), and hence not repeated
here.
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The model is calibrated to monthly frequency. Following the original approach, we
construct quarterly simulated data, and we report results on a quarterly basis. We refer
the interested reader to the online Appendix 3.10.2 for details on the model aggregation.
Finally FGRU (2011) takes the real interest rate, rt, as an exogenously defined process.
We now turn to describe these dynamics.
3.3.2.1 Stochastic Volatility in Real Interest Rate
The real interest rate, rt, a country faces on loans denominated in US dollars is decom-
posed as the international risk-free real rate plus a country–specific spread:
rt = r + εtb,t + εr,t
where r is the mean of the international risk-free real rate plus the mean of the country
spread; the term εtb,t, equals the international risk-free real rate subtracted from its
mean, and εr,t equals the country spread subtracted from its mean. Both εtb,t and εr,t
follow AR(1) processes described by
εtb,t = ρtbεtb,t−1 + e
σtb,tutb,t
εr,t = ρrεr,t−1 + e
σr,tur,t ,
where both ur,t and utb,t are normally distributed random variables with mean zero and
unit variance. Importantly, the process for interest rates displays stochastic volatility.
In particular, the standard deviations σtb,t and σr,t follow an AR(1) process:
16
σtb,t = (1− ρσtb) σtb + ρσtbσtb,t−1 + ηtbuσtb,t (3.5)
σr,t = (1− ρσr)σr + ρσrσr,t−1 + ηruσr ,t, (3.6)
where both uσtb,t and uσr ,t are normally distributed random variables with mean zero
and unit variance.17
Each of the components of the real interest rate is affected by two innovations. For
instance, εtb,t is hit by utb,t and uσtb,t. The first innovation, utb,t, changes the rate, while
the second innovation, uσtb,t, affects the standard deviation of utb,t. The innovations ur,t
and uσr ,t have a similar reading. Section 3.10.4 highlights why it is key to have two
separate innovations, one to the level of the interest rate and one to the volatility of the
level.
16This specification has been adopted by (Justiniano and Primiceri 2008b) among others.
17 (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) re-estimate the process
relaxing the assumption that innovations to the country spread and its volatility are uncorrelated. We
defer the discussion of correlated shocks to Section 3.3.2.4.
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In comparison with the country spread, the international risk-free real rate has both
lower average standard deviation of its innovation (σtb is smaller than σr for all four
countries) and less stochastic volatility (ηtb,t is smaller than ηr,t for all four countries).
These relative sizes justify why in our analysis we concentrate only on the innovation to
the volatility of the country spread, uσtb,t, and forget about shocks to the international
risk-free real rate. For simplicity, we refer to the innovation uσtb,t as the stochastic
volatility shock.
3.3.2.2 Volatility Shocks, Risk Aversion and Macro Dynamics
In this section, we analyze the quantitative implications of the interaction between risk
aversion and volatility within the FGRU (2011) model.
We first look at the impulse response functions (IRFs) of the model to shocks in the
productivity, country spreads, and its volatility. To save space we report the results
only for the model calibrated to Argentina. We consider both the original calibration of
(Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) and the re-
calibrated model of (Born and Pfeifer 2014).18 The IRFs for a one standard deviation
shock are reported in Figure 3.6. We plot the IRFs of output (first row of panels),
consumption (second row), investment (third row) to the three shocks (columns).
[Insert Figure 3.6 about here.]
The third column plots the IRFs to a one-standard-deviation shock to the volatility of
the Argentinean country spread, uσtb,t. This column shows that there is a large effect
of risk aversion on macro dynamics. Importantly, risk aversion plays an important role
only for the the impulse responses from a volatility shock in country spread; indeed the
second column shows that IRFs to shocks in the level are hardly affected. Zooming in on
the third column, we observe that in response to a volatility shock, output, consumption,
and investment fall more in the case of high risk aversion, than in the case of low risk
aversion. For example, after a shock to volatility, consumption drops 0.41 percent upon
impact for a risk aversion equal to 5; the contraction is larger (0.90 percent at impact)
for a risk aversion equal to = 15. Similarly, we observe a slow fall in output (after
10 quarters, it falls 0.16 percent) when risk aversion is low. However, for high risk
aversion the fall is deeper and more persistent (after 11 quarters years, it falls 0.32
percent). Finally, whereas we observe only a slow decrease of investment (after five
quarters it falls 2.18 percent) for low risk aversion, the decrease is substantially larger
18We use the same parameters as in (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and
Uribe 2011) and (Born and Pfeifer 2014); these are reported in Table 3.9 for the reader’s convenience.
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at 3.98 percent for large risk aversion. Columns 2− 4 in Table 3.2 displays the drops in
macroeconomic variables, and the length of the recovery phase, for alternative values of
risk aversion.
[Insert Table 3.2 about here.]
These IRFs show that the effects of volatility shocks on the real economy are intertwined
with the magnitude of the risk aversion coefficient. The impact of risk aversion on real
quantities is less amplified when one considers instead level shocks to productivity or to
the real interest rate. These results suggest that increasing the risk aversion parameter
to achieve a better fit of model risk premia may have the unintended consequence of
affecting the ability of the model to match key macroeconomic moments such as output
or investment volatility.19
To gauge the contribution of the volatility shocks to aggregate fluctuations for different
levels of risk aversion, it is instructive to consider a variance decomposition.20 Table
3.3 shows the variance decomposition of output, investment, and consumption. Each
column corresponds to a specific simulation: (1) the benchmark case with all three
shocks (productivity, the country spreads and its volatility); (2) when we have a shock
only to productivity; (3) when we have a shock to productivity and to the interest rate
(with volatility fixed at its unconditional value); (4) when we have shocks to interest
rate and to volatility; (5) when we have a shock only to the interest rate level; and (6)
when we have shocks only to interest rate volatility.
[Insert Table 3.3 about here.]
The last column shows that volatility alone makes a relatively important contribution to
the fluctuations of consumption (the standard deviation is 0.75) and investment (stan-
dard deviation of 3.08). Increasing the risk aversion almost doubles these contributions.
We next move to consider an alternative calibration of the FGRU (2011) model. In
particular, (Born and Pfeifer 2014) noted an error in the time aggregation of flow
variables, and they show that the model of (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana,
Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) must be recalibrated. Figure 3.7 compares the IRFs
19Two features of the model could potentially affect the results. The FGRU (2011) model assumes that
the household faces a cost of holding a net foreign asset position. Importantly, the working paper version
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2009) quantitatively compared this specification with other ways to close the
open economy aspect of the model, and found that the results were if anything, often bigger. Similarly,
working capital makes the findings of (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and
Uribe 2011) even stronger. We thus conjecture that our documented interplay between volatility, risk
aversion, and real variables is robust to these changes in model specification as well.
20Appendix 3.10.2 provides additional details on how to obtain the variance decomposition for the
FGRU (2011) economy.
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for the recalibrated corrected model with the IRFs in (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-
Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) (these are the same as those shown in Figure
3.6, and reproduced here for reader’s convenience). As noted in (Born and Pfeifer 2014),
the figure clearly shows that a one standard deviation volatility shock now leads to
a larger drop in macro quantities than originally reported in (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde,
Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011). The difference between the two
calibrations is further magnified the higher the risk aversion value. Columns 5 − 7 in
Table 3.2 displays the drops in macroeconomic variables, and the length of the recovery
phase, for alternative values of risk aversion.
[Insert Figure 3.7 about here.]
We now turn to quantify the effect of the interaction of volatility shocks with risk aver-
sion, as well as the interaction between level and volatility shocks with risk aversion, for
business cycle moments in the recalibrated corrected model of (Born and Pfeifer 2014).
Table 3.4 shows the variance decomposition for the alternative calibration proposed by
(Born and Pfeifer 2014). First, consistent with (Born and Pfeifer 2014), we find that
in the re-calibrated model that corrects for the time-aggregation, the contribution of
volatility shocks to business cycle volatility increase, and more so the higher the risk
aversion.21 Second and more important, by comparing Table 3.4 with Table 3.3 an im-
portant insight emerges: risk aversion amplifies not only the simulation with volatility
shocks only (column 6) but also the simulation where both level and volatility shocks are
active (column 5). For example, in the (Born and Pfeifer 2014) re-calibrated economy,
investment raises by about 28% (18.11/14.19) when risk aversion raises from 5 to 15. On
the other hand, the original (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez,
and Uribe 2011) calibration does not show any sensitivity of investment to risk aversion
in a simulation buffeted by level and volatility shocks. This makes us conclude that: (1)
volatility shocks are amplified by the magnitude of risk aversion; (2) the amplification
effect of risk aversion in a simulation where both level and volatility shocks are active
depends on the specific calibration of the model. The next section digs deeper into this
issue and highlights the key role played by the cost of debt parameter ΦD (which is higher
in FGRU (2011) and lower in (Born and Pfeifer 2014), see Table 3.9) in determining the
interaction between risk aversion and the level shock to interest rates.
[Insert Table 3.4 about here.]
21When compared with the benchmark case with all three shocks (column 1), volatility shocks alone
(column 6) account for 6 percent of output volatility and 35 percent of investment volatility. By increas-
ing risk aversion, the contribution of volatility shocks to output and investment raises is a remarkable
35% and 67%, respectively.
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3.3.2.3 Level Shock to the Country Spread
Examining the variance decomposition in Table 3.3, it is striking that as risk aversion
increases from Panel A to Panel B, the unconditional volatilities of macroeconomic
aggregates actually drop in columns (1), (3), (4) and (5). This is driven by the level
shock to country spread in column (5), as columns (2) and (6) show that the level shock to
TFP and the volatility shock to country spread generate higher economic volatilities with
increasing risk aversion. This implies that risk aversion can dampen the macroeconomic
response to some shocks while strengthening the response to others.
To understand the mechanism causing elevated risk aversion to attenuate output, con-
sumption and investment volatilities following level shocks to country spread, we focus
on the Euler equation specific to the open economy model of FGRU (2011):
1
1 + rt
= ΦD(Dt+1 −D) + βEt
[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−ν]
.
Here, like the original model, we assume CRRA utilities for the ease of exposition. To
start with, assume the debt adjustment parameter, ΦD, is zero. A positive level shock to
rt increases the country spread and lowers the price (
1
1+rt
) of the internationally traded
bond. Under the low risk aversion calibration, ν = 5 for example, lower bond price today
translates into higher expected consumption growth between today and tomorrow in the
Euler equation. As a result, the representative agent optimally decides to borrow more
today and invest less in capital. As risk aversion increases, to ν = 15 for example, a
level shock of the same magnitude to country spread does not raise consumption growth
expectation as significantly. To see this, rewrite the Euler equation in logs while keeping
ΦD = 0:
e−rt = βEt
[
e−ν(ct+1−ct)
]
.
Holding the increase in rt constant, larger ν means smaller (ct+1 − ct). As consumption
growth expectation is tempered due to high risk aversion, the representative agent does
not adjust borrowing and investment after the level shock is realized as dramatically rel-
ative to the case when risk aversion is low. Taken together, high risk aversion attenuates
the dynamic response of macroeconomic variables with respect to level shocks through
the consumption growth expectations.
In the benchmark case, however, ΦD is not zero, and the debt adjustment cost term
enters the Euler equation. Under this scenario, a positive level shock to country spread
lowers the price of the internationally traded bond and causes debt level to decline (since
ΦD > 0). Furthermore, because the debt adjustment term partially absorbs the price
drop, consumption growth expectation does not alter between high and low risk aversion
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calibrations as much compared to the scenario when ΦD is zero. Therefore, the repre-
sentative agent assuages the disinvestment to similar degrees regardless of high or low
risk aversion. In other words, debt adjustment cost renders the impact of risk aversion
on the debt and investment responses to level shocks to country spread ineffective.
Figure 3.8 demonstrates the FGRU (2011) model implied impulse response functions for
output, consumption, investment, hours, q and debt following a positive level shock to
country spread under low and high risk aversion calibrations. Panel A presents the IRFs
when the debt adjustment cost parameter is set to close to zero (ΦD = 0.0001), while
Panel B contains the IRFs when the same parameter is set to 0.1. When the adjustment
term is small in Panel A, higher rt causes output, investment, hours and q to decline.
At the same time, consumption and borrowing increase due to a rise in consumption
growth expectation, consistent with the mechanism described above. Furthermore, as
risk aversion is elevated from 5 to 15 in Panel A, the drops in output and investment
and the increase in borrowing are less exaggerated.
[Insert Figure 3.8 about here.]
In Panel B of Figure 3.8, we set the debt adjustment term to be large. Three takeaways
are immediate. First, in comparison to Panel A, the positive level shock to country
spread leads to moderate declines in consumption and borrowing as the adjustment
cost absorbs most of the “good news” generated by lower price of debt. Second, as
consumption growth expectation is mitigated by the cost of changing the debt level,
investment only dips mildly in contrast to when ΦD = 0. Finally, the differential impact
of the country spread shock under low and high risk aversion is completely nullified in
Panel B in the presence of debt adjustment cost. These implications are in line with our
priors formed by examining the Euler equation of the FGRU (2011) model and provide
us with insights on the interaction between risk aversion and first moment shocks to the
real interest rate.
3.3.2.4 Correlated Level and Volatility Shocks
(Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) argue that
in the data, movements in the volatility of real interest rates are highly correlated with
variations in levels. Accordingly, in this section, we investigate the scenario under which
the innovations to the level and volatility shocks to the country spread are not indepen-
dent from each other. By allowing for feedback between the first- and second-moment
dynamics, our analysis sheds light on the interaction between the level and volatility
dynamics, and it complements the work by (Gorodnichenko and Ng 2017).
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[Insert Table 3.5 about here.]
Table 3.5 presents the results of the variance decomposition of the FGRU (2011) model
under the correlated innovation structure outlined in the original paper, where the
columns are consistent with those described in Table 3.3. Comparing Panel A with
Panel B in Table 3.5, our previous finding under the baseline calibration of FGRU is
preserved: increase in risk aversion amplifies the effect of volatility shocks to country
spread on investment volatility in column (6) but dampens the effect of level shocks
to country spread on investment volatility in column (5). In column (4) of Table 3.5,
however, we see that the correlated shock structure between level and volatility shocks
to the country spread allows risk aversion to amplify the effect on investment volatility
when both shocks are activated. This is in line with the results from the BB (2017)
model in Table 3.1 and the (Born and Pfeifer 2014) calibration in Table 3.4. The corre-
lated innovations to level and volatility shocks to country spread accentuates the positive
influence of risk aversion has on the response of investment to the second moment shock.
3.3.3 Stochastic Volatility in Productivity
We next investigate the interplay of risk aversion and stochastic volatility in a model
that introduces stochastic volatility in stationary technology shocks. To this end we
modify the BB (2017) model economy as described in Appendix D.2 of (Basu and
Bundick 2017).22 ,23 In particular, we first shut down stochastic volatility the house-
hold’s intertemporal preferences, i.e. σa,t = σa in Eq. (3.2) is not time varying. Next,
consider intermediate goods-producing firms i with the same constant returns to scale
Cobb-Douglas production function, subject to a fixed cost of production Φ and their
level of productivity Zt: Yt(i) = (Kt(i)Ut(i))
α (ZtNt(i))
1−α − Φ, where Ut(i) is the rate
of utilization of their installed physical capital, Nt(i) is labor, Yt(i) is the intermediate
good. The technological process zt = log (Zt) evolves according to a stochastic volatility
process
zt+1 = (1− ρz) zss + ρzzt + eσz,t+1εz,t+1 (3.7)
σz,t+1 = (1− ρσ) σz + ρσσz,t + εσ,t+1 (3.8)
with εz,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1), zss = logZss where Zss is the steady state level of Zt, and
εσ,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σσ). The innovations εz,t+1 and εσ,t+1 are assumed to be mutually
22We use the same parameters as in (Basu and Bundick 2017); these are reported in Table 3.7 for the
reader’s convenience.
23In a previous version of this paper, we considered the (Andreasen 2012) model which also intro-
duces stochastic volatility in stationary technology shocks. Using the (Andreasen 2012) model and the
corresponding calibration does not alter any of the conclusions described in this section.
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independent at all leads and lags. In words, two independent innovations affect the the
level of productivity. The first innovation, εz,t+1, changes the level of productivity itself,
while the second innovation, εσ,t+1, determines the spread of values for the productivity
level.
3.3.3.1 Volatility Shocks, Risk Aversion and Macro Dynamics
Figures 3.9(a) and 3.9(b) show the IRFs to a level and volatility shock to technology,
respectively. The amplification effect of risk aversion is present only for impulse responses
to a volatility shock in technology; responses to level shocks, see Figure 3.9(a), do not
display any sensitivity to the risk aversion parameter. Zooming in on the uncertainty
channel, Figure 3.9(b) shows that that a higher level of risk aversion generates a more
pronounced decline in output, consumption, and hours in response to a volatility shock.
[Insert Figure 3.9 about here.]
We compare the variance decomposition obtained from an economy featuring SV in
productivity (see Table 3.6) with the (Basu and Bundick 2017) demand shock model
and the variance decompositions of the FGRU (2011) open economy model (see Tables
3.1 and 3.3). The latter two economies are characterized by a much stronger effect of
volatility shocks in terms of driving economic dynamics compared with the standard
New-Keynesian model with uncertainty in productivity. For example, when rising risk
aversion in the economy with productivity uncertainty, the variability of output and
consumption due to volatility shocks in productivity increases by 90%. Although these
increases are still substantial, they are below those observed for the FGRU (2011) and
the (Basu and Bundick 2017) economies.24
[Insert Table 3.6 about here.]
To conclude, a careful inspection of the variance decomposition of endogenous vari-
ables shows that the interaction of uncertainty shocks and risk aversion is much more
pronounced when stochastic volatility materializes in shocks to demand or the real in-
terest rate rather than productivity. The explanation is that capital acts as a hedging
instrument to productivity uncertainty. Higher productivity uncertainty today raises ex-
pected output tomorrow, which in turn drives the expected return on capital higher since
Rkt =
∂Yt
∂Kt
. Therefore, although the representative agent optimally chooses to disinvest
today due to uncertainty, the degree to which the disinvestment occurs is tempered by
24In FGRU (2011) the variability of consumption raises by 97% = 1.48/0.75 − 1, whereas in Basu-
Bundick (2017) it raises by 105% = 0.43/0.21 − 1.
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the fact that return on capital investment might be large tomorrow when productivity
is high. As a result, investment declines following the uncertainty shock to productivity
but the effect is much more mild relative to the decline following second moment shocks
to interest rate and preferences. This suggests the source of uncertainty is important in
the class of DSGE models we consider.
3.4 Conclusion
Our study shows that, within the class of DSGE models widely used for policy analysis,
the response of macroeconomic quantities to volatility shocks is stronger for higher level
of risk aversion. IRFs to level shocks are less sensitive to the value of risk aversion. The
effect we document are quantitatively important: after a shock to volatility, the higher
the risk aversion, the larger and more prolonged the decline in economic activity. On
the other hand, these models are much more robust to varying degrees of risk aversion
with respect to level shocks in the economy.
By examining the interactions of risk aversion and volatility shocks in two well known
DSGE models in the literature, we also document that the impact of volatility shocks
is significantly more pronounced in models where uncertainty is directly related to pref-
erences rather than production. Variance decompositions of the (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde,
Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) open economy model and the (Basu
and Bundick 2017) demand shock model underscore a much stronger effect of volatility
shocks in terms of driving economic dynamics compared to a standard New-Keynesian
model with uncertainty in productivity.
Our results could be relevant for policymakers to consider stochastic volatility, and
its interplay with financial quantities via risk-aversion, when implementing fiscal and
monetary policy.
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3.5 Tables
Table 3.1: Variance Decomposition Basu and Bundick (2017) - The Effect
of Structural Shocks when the Discount rate shocks have a time-varying
second moment
This table reports the variance decomposition for the different structural shocks in the model of Basu and
Bundick (2017). First column displays moments obtained from data. Second column: 200 simulations of
the model; third column: TFP shocks only; fourth column: without TFP shocks fifth column: only level
shocks to household discount factor; fifth column: only shocks to the volatility of household discount
factor. Panel A (B) reports the simulation results for a risk aversion parameter equal to 80 (160).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preference Shocks
Data All Shocks TFP only w/o TFP Level only Volatility only
Panel A: γ = 80, Pruning, 200 Replications
σY 1.1 1.12 0.72 0.84 0.44 0.40
σC 0.7 0.81 0.42 0.68 0.39 0.21
σI 3.8 5.00 1.70 4.68 2.74 1.00
σH 1.4 0.83 0.17 0.81 0.46 0.25
Panel B: γ = 160, Pruning, 200 Replications
σY 1.1 1.36 0.74 1.12 0.48 0.82
σC 0.7 0.89 0.41 0.78 0.40 0.43
σI 3.8 5.64 1.87 5.29 3.00 2.10
σH 1.4 0.97 0.19 0.95 0.49 0.51
Table 3.2: IRF Analysis - The Effect of a Volatility Shocks in FGRU (2011)
This table reports displays the drops in macroeconomic variables, and the length of the recovery phase,
for alternative values of risk aversion. Results are shown for both the model by (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde,
Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) and the recalibrated corrected model by (Born and
Pfeifer 2014). “Recovery time” is defined as time (closest quarter) it takes for a variable to revert back
to its unconditional mean. An example: With a risk aversion of 15, it takes 4 quarters for consumption
to revert back to its mean level after a one standard deviation shock in volatility. See also Figure 3.7.
FGRU (2011) BP (2014)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Risk Aversion Largest Drop Time Recovery Time Largest Drop Time Recovery Time
Panel A: Consumption
5 -0.410 1 4 -1.125 1 8
15 -0.896 1 4 -2.757 1 7
20 -1.381 1 5 -4.390 1 7
25 -1.866 1 5 -6.022 1 7
Panel B: Investment
5 -2.183 5 14 -4.230 5 15
15 -3.979 5 15 -9.778 5 14
20 -5.774 5 15 -15.353 4 14
25 -7.570 5 16 -20.957 4 14
Panel C: Output
5 -0.165 10 22 -0.287 10 26
15 -0.321 11 25 -0.753 11 26
20 -0.481 11 26 -1.2209 11 26
25 -0.642 12 27 -1.6886 11 26
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Table 3.3: Variance Decomposition FGRU (2011) - The Effect of Structural
Shocks
This table reports the variance decomposition for the different structural shocks in the model of FGRU
(2011) with stochastic volatility. First column: 200 simulations of the model; second column: TFP
shocks only; third column: without volatility shocks to spread and T-bill rate; fourth column: without
TFP shocks; fifth column: only level shocks to the spread and the T-bill rate; sixth column: only shocks
to the volatility of spread and the T-bill rate.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interest Rate
All Shocks TFP only w/o volatility w/o TFP Level only Volatility only
Panel A: γ = 5, Pruning, 200 Replications
σY 5.25 5.02 5.09 1.10 0.64 0.16
σC 7.60 2.63 4.70 7.11 4.00 0.75
σI 20.63 5.00 12.71 19.90 11.63 3.08
Panel B: γ = 15, Pruning, 200 Replications
σY 5.23 5.01 5.07 1.07 0.57 0.31
σC 7.42 2.73 4.38 6.86 3.53 1.48
σI 20.42 5.42 11.86 19.57 10.54 5.89
Table 3.4: Variance Decomposition BP (2014) - The Effect of Structural
Shocks
This table reports the variance decomposition for the different structural shocks in the recalibrated model
of BP (2014) with stochastic volatility. First column: 200 simulations of the model; second column: TFP
shocks only; third column: without volatility shocks to spread and T-bill rate; fourth column: without
TFP shocks; fifth column: only level shocks to the spread and the T-bill rate; sixth column: only shocks
to the volatility of spread and the T-bill rate.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interest Rate
All Shocks TFP only w/o volatility w/o TFP Level only Volatility only
Panel A: γ = 5, Pruning, 200 Replications
σY 4.59 4.46 4.49 0.75 0.40 0.27
σC 4.39 2.10 2.72 3.81 1.76 1.40
σI 15.51 5.84 9.78 14.19 7.80 5.46
Panel B: γ = 15, Pruning, 200 Replications
σY 4.61 4.44 4.47 0.93 0.38 0.66
σC 5.24 2.40 2.65 4.63 1.20 3.38
σI 19.54 6.68 9.85 18.11 7.11 13.10
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Table 3.5: Variance Decomposition FGRU (2011) when innovations to the
country spread and its volatility are correlated
This table reports the variance decomposition for the different structural shocks in the model of FGRU
(2011) with stochastic volatility. First column: 200 simulations of the model; second column: TFP
shocks only; third column: without volatility shocks to spread and T-bill rate; fourth column: without
TFP shocks; fifth column: only level shocks to the spread and the T-bill rate; sixth column: only shocks
to the volatility of spread and the T-bill rate.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interest Rate
All Shocks TFP only w/o volatility w/o TFP Level only Volatility only
Panel A: γ = 5, No Pruning, 200 Replications, Corr(ur ,uσr )=0.3
σY 5.28 5.02 5.07 1.30 0.55 0.99
σC 7.14 2.53 3.00 6.71 1.91 4.48
σI 24.25 6.38 9.98 23.69 8.61 17.93
Panel B: γ = 15, No Pruning, 200 Replications, Corr(ur,uσr )=0.3
σY 5.28 5.01 5.05 1.36 0.51 1.10
σC 7.49 2.60 3.10 7.06 1.95 5.01
σI 25.55 6.74 9.46 24.91 7.76 20.13
Table 3.6: Variance Decomposition Basu and Bundick (2017) - The Effect of
Structural Shocks when the Technology shocks have a time-varying second
moment
This table reports the variance decomposition for the different structural shocks in the model of Basu and
Bundick (2017). First column displays moments obtained from data. Second column: 200 simulations
of the model; third column: shocks to the volatility of household discount factor only; fourth column:
without shocks to household discount factor; fifth column: only level shocks to household discount factor;
fifth column: only shocks to the volatility of household discount factor.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Technology Shocks
Data All Shocks Preference only w/o Preference Level only Volatility only
Panel A: γ = 80, Pruning, 200 Replications
σY 1.1 4.48 0.08 4.48 2.65 0.21
σC 0.7 3.87 0.26 3.86 2.27 0.22
σI 3.8 6.45 0.91 6.38 3.83 0.19
σH 1.4 0.46 0.18 0.42 0.24 0.10
Panel B: γ = 160, Pruning, 200 Replications
σY 1.1 4.47 0.09 4.46 2.66 0.40
σC 0.7 3.85 0.27 3.84 2.24 0.42
σI 3.8 6.47 0.96 6.39 3.93 0.38
σH 1.4 0.50 0.19 0.46 0.24 0.21
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3.6 Figures
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Figure 3.1: State-dependent (leverage) IR to an uncertainty shock:
This figure plots the empirical impulse responses to an uncertainty shock for different
levels of risk aversion. We measure uncertainty using the VXO. Our proxy for risk
aversion is intermediary leverage (He, Kelly, Manela, 2016). The state variable st takes
values -1 (low risk aversion; blue line with squares), 0 (black line), and +1 (high risk
aversion; red line with circles) units of σ(st). The left column shows the state-dependent
IR of GDP (top), consumption (mid), and investment (bottom) to a volatility shock
are estimated using SLP. The right column reports the state multiplier of the state-
dependent IR of GDP (top), consumption (mid),and investment (bottom) to a volatility
shock estimated using SLP. The shaded areas denote 68% confidence intervals.
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(d) State Multiplier – Consumption.
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Figure 3.2: State-dependent (dividend-price) IR to an uncertainty shock:
This figure plots the empirical impulse responses to an uncertainty shock for different
levels of risk aversion. We measure uncertainty using the VXO. Our proxy for risk
aversion is the log dividend-price ratio. The state variable st takes values -1 (low risk
aversion; blue line with squares), 0 (black line), and +1 (high risk aversion; red line with
circles) units of σ(st). The left column shows the state-dependent IR of GDP (top),
consumption (mid), and investment (bottom) to a volatility shock are estimated using
SLP. The right column displays the state multiplier of the state-dependent IR of GDP
(top), consumption (mid),and investment (bottom) to a volatility shock estimated using
SLP. The shaded areas denote 68% confidence intervals.
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(a) Output and Leverage.
(b) Output and Dividend-price ratio.
Figure 3.3: The Role of the interaction between Uncertainty and Risk aver-
sion in Output:
The solid line displays (log) per capita, real GDP for our sample. The dashed line is
the four periods ahead forecasts from direct regressions that allow for an interaction
between risk aversion and uncertainty. The line with squares is the four periods ahead
forecasts from direct regression with no interaction between risk aversion and uncer-
tainty. Shaded areas indicate NBER recession dates. We measure uncertainty using the
VXO, a well-known and readily-observable measure of aggregate uncertainty. To proxy
for risk aversion we use either the intermediary (equity-based) leverage measure by He
et al. (2017) (see Panel A), or the dividend-price ratio (Panel B).
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(a) Investment and Leverage.
(b) Investment and Dividend-price ratio.
Figure 3.4: The Role of the interaction between Uncertainty and Risk aver-
sion in Investment:
The solid line displays (log) per capita, real investment for our sample. The dashed line
is the four periods ahead forecasts from direct regressions that allow for an interaction
between risk aversion and uncertainty. The line with squares is the four periods ahead
forecasts from direct regressions with no interaction between risk aversion and uncer-
tainty. Shaded areas indicate NBER recession dates. We measure uncertainty using the
VXO, a well-known and readily-observable measure of aggregate uncertainty. To proxy
for risk aversion we use either the intermediary (equity-based) leverage measure by He
et al. (2017) (see Panel A), or the dividend-price ratio (Panel B).
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(a) Response to level shock.
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(b) Response to volatility shock.
Figure 3.5: Impulse Response Function to Preference Shock– Basu and
Bundick (2017):
This figure plots the impulse responses for a one standard deviation shock to the (i)
level, and (ii) volatility of the exogenous process for household discount factors. Impulse
responses are for a one standard deviation shock when the model is approximated up to
third order. To construct these responses, we set the exogenous shocks in the model to
zero and iterate our third-order solution forward. After a sufficient number of periods,
the endogenous variables of the model converge to a fixed point, which we denote the
stochastic steady state. We then hit the economy with a one standard deviation un-
certainty shock but assume the economy is hit by no further shocks. We compute the
impulse response as the percent deviation between the equilibrium responses and the
pre-shock stochastic steady state.
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(a) Technology level shock.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
Output
Baseline RA (5)
High RA (15)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
-3
-2
-1
0
1
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
Consumption
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Quarters
-10
-5
0
5
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
Investment
(b) Country spread level shock.
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(c) Country spread vol shock.
Figure 3.6: Impulse Response Functions – FGRU (2011)
: This figure plots the impulse responses for a one standard deviation shock to the (i)
technology level (ii) interest rate (iii) conditional volatility in interest rate. Impulse
responses are for a one standard deviation shock when the model is approximated up
to third order. The cost of debt is set to ΦD = 0.001. To construct these responses,
we set the exogenous shocks in the model to zero and iterate our third-order solution
forward. After a sufficient number of periods, the endogenous variables of the model
converge to a fixed point, which we denote the stochastic steady state. We then hit the
economy with a one standard deviation to e.g. country spread shock but assume the
economy is hit by no further shocks. The IRFs must be interpreted as the percentage
deviations from the ergodic mean in absence of shocks, EMAS. See Appendix 3.10.1
for a comparison between steady state, ergodic mean, and EMAS in the (Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) model, and Appendix
3.8 for additional details.
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Figure 3.7: Impulse Response Function to a Volatility Shock Interest Rates
– FGRU (2011) vs BP (2014)
Impulse responses are for a one standard deviation shock to the conditional volatility
in interest rate when the model is approximated up to third order. The IRFs must be
interpreted as percentage deviations from the theoretical mean based on the third-order
pruned state space of (Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2017).
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(a) Response to country spread level shock when cost of debt is low.
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(b) Response to country spread level shock when cost of debt is high.
Figure 3.8: Impulse Response Function to Country Spread Level Shock for
different values of the holding cost of debt – FGRU (2011)
: This figure plots the impulse responses for a one standard deviation shock to the
country spread level shock when the (i) cost of debt ΦD = 0.0001, and (ii) cost of
debt ΦD = 0.1. Impulse responses are for a one standard deviation shock when the
model is approximated up to third order. To construct these responses, we set the
exogenous shocks in the model to zero and iterate our third-order solution forward.
After a sufficient number of periods, the endogenous variables of the model converge to
a fixed point, which we denote the stochastic steady state. We then hit the economy
with a one standard deviation country spread shock but assume the economy is hit by
no further shocks.
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(a) Response to level shock.
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(b) Response to volatility shock.
Figure 3.9: Impulse Response Function to Technology Shock – Basu and
Bundick (2017)
: This figure plots the impulse responses for a one standard deviation shock to the (i)
level, and (ii) volatility of technology. Impulse responses are for a one standard deviation
shock when the model is approximated up to third order. To construct these responses,
we set the exogenous shocks in the model to zero and iterate our third-order solution
forward. After a sufficient number of periods, the endogenous variables of the model
converge to a fixed point, which we denote the stochastic steady state. We then hit the
economy with a one standard deviation uncertainty shock but assume the economy is
hit by no further shocks. We compute the impulse response as the percent deviation
between the equilibrium responses and the pre-shock stochastic steady state.
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3.7 Appendix
3.8 Perturbation Methods and Generalized Impulse Re-
sponse Function
This appendix includes a more detailed discussion of the solution of the model and the
explanation of how we compute the IRFs and the variance decomposition of the model.
We refer the interest reader to the (Born and Pfeifer 2014) Appendix for an exhaustive
discussion of the use of perturbation and pruning techniques, and their implications for
simulation and IRFs.
To judge the importance of volatility shocks for business cycle moments, and their
interaction with risk aversion, our analysis relies on perturbation methods. Perturbation
methods were first extensively applied to dynamic stochastic models by (Judd 1998).
Our investigation faces a number of computational challenges. First, we are interested in
the implications of a volatility increase while keeping the level of the variable constant.
We thus have to consider a third-order Taylor expansion of the solution of the model,
see e.g. (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2004), (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana,
Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) and (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and
Rubio-Ramı´rez 2015). Indeed, in a first-order approximation, stochastic volatility would
not even play a role, since the policy rules of the representative agent follow a certainty
equivalence principle. In the second-order approximation, only the product of the two
innovations appears in the policy function. Only in the third-order approximation do
the innovations to volatility play a role by themselves.25
Second, higher order perturbation solutions tend to explode due to the accumulation of
terms of increasing order. For example, in a second order approximated solution, the
quadratic term at time t will be raised to the power of two in the quadratic term at
t+1, thus resulting in a quartic term, which will become a term of order 8 at t+2 and
so on. As a solution, we adopt the pruning scheme described in (Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2017). This pruning scheme augments the state space to
keep track of first to third order terms and uses the Kronecker product of the first and
second order terms to compute the third order term. In contrast, (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde,
Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) and (Born and Pfeifer 2014) use a
IRF-pruning scheme were all higher order terms are based on the first-order terms. Also,
25 Recently, (de Groot 2016) shows that to risk-correct the constant term for the standard deviation of
stochastic volatility innovations (a.k.a. vol of vol) a fourth (or sixth, depending on the functional form of
the volatility process) order expansion is further needed. (de Groot 2016) shows that this risk-correction
has important consequences for the bond and equity risk premia as well as for understanding the welfare
cost of business cycle fluctuations.
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whereas in (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011)
and (Born and Pfeifer 2014) the IRF-pruning scheme differs from the scheme used for
simulations, we use the same pruning for both IRFs and simulations.
Third, computing IRFs in a nonlinear environment is somewhat involved, since the
IRFs are not invariant to rescaling and to the previous history of shocks. To circumvent
this problem, we consider the generalized impulse response function (GIRF) proposed
by (Koop, Pesaran, and Potter 1996). In particular, we follow (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde,
Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011), (Born and Pfeifer 2014) and (Basu
and Bundick 2017), and we start the IRFs at the ergodic mean in the absence of shocks
(EMAS).
Fourth, to judge the importance of risk shocks for business cycle moments, it is instruc-
tive to consider a variance decomposition. However, computing a variance decomposition
is complicated because, with a third-order approximation to the policy function and its
associated nonlinear terms, we cannot neatly divide total variance among the shocks as
we would do in the linear case. Thus, to gauge the relative importance of shocks we
follow (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) and
(Born and Pfeifer 2014), and we simulate the model with only a subset of the shocks. In
particular, we set the realizations of one or two of the shocks to zero and measure the
volatility of the economy with the remaining shocks. The agents in the model still think
that the shocks are distributed by the law of motion that we specified: it just happens
that their realizations are zero in the simulation.
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3.9 The BB (2017) Model: Additional Details
Table 3.7: Parameters for BB (2017) and BB SV Productivity model econ-
omy
This table reports the parameters used for the (Basu and Bundick 2017) model. These are the same
values as in their original papers, and reported here for readers convenience. The high risk aversion
scenario refers to a change in γ from 80 to 160, while leaving all other parameters unchanged.
BB (2017) BB SV Productivity (2017)
β 0.994 0.994
σ 80.000 80.000
ψ 0.950 0.950
η 0.350 0.350
α 0.333 0.333
δ 0.025 0.025
δ1 0.030 0.030
δ2 0.0003 0.0003
φK 2.090 10.000
φP 100.000 100.000
θu 6.000 6.000
ν 0.900 0.900
Π 1.005 1.005
ρπ 1.500 1.500
ρy 0.200 0.200
ρa 0.936 0.936
σa 0.003 0.003
ρσa 0.742
σσa 0.003
ρz 0.988 0.988
σz 0.001 0.006
ρσz 0.742
σσz 0.006
3.10 The FGRU (2011) Model: Additional Details
3.10.1 Steady State, EMAS, and Ergodic Mean
This appendix compares the deterministic steady state, the ergodic mean in the ab-
sence of shocks (EMAS), and the ergodic mean for the (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-
Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) model. It is in fact well know that time-
varying volatility moves the ergodic distribution of the endogenous variables of the
model away from their deterministic steady state. The theoretical mean are based
on the third-order pruned state space of (Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, and Rubio-
Ramı´rez 2017). We use the term EMAS for (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana,
Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011)’s concept of “[s]tarting from the ergodic mean and in
the absence of shocks” (p. 10 in their technical appendix). The EMAS is the fixed point
of the third order approximated policy functions in the absence of shocks. Sometimes, it
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is referred to as the “stochastic steady state” (?, e.g.)]Juillard:Kamenik:2005, because it
is the point of the state space where, in absence of shocks in that period, agents would
choose to remain although they are taking future volatility into account.
Table 3.8 compares steady state, ergodic mean, and EMAS in the original model of
(Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011). Results
for the (Born and Pfeifer 2014) re-calibrated model after correcting for time aggregation
are available upon request.
Table 3.8: Ergodic Mean FGRU (2011)
This table reports the steady-state values, the analytical ergodic means, and the simulated ergodic
means in the absence of shocks for the FGRU (2011) model. We consider also the model with Epstein-
Zin preferences when risk aversion equals the inverse of the elasticity of substitution.
Analytical Ergodic Mean Simulated EMAS
Steady State FGRU FGRU with EZ FGRU FGRU with EZ
Dt 4.00 2.09 2.09 2.55 2.55
Kt 3.29 3.31 3.31 3.29 3.29
Ct 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.89
Ht 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Yt 1.05 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.05
It -0.98 -0.97 -0.97 -0.98 -0.98
NXYt 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
CAt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 3.9: Parameters for FGRU (2011) model economy
This table reports the parameters used for the (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-
Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) and (Born and Pfeifer 2014) models. These are the same values as in their
original papers, and reported here for readers convenience. The high risk aversion scenario refers to a
change in γ from 5 to 15, while leaving all other parameters unchanged.
FGRU (2011) BP (2014)
ψ 5.0000 5.0000
η 1000.0000 1000.0000
γ 5.0000 5.0000
β 0.9804 0.9804
δ 0.0140 1.0560
φ 0.0006 0.0010
α 0.3200 0.3200
ΦD 0.001 0.0006
D¯ 18.8016 4.0000
ϕ 47.8376 95.0000
r 0.02 0.02
ρx 0.9500 0.9500
σx -3.2168 -4.1997
ρr 0.9700 0.9700
σr -5.7100 -5.7100
ρσr 0.9400 0.9400
ηr 0.4600 0.4600
ρtb 0.9500 0.9500
ρσtb -8.0600 -8.0600
σtb 0.9400 0.9400
ηtb 0.1300 0.1300
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3.10.2 Time Aggregation: Moments, IRFs and Variance Decomposi-
tion
(Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) set up their
model in monthly terms, but report results at quarterly frequency.We follow their ap-
proach, and we aggregate monthly output, consumption, investment to quarterly fre-
quency by summing up monthly percentage deviations. The only exceptions are Figure
3.7 and Table 3.4 where we follow (Born and Pfeifer 2014) and we aggregate by averaging
percentage deviations of monthly flow variables.
For the moment computations, the percentage deviations are from the deterministic
steady state. Following (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and
Uribe 2011) and (Born and Pfeifer 2014), the quarterly variables are HP-filtered before
using them to compute the moments.
The variance decomposition in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 are obtained as follows. We sim-
ulate the model, starting from the ergodic mean, for 96 periods. We hit the equilibrium
system with a subset of the shocks. As we mentioned in the main text as well as in
the next section, since the data come in quarterly frequency, we build quarters of data
from the model-simulated variables, and we H-P filter them. The simulations are always
restarted at this point after 96 periods and there is no burn-in. We repeat this exercise
200 times to obtain the mean of the moments over the 200 simulations. Table 3.10 check
the stability of our simulations.
For the impulse response functions in Figure 3.11 the percentage deviations are from the
theoretical mean based on the third-order pruned state space of (Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2017). In particular, we compute GIRFs at the true
ergodic mean using the methods proposed in (Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, and
Rubio-Ramı´rez 2017). However, the analytical expression for the ergodic mean is avail-
able only for the third-order (or lower) pruned state space described in (Andreasen,
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2017). Thus in the second and third columns
in Figure 3.11 we compute the IRFs at the EMAS. In particular, we first simulate the
model, starting from the ergodic mean (obtained analytically using a third-order pruned
state space), for 2,096 periods. We disregard the first 2,000 periods as a burn-in and use
the last 96 periods to compute the IRFs. In period 2,001 we set the realization of one of
the shocks (productivity, the country spreads and its volatility) to one. We repeat this
exercise 200 times to obtain the mean of the IRFs over the 200 simulations. As already
mentioned, since the data come in quarterly frequency, we build quarters of data from
the model-simulated monthly IRFs.
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Figure 3.10: IR to a uncertainty shock:
This figure plots the empirical impulse responses to uncertainty shock. We measure uncertainty using
the VXO. The IR of GDP (top), consumption, investment, and inflation (bottom) to a volatility shock
are estimated using LP (blue line) and SLP (red line). The black dashed line is the original response in
Basu−Bundick (2017). The dashed lines denote the 68% confidence interval.
3.10.3 Local Projection in Basu - Bundick (2017)
In this section we check whether the linear (i.e. β1,h = 0, in Eq. (1) in the text) LP (and
SLP) methodology delivers similar results to the original specification in BB (2017),
which is instead based on a VAR. To this end, Figure 3.10 displays the original VAR-
based response of BB (2017) overlaid with the responses from our LP and SLP estima-
tion. The figure shows that our methodology replicates in a nonparametric setting the
findings of BB (2017) such that higher uncertainty causes declines in output, consump-
tion, investment, and inflation.
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3.10.4 Robustness
In the interest of space we run a battery of robustness tests for the FGRU (2011)
economy. Analogous results for the BB (2017) economy are available upon request.
Simulation Table 3.10 checks the stability of our simulations. In particular it shows
that our results are robust to an increase in the number of replications, and to removing
pruning from the simulations.
Table 3.10: Variance Decomposition FGRU (2011) - Robustness Tests
This table reports the variance decomposition for the different structural shocks in the model of FGRU
(2011) with stochastic volatility. First column: 200 simulations of the model; second column: TFP
shocks only; third column: without volatility shocks to spread and T-bill rate; fourth column: without
TFP shocks; fifth column: only level shocks to the spread and the T-bill rate; sixth column: only shocks
to the volatility of spread and the T-bill rate.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interest Rate
All Shocks TFP only w/o volatility w/o TFP Level only Volatility only
Panel A: γ = 15, Pruning, 1000 Replications
σY 5.29 5.14 5.18 1.07 0.58 0.31
σC 7.60 2.81 4.57 7.00 3.63 1.52
σI 20.81 5.55 12.13 20.01 10.89 6.01
Panel B: γ = 15, No Pruning, 200 Replications
σY 5.22 5.01 5.07 1.01 0.58 0.29
σC 7.18 2.75 4.46 6.57 3.60 1.46
σI 19.01 5.43 11.97 18.11 10.63 5.74
Stochastic Volatility and Perturbation Solution To compute impulse response
functions we have so far relied on a pruned state-space system for non-linear DSGE
models when the model is approximated up to third order, see (Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2017). Moreover, we have followed (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde,
Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) and (Born and Pfeifer 2014) so that
the IRFs we reported so far must be interpreted as deviations from the ergodic mean in
absence of shocks, EMAS.
In Figure 3.11 we investigate the effects of pruning and the order of approximation on
our results.
The first column shows the IRFs obtained when we use the analytical expressions for
the generalized impulse response function (GIRF) derived in (Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2017) for a model that is pruned and approximated up
to third order. These IRFs must be interpreted as the percentage deviations from the
theoretical mean based on the third-order pruned state space of (Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2017). The second column in Figure 3.11 shows GIRF
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Figure 3.11: Impulse Responses to a Volatility Shock in Interest Rates –
FGRU (2011):
Impulse responses are for a one standard deviation shock when the model is approxi-
mated up to third order (first and second columns) and to the fifth order (last column).
The IRFs in the first column must be interpreted as percentage deviations from the
theoretical mean based on the third-order pruned state space of (Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2017). The IRFs in the second to third column must
be interpreted as percentage deviations from the ergodic mean in the absence of shocks
(EMAS).
when the system has not been pruned. Comparing these impulse responses with those
in Figure 3.6, it is clear that our results are not affected by pruning, nor by choosing
EMAS or ergodic mean as the initial condition.
The third column in Figure 3.11 investigates how our results are affected by adopting
a fifth-order (rather than a third-order) solution for the decision rules. We rely on
the approach developed by (Fernandez-Villaverde and Levintal 2016) to overcome the
computational challenges associated with higher than third-order approximation. The
figure shows that fourth- and fifth-order terms are not important for the (Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe 2011) calibration. Clearly,
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there might exist parameter values for which these orders are relevant.
Stochastic Volatility: Alternative Functional Forms Figure 3.12 shows how
our results change depending on the functional form used for the stochastic volatility
process. This analysis is important because the finance and macro literature have largely
specified stochastic volatility processes differently. One can re-write Eq. (3.5) as follows:
εr,t = ρrεr,t−1 +m(xt)ur,t (3.9)
xt+1 = (1− ρx)x+ ρxxt + εx,t+1 (3.10)
where now the innovations are scaled by m (xt), but we leave unspecified the functional
form of m (·). The previous analysis focused on the functional form m (·) ≡ exp (·) and
xt = σr,t. This specification is commonly used in macroeconomics. In contrast, finance
papers like to use m (·) ≡ √(·) and xt = σ2r,t.26 Figure 3.12 shows that our results are
not affected by either functional choice.
The ARCH model (Engle, 1982), and its various generalizations, provides another can-
didate to model time-varying volatility. In a GARCH model, the conditional volatility
is a function of lagged volatility and lagged squared residuals of the level process. Thus,
a GARCH process is not driven by separate innovations relative to the level process. On
the contrary, the specifications we have analyzed so far admitted two innovations, one to
the the country-spread and one to the volatility of the country spread, respectively. In
unreported results, we analyze the IRFs to a real rate shock when stochastic volatility
is modeled with GARCH, and we show that the risk aversion does not affect macro
dynamics when the time-varying volatility has no separate innovations relative to the
level process.
26The benefit of the m (·) ≡
√
(·) specification is that the stochastic process is still conditionally
normal and can be exploited to generate a conditionally log-normal linear approximation that accounts
for risk as in Campbell and Shiller (1988). The drawback of this functional form is that it is possible to
get a negative standard deviation. The functional form m (·) ≡ exp (·) ensures the standard deviation
remains strictly positive but, as pointed out by (Andreasen 2010), has the drawback that the level of
the process does not have any moments.
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Figure 3.12: Impulse Responses to a Volatility Shock Interest Rates – FGRU
(2011):
IRFs are for a one standard deviation shock to the conditional volatility in interest
rate when the model is approximated up to third order. The IRFs must be interpreted
as percentage deviations from the theoretical mean based on the third-order pruned
state space of (Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramı´rez 2017). The first
column focuses on the specification that is commonly used in macroeconomics: the
functional form is m (xt) ≡ exp (xt) with xt = σr,t. The second column focuses the
typical specification used in finance papers: the functional form is m (xt) ≡
√
(xt) and
xt = σ
2
r,t. In all cases, xt follows an exogenous AR(1) process.
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